Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL1615
2006-04-11 11:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

: PSA ASSESSMENT: FARYAB PREY TO WARLORDS, WEAK

Tags:  PGOV ASEC KJUS PREL AF 
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VZCZCXRO9257
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #1615/01 1011119
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111119Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9516
INFO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0544
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2414
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2608
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5814
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1255
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001615 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV ASEC KJUS PREL AF
SUBJECT: : PSA ASSESSMENT: FARYAB PREY TO WARLORDS, WEAK
GOVERNANCE

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001615

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV ASEC KJUS PREL AF
SUBJECT: : PSA ASSESSMENT: FARYAB PREY TO WARLORDS, WEAK
GOVERNANCE

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Afghan and senior international
leaders assess that the roots of conflict in Faryab
province stem both from the rivalry between the two
factions of Junbesh and Azadi, and from the weak
governance that allows those private militias to
operate. In a recent Provincial Security Assessment
(PSA) meeting on Faryab, National Security Advisor
Rassoul tasked the group of Afghan and international
participants to consider three lines of action:
changing elements of the provincial leadership,
putting an end to the factional power struggle, and
strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces in
the province. At the end of the meeting he thanked
the international participants for their
contribution and said the Afghan side would meet
separately to devise a plan. Both the tenor of the
meeting and the GOA ownership of the decision-making
process show how the PSA has matured from its
halting beginnings into an Afghan-led, results-
oriented program. We hope that it will lead to real
changes in Faryab province, and in other provinces
under consideration. End summary.


2. (C) The Provincial Security Assessment meeting
held April 8 reviewed the political and security
situation in Faryab province. NSA Rassoul chaired
the meeting; the Afghan side included Interior
Minister Zarar Moqbil, National Directorate of
Security Director Saleh, Ministry of Defense
Director of Operations Lieutenant General Karimi,
and for the first part of the meeting Faryab
Governor Latif Ibrahimi. International
participation included senior representatives from
Embassy, CFC-A, ISAF, and UNAMA.


3. (C) The various presentations had several common
themes. The two critical issues in the province are
the power struggle between the two factions/parties

of Junbesh (led by Abdul Rashid Dostum) and Azadi
(led by Malik Pahlawan). As Minister Zarar noted,
both parties want to increase their influence, and
both have been able to keep their weapons and
militia forces. NDS Chief Saleh remarked - before
Zarar arrived - that while 200 additional police had
been deployed to the area in the hope that they
would separate and disarm the factions, they have
been ineffective. Zarar in his own presentation
claimed that 80 percent of the police force is
qualified and professional but the patrolmen lack
sufficient weapons and ammunition to carry out their
duties. LTG Karimi reported that in response to an
Afghan NSC request, the ANA has sent a company of
116 personnel to Faryab, based in Pashtunkot, to
improve security. ISAF MG Lane said that ISAF,s
assessment supported the above analysis, but added
that the two factions are also fighting for control
over smuggling routes, and they have been fueled by
feuding at the local level among sub-commanders
trying to gain power.


4. (C) Governor Ibrahimi pointed out underlying
problems that exacerbated the rivalry between the
Junbesh and Azadi, including the fact that the

KABUL 00001615 002 OF 003


province is mountainous and poor with massive
unemployment and very little reconstruction
investment. He argued that the ANP are weak and
their numbers remain inadequate. Moreover, he
commented on the scarcity of qualified professional
police officers, as well as the lack of weapons,
ammunition, clothing, fuel, and even food for ANP
patrolmen. He said that if district leaders, both
administrators and police chiefs, were to be
transferred, they needed to be replaced from people
outside the area - otherwise they would be caught up
in the factional strife. He highlighted the
importance of the DIAG process in Faryab, saying the
central government needed to put direct pressure on
both Dostum and Malik to disband their groups. He
defended the provincial authorities by saying they
have already arrested one notorious commander,
Nadir, and are trying to detain another, Rehmatullah
Rais. (Comment: Nadir is an Azadi commander while
Rehmatullah is Junbesh - the arrest of only Nadir
supports the claim that the governor favors Junbesh.
End comment.)

Lines of Action
--------------


5. (C) At this point, Dr. Rassoul thanked the
governor and then asked him to leave the meeting.
He told the remaining participants that he did this
because in Faryab, weak governance is part of the
problem and needed to be discussed openly without
the governor,s presence. He pointed out that Faryab
is the only place left where warlords are
challenging the authority of the state and are
essentially running a parallel government. Rassoul
specified three lines of action:

1) Governance. The meeting representatives came to
general agreement that the Deputy Governor, Sayed
Ahmed Sayed should be replaced. UNAMA DSRSG
Alexander also proposed the removal of the Chief of
the Border Police, and that was agreed by the group.
There was discussion of whether the Governor should
also be replaced; while he is certainly weak,
doesn,t follow through with initiatives, and openly
favors Junbesh, removing him could destabilize the
province by causing a reaction from Dostum,s
supporters, especially the violent Junbesh Youth
(who had been behind the attack on the PRT last
month). Rassoul said the Afghan side would have an
internal meeting on this question and present their
decision to the PSA at its next meeting.

2) Junbesh-Azadi. Rassoul said that the GOA would
put heavy pressure on both Dostum and Malik and
urged the international community to do the same.
All agreed that the DIAG process was critical for
success. DSRSG Alexander commented that any action
needed to include a justice element. Arguing that
Faryab had previously been quite successful but was
now sliding relatively quickly into a dangerous
situation, he said this was in large part because
those who have challenged government authority have
not suffered for it. There have not been any
consequences for clear crimes committed, he said,
including not only the attack on the PRT, which

KABUL 00001615 003 OF 003


resulted in several deaths, but also recent murders
in several districts and the still-outstanding cases
of murder, theft, and rape committed by Azadi
commander Gul Muhammed Pahlewan. The criminals,
including also Junbesh commander Rahmatullah Rais,
must be brought to justice.

3) Strengthening ANSF. DCM pointed out that any
plan to disband the armed groups in Faryab would
require strengthening the security forces there.
Rassoul agreed, saying that ANA and/or ANP would
need to be reinforced. LTG Karimi requested the
support of the ISAF PRT for the ANA in terms of
training, logistics, and air lift. He said without
PRT support it would be difficult to keep the ANA
there over the full year. Karimi added that as the
ANA continued to increase in numbers, it would
probably be possible to increase the number of
personnel deployed to Faryab. At present, he noted,
one ANA brigade is scattered over nine northern
provinces.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) This meeting shows how the PSA concept has
matured since its inception last winter. The
meeting was focused and constructive, with Dr.
Rassoul presenting a practical list of action items,
soliciting discussion, and then calling an internal
follow-on meeting for the Afghan participants to
make their own decisions as to the best way ahead.
Faryab remains one of the last provinces to be
plagued with the kind of warlordism that was rife
here a few years ago - indeed not much has changed
there since DCM visited Maimana in 2002. Since the
issues of factionalism and weak governance are
clearly a GOA lead, the international community will
wait to see what decisions are made. We will then
support through the PRT and other means available,
such as DIAG.
Norland