THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT: AFGHAN VS AMERICAN BELIEFS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001554

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLA, CG CFA-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2015
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT: AFGHAN VS AMERICAN BELIEFS

REF: KABUL 1544

Classified By: RONALD E. NEUMANN FOR REASONS 1.4(A) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Afghanistan is in flux, fully exposed to a
barrage of new concepts, economic and social change after
decades of war, with a populace that both welcomes many
changes and yet can react negatively and forcefully when new
ideas and events seem to threaten the fragile social
structure and traditions of what is still in most ways a
closed society. Any incident (such as the Rahman apostasy
case) which puts general western concepts of law and
tradition into conflict with traditional Afghan custom should
be viewed within this context. What the West sees as a
much-needed campaign at national reform on many fronts can be
viewed very differently by Afghan stake-holders, and can
generate social and political repercussions. The presence of
a large military peacekeeping force, the Western-instigated
campaign to eradicate the poppy crop that provides or
supplements income for thousands of families, the tension
engendered by a Western-driven military and security campaign
to root out the remnants of the Taliban regime, the barrage
of criticism that hits Afghans -- much of it originating in
the Western press - about Afghan corruption, inefficiency and
poor governance, and a consistent effort by Western advisors
to change the traditional Afghan legal and local government
system are often necessary components of building a
democratic, accountable state. But they all exacerbate the
possibilities of tension. Pushed recklessly, they would
impact negatively on the long-term U.S. mission of creating a
stable Afghanistan that will never shelter another September
11 attack. Success will come with getting the balance right
between necessary principles and unnecessary speed. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Islam - and specifically the Afghan concept of
Islam - is the basis of behavior in Afghanistan, a unifying
factor that is inseparable from the Afghans' sense of
personal identity, their conception of their own place in
society and their understanding of what Afghanistan is. It
is common wisdom that Afghan law is based on the Koran and
Sharia, but less-well understood is what this means in daily
life to the Afghans. It permeates the social structure and
is the basis of social behavior in every way, bringing
political leaders to their knees in daily public prayer,
regulating the way men and women relate socially, defining
dress standards, and affecting what can be printed or viewed
in the media more than in some other Muslim societies. The
Constitution attempts to bridge the traditional Afghan
conservative religious view of law with ideas and beliefs
that are part of a more international norm, but success has
been limited.


3. (SBU) While other religions are given a nod of
recognition in Article Two of the Constitution ("followers of
other faiths shall be free within the bounds of law in the
exercise and performance of their religious rituals"),the
same article strongly affirms the central tenet that "the
sacred religion of Islam is the religion of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan". The Constitution codifies the role
of Islam in very basic terms. Article Three states that "In
Afghanistan, no law shall contravene the tenets and
provisions of the holy religion of Islam". Article Sixty Two
states that presidential candidates should be Muslim, and in
the presidential oath of office specified in Article Sixty
Three, the President-elect must swear "to obey and protect
the holy religion of Islam". Cabinet Ministers swear a
similar oath, and members of the Supreme Court "swear in the
name of God Almighty to support justice and righteousness in
accord with the provisions of the sacred religion of Islam"
as well. Article One Hundred Forty Nine notes that "the
principles of adherence to the tenets of the holy religion of
Islam as well as Islamic republicanism shall not be amended".


4. (SBU) The explicit references to Islam in the
Constitution are not mere words. During the Constitutional
Loya Jirga (2003-2004) where the statutes of the constitution
were discussed and hammered out, this emphasis on adherence

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to Islam was deeply felt and insisted on by Afghan delegates
from every political and ethnic background, who saw it as a
basic part of their personal and national identity.
References to the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, international treaties and
international conventions were included as a nod to the UN
and other advisors in order to make the Constitution more
palatable to the Western tastes, but few of the delegates had
any real knowledge of what was contained in these documents.


5. (C) Recent incidents in Afghanistan reacting to the
alleged desecration of the Koran by American prison guards in
Guantanamo, cartoons ridiculing the Prophet Mohammad printed
in Denmark, articles supporting the right to conversion
written by dissident Shi'ite Afghan cleric Mohaqqeq Nasab,
and most recently the case of Abdul Rahman, a convert to
Christianity from Islam, are well-publicized events that
reverberated through Afghan society at all levels. They
demonstrated the power of conservative Afghan religious
groups to draw attention or incite demonstrations (there have
been surprisingly few so far, though things may be brewing)
when they perceive that Islam has been threatened. They also
serve as a very convenient pretext for people - whether
Afghan or foreign - whose political agenda involves weakening
the central government or causing embarrassment for western
security forces and advisors in the country. Many Afghans
point to hostile foreign hands - usually defined as Iran or
Pakistan - who use such incidents to further their own
policies of disruption, but it is just as possible that drug
lords who are trying to preserve the narcotics-based economy
that enriches them, smugglers who benefit form insecure
borders, families involved in long-term feuds, and a wide
variety of domestic political opposition figures and groups
might be involved. Any incident that seems to weaken the
central government's authority or weaken the reputation of
western security forces can serve the purposes of this wide
spectrum of special political and economic interest groups.


6. (C) The core problem for the USG efforts in Afghanistan
is that such incidents are almost impossible to predict or
forestall. Much of the populace is attached to the religion
of Islam in a personal and very profound way. Levels of
sophistication and religious training vary widely, but the
economic, social, and political reality in Afghanistan means
that many people are easily swayed by emotional charges that
westerners are trying to insult or destroy the country's
religious and social traditions.


7. (C) The conversion case of Abdul Rahman was a flash
point in Afghanistan. The Afghan reaction to the west's
criticism has been generally consistent through all contacts
with Afghan officials and private citizens. Ex-jihadis,
government officials, and Members of Parliament of all
stripes have warned Poloff that this situation, and similar
cases that may arise, are explosive and might irreparably
damage the Afghan-American relationship. While some
expressed their concern in political terms and claimed that
the U.S. forced President Karzai into a dangerous corner,
others couched their comments in a religious manner. It made
no difference whether the Afghan was U.S.-educated and
liberal in world-outlook, or totally unfamiliar with the
west. The latest in these discussions was a friendly but
very pointed warning to Poloff from a well-placed Member of
Parliament (who is very favorably inclined towards the U.S.)
that it might be impossible to control the popular backlash
if another such incident occurred, and that the consequences
would cause a serious breach between the Afghan people and
the U.S. He added that this was not his opinion alone, but
that he had been asked to present it by other MPs to Poloff.


8. (SBU) This does not mean that Afghans want to see a
break in relations. Far from it. They fully support
American assistance in reconstructing the country and
emphasize their gratitude and their need for foreign help
continuously. But there is a line between their heartfelt
request for assistance and what many view as unwelcome
interference in religious practice. The Abdul Rahman case
served to highlight their fear that Afghan traditions and

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faith are in jeopardy.


9. (C) The bottom line: Many Afghans see the western
criticism about Abdul Rahman as an attack on Islam, on the
ability of Afghanistan to govern itself, and on the Afghan
sense of identification as Moslem and Afghan. Those who are
politically sophisticated understand that the issue is an
important one to the USG and to Americans who support
Afghanistan, but domestic emotions in Afghanistan itself may
outweigh this understanding. Afghan friends of the U.S. hope
that official USG reaction to the Rahman case - and others
that may follow - will take this into consideration, because
they fear the domestic, political and popular consequences in
Afghanistan of any repetition of U.S. criticism.
Neumann