Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL1545
2006-04-06 12:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PROGRESS ON UN 1267 SANCTIONS DELISTING REQUEST

Tags:  PTER EFIN ASEC PGOV PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4374
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #1545/01 0961225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061225Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9442
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2403
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2602
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5803
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1244
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001545 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
USUN FOR TESSLER
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PTER EFIN ASEC PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON UN 1267 SANCTIONS DELISTING REQUEST

REF: A) STATE 46197 B) KABUL 1341 C) KABUL 1328

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CRS, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
USUN FOR TESSLER
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PTER EFIN ASEC PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: PROGRESS ON UN 1267 SANCTIONS DELISTING REQUEST

REF: A) STATE 46197 B) KABUL 1341 C) KABUL 1328

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Summary: The Afghan
National Security Council is preparing dossiers on
the 20 individuals for whom they have requested
removal from the 1267 Sanctions list. The UN Team
has also requested information from CFC-A,
particularly with regard to Uruzgan governor Monib,
a reconciled former Taliban whom the GOA is
relying on to bring order to one of Afghanistan,s
unruly provinces. The Afghan side has finally come
to realize the seriousness of the situation
involving Monib, and is acting expeditiously
(including having us fly Monib up to Kabul on April
4) to build an "ironclad" case for removal. Some
information has been shared with the Monitoring Team
but most is expected to be forwarded electronically
within the next few days. Embassy will continue to
facilitate the compilation of supporting documents
and work with all parties to help bring about a
positive outcome. Most importantly, the USG and the
GOA cannot afford to let this case derail
Monib,s vital work in Uruzgan. End summary.


2. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Members of the 1267
Sanctions UN Monitoring Team have spent over a week
in Kabul working with the Afghan National Security
Council and other key players regarding the
delisting request for 20 former senior Taliban
officials. Although the last member of the team
departed Kabul April 4, the Afghan NSC has not yet
completed its file review. It intends to send
additional supporting information to the Monitoring
Team electronically in a few days.

Documents Promised by NSC
--------------


3. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) National Security

Council official Daud Yakub told poloff that the NSC
is preparing the following package to support its
delisting request:

- A cover letter from National Security Advisor
Rassoul describing the reconciliation process
(Program-e Tahkim-e Solh, PTS).

- Detailed information for 15 of the 20 persons for
whom the NSC has requested delisting. (For five
individuals, extant files are insufficient.) The
information will include copies of the individual,s
loyalty oath, statements of acceptance from the
provincial and central government and the PTS
commission, and any other relevant background
information gleaned from public and/or official
sources. (Note: These are the documents requested
in ref a. End note.)

- Dr. Rassoul,s letter will request that all
information remain confidential and not be shared
outside the UN Security Council.


4. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Subsequently, within the
next two weeks, the NSC also intends to submit a

KABUL 00001545 002 OF 004


database with any updated information they have for
the 142 Taliban 1267 listees, including their
present place of residence and occupation as well as
any dealings they have had with the GOA.


5. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) The delay in providing
documentation has stemmed primarily from two
reasons: 1) Nineteen of the 20 individuals in
question were reconciled with the GOA before the
start of the PTS program. For that reason, the PTS
Commission does not have the relevant signed
documents on file, so they have had to be recovered
in other ways; and 2) the background files include
attestations of support from named witnesses, who
could be put at risk if the information becomes
public. Realizing the political importance of
providing as much material as possible, NSC
officials are carefully redacting the files to
remove only the most sensitive witness names and
identifying information for their protection.

UN Monitoring Team Requests
--------------


6. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Separately, Monitoring
Team member Joseph Smith told poloff that they have
found their visit frustrating but hope it will
ultimately reach its goal of collecting the
information needed for the UNSC to make a
determination regarding the delisting request. He
said the Team is hoping to get the following
information for its report:

- NSC materials as described above.

- A non-paper from Coalition Forces Command -
Afghanistan (CFC-A) assessing the security situation
in Uruzgan province and the performance of Governor
Monib since his arrival on March 18 (see para 8
below). (Note: Embassy and CFC-A have agreed that
the fully-cleared paper would go directly to the
Monitoring Team as a Coalition assessment but would
also be transmitted to Washington and USUN via
email.)

- Any releasable information regarding Bagram
Detention Facility Administrative Review Board
decisions for any of the individuals who were held
at Bagram, e.g. Abdul Wakil Mutawakil. (Note:
Smith remarked that while Coalition detention would
be considered a negative factor, a statement by the
Coalition that the individual was released outright
or through PTS, especially with accompanying
documentary support, would turn it into a positive
factor. CJTF-76 assesses than any release of
information would require approval from OSD. End
note.)

- Embassy coordination with the National Directorate
of Security (NDS) for the release of additional
information. (Comment: Smith said the team met with
the head of NDS, Amarullah Saleh, and was told that
NDS would not contribute information to the case
files. This may be a reflection of bureaucratic
tension between NSC and NDS. End comment.)


7. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Smith noted that not all

KABUL 00001545 003 OF 004


the information the Team has collected will
necessarily help the individuals, cases. He said
the Monitoring Team has the obligation to gather as
much information as it can, and leaves it to the
UNSC to evaluate the results.

Documentation Regarding Governor Monib
--------------


8. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) As noted ref b, all
participants are paying particular attention to
developing documentation regarding Uruzgan Governor
Abdul Hakim Monib. Smith explained the legal
decision rendered by the UN Office of Legal Affairs,
which was contained in a letter to UNAMA dated March

24. According to Smith, UNOLA determined that the
UN must cease all assistance to the province of
Uruzgan, with the exception of specific
humanitarian projects provided through protected
channels, a carve-out that is designed to be
extremely limited. UN lawyers also interpret the
sanctions as requiring that the provincial
government should not receive any military or other
assistance, advice, training, equipment, or spare
parts. (Comment: Pending resolution of the case,
which we are confident will result in Monib,s
delisting, we are continuing to support military and
humanitarian projects in Uruzgan without change.
See below para 12. End comment.)


9. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Smith noted that if the
team receives the CFC-A assessment in time, they
will probably make it the centerpiece of their
report. In particular, they appreciate CFC-A and
Embassy concerns about potentially destabilizing
this key province at a time when Monib is showing
early signs of effective leadership - beginning a
process of reversing the damage done by his
predecessor Jan Mohammad, a former Uruzgan militia
commander (ref c).


10. (C/REL NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ) Embassy has met with
NSC officials at several levels to reiterate the
importance of getting Monib delisted, and has urged
the fullest possible compliance with the Monitoring
Team,s requests. Yakub told poloff on Apr 3 that he
wants the NSC case regarding Monib to be "ironclad."
As part of this, National Security Advisor Rassoul
summoned Monib to Kabul on April 4 to review his
paperwork and insure that all the necessary
documents have been properly signed and attested.
(Note: Embassy assisted by arranging Monib,s flight
to Kabul on PRT Air on short notice, escorted by
PRToff and PRT interpreter. End note.) Yakub said
that he expects the documents to be ready by the end
of the week.

Comment
--------------


11. (C/NF) The NSC has been slow to respond to
repeated requests for information in part because it
sees the UN request as an infringement on the
ability of the Afghan government to make sovereign
decisions regarding the best use of the pool of
leadership available to it. There is also lingering
resentment that the 1267 list singles out Taliban

KABUL 00001545 004 OF 004


while leaving untouched former communists and others
who have made life in Afghanistan miserable.
Certainly President Karzai and his senior advisors
are confident that the individuals on the delisting
request are genuine supporters of the Afghan
government and its democratic political process.
Still, having finally realized the importance of
this issue internationally, they are doing their
best to comply, given their limited resources and
capacity. Both the Afghans and the UN team,
however, recognize that political elements at play
make this more than a simple request for
documentation. Not only does this action put
pressure on the already wobbly Dutch and give an
excuse for Russian posturing in New York, it also
shows the weakness of Afghan institutions: for
example, the NSA,s request for all information to be
sent directly to the UNSC and held in confidence
there stems in large part from a lack of confidence
in the willingness - for political reasons - of
Afghanistan,s own UN Mission to support the action.
Thus, parties supporting the delisting request will
need to tread carefully to bring this to a
successful conclusion.


12. (C/NF) Comment cont,d: Regarding Monib, we
pressed for many months for the removal of his
predecessor, including discussions by Secretary Rice
and NSC Hadley with President Karzai. Karzai worked
for nine months to find the person he considered the
right leader to bring Uruzgan under control.
Uruzgan is one of Afghanistan,s most unruly
provinces, the former home of Mullah Omar and still
a Taliban stronghold. Monib,s predecessor Jan
Mohammad had long been one of Afghanistan,s worst
governors. Keeping Monib on the job and reversing
Uruzgan,s rot is one of our highest priorities and
we cannot afford to have the 1267 delisting process
in New York bog down, block, or delay USG work in
Uruzgan while we wait for formal delisting, which we
think is fully merited. Our work on the ground is
simply too important. We will therefore continue to
support the new governor in winning a war. End
comment.
Neumann