Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL1358
2006-03-28 12:24:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF DOSTUM PRESIDES OVER

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER AF 
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DE RUEHBUL #1358/01 0871224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
O 281224Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9207
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2377
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2575
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5753
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1218
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001358 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF

STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB,
S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF DOSTUM PRESIDES OVER
WEAPONS TURNOVER

REF: KABUL 840

KABUL 00001358 001.8 OF 003

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001358

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF

STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB,
S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF DOSTUM PRESIDES OVER
WEAPONS TURNOVER

REF: KABUL 840

KABUL 00001358 001.8 OF 003


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: General Dostum, the paramount
warlord in northern Afghanistan, presided over a
Feb. 23 ceremony in Sheberghan, capital of Jowzjan
Province north of Mazar-e Sharif, during which over
100 of his commanders turned in 2.5 tons of boxed
ammunition and roughly 400 small arms, RPG
launchers, grenade launchers, and other weapons.
Disarmament officials were impressed by the quantity
and quality of the ammunition turned over. Moving
from handing in weapons to disbanding illegally-
armed groups is, however, a longer, more difficult
process. END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) At what ostensibly was a ceremony honoring
the 565 th birthday of an ethnic-Uzbek poet at his
palace in Sheberghan, General Dostum orchestrated a
turnover of a significant quantity of weapons and
ammunition by more than 100 of his Junbesh
commanders to officials from the Afghan New
Beginnings Program (ANBP),the international body
which implements DIAG (Disbandment of Illegally-
Armed Group) as over 1000 people and representatives
of local and international news media looked on.
During the ceremony, Dostum distributed certificates
of appreciation to the commanders, thanking them for
their part in the struggle to liberate Afghanistan
from the Soviets and the Taliban, and in the ongoing
effort to eliminate Al Qaeda in the north.

3. (SBU) Of the 389 weapons turned in, 110 were AK-
47s. The weapons were old and the final report from
ANBP indicated 36% were unserviceable, which hovers
inside ANBPs average unserviceability range of 35-
40%. Significantly, however, nearly all the bad
weapons consisted of old AK-47s only six of the
109 submitted functioned. On the other hand, nearly
all the heavier weapons turned in, including RPG7s,
82mm mortars and recoilless rifles, were operational
and in good condition. Personnel from ANBP and AST
(Ammunition Survey Team) collected the weapons,
which were then transported immediately to Mazar-e

Sharif where they were accounted for, stocked, and
transferred to an ammunition dump at the 209th Corps
s
(monitored by a U.S. embedded training team). The
209th Corps site was selected in lieu of the ammo
dump in Sheberghan, where the weapons might well may
have found their way back to the original donors.

4. (SBU) The weapons turnover was the result of
nearly six weeks of regular meetings and discussions
between PRToff and General Dostum and his
subordinates. After nearly eight months of silence,
Dostum initiated contact with the PRT, indicating a
renewed desire to engage with the international
community (IC) and the GOA. He seems to have
realized how little leverage he had gained in the
interim by refusing to interact with ISAF forces,
and appeared willing to work once again towards
fulfilling GOA/IC expectations of regional stability
and most importantly, DIAG compliance.

5. (SBU) His long silence is believed to be the
result of the Mazar PRTs initial approach to the
Dostum problem, which began with repeated demands
for weapons and culminated in search-and-seizure
re

KABUL 00001358 002.6 OF 003


operations last year. General Dostum has a great
deal of influence across the north, as his militias
and Junbesh political party (from which he nominally
resigned on taking a largely ceremonial posting in
the central government) control the provinces of
Faryab, Sar-e Pol, and Jowzjan, and are thought to
have strong support in Takhar and Balkh. His
decision to halt interaction with the PRT was a
great concern to the north, as Junbesh continued to
project military power in addition to playing a
large role in the appointments process for districts
and provinces under its control. Lacking a clear
channel for communication, the PRT had no
constructive leverage over these decisions and
activities which have a significant impact on
regional security and stability.

6. (SBU) In a meeting with Dostum following the
ceremony, PRToff emphasized the need to build on the
days momentum with subsequent events in other
provinces. PRToff argued the event in Sheberghan
grabbed the attention of the north, particularly the
PRTs there, and Dostum now needed to substantiate it
by similar displays in neighboring provinces by his
commanders. PRToff suggested that given recent
unrest in Faryab and Jowzjan provinces and the
cartoon riots against the PRT in Maimana, along with
the nearly complete political and military power
Junbesh enjoys there, Faryab seemed the logical
choice for the next turnover.

7. (SBU) As a result of his recent activities,
General Dostum expects to bring more development aid
to the north (in addition to garnering more
political power for himself and his party). The
impression among northern Afghans is that they are
shortchanged on development aid that is going to the
restive Pashtun south and east, and therefore they
have less buy-in to the reconstruction process. If
Dostum is viewed as a conduit for bringing in more
aid then the kudos will go to him first, and to the
IC second. Dostums move comes at a time of
increasing unrest in the northern region (i.e., the
cartoon riots, increased number of security
incidents),and an effort to disarm publicly in an
atmosphere of increasing friction between various
competing illegally armed groups may lower tensions
somewhat. The IC would be well served to publicize
more broadly ongoing development programs to remind
the northern people of their continued importance
and draw a link between disarmament, stabilization,
and propensity for development spending.

8. (SBU) COMMENT: As Faizullah Zaki, a Junbesh MP
said, For the last thirty years, every arms factory
in the world has been exporting to Afghanistan.
The sheer quantity of weapons in the region makes
Dostums weapons turnover appear insignificant. The
importance of the event, however, is that it is a
symbol of Dostums willingness to play ball with
the GOA and IC. The benefits of engaging Dostumif
he feels it is beneficial to work with DIAG, DIAG
will happen in the north. If he sees DIAG as a
as a
unilateral threat from an outside force (as it was
initially presented, resulting in his months-long
period of silence with the PRT),hell continue

KABUL 00001358 003.6 OF 003


arming his militias and acting independently. If
Dostum continues to play ball, then the leader of
the largest illegally-armed network in the region
will sanction the DIAG process, isolating and
marginalizing noncompliant illegally-armed groups.
Having Dostum work with the PRT, GOA and IC has
already yielded resultshes been helping defuse
regional tensions through orders to his
subcommanders, for example. The more politically
enfranchised he feels, the less likely he is to
sanction violence coming from his militias. END
COMMENT.

9. (SBU) EMBASSY COMENT: Central authorities in
Kabul have an overall plan for the disbandment of
illegal armed groups that envisions the first five
priority provinces for DIAG to be Takhar, Herat,
Kapisa, and Farah. Factors in the decision making
process included a willing governor, a relatively
vely
stable security situation, and an adequate Afghan
security presence factors that are not yet present
in Faryab. While events such as the one organized
by Dostum are helpful, in that weapons and
ammunition are taken out of circulation, the
ultimate goal of DIAG is the disbandment of the
groups, not simply the handing over of weapons. In
addition, the international community in Kabul views
the weapons handover in Sherberghan primarily as
publicity ploy by Dostum to atone for his partys
involvement in the recent violence in Maimana
(Reftel). END EMBASSY COMMENT.
NEUMANN