PRT/LASHKAR GAH - HELMAND VIOLENCE: CAUSES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001285

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CT, SA/PAB, EUR/RPM, INL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH - HELMAND VIOLENCE: CAUSES
AND PROSPECTS

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Over the past year, as the
insurgency has gained momentum in Helmand province,
security has deteriorated. Causes are varied,
complicated, and intertwined. They include: Some
blurring of tribal/drug trafficking boundaries;
growing Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) strength; the
nexus among drug traffickers, warlords, and ACM;
corruption among law enforcement forces; and the
inability to make much headway in provincial and
district governance. The 2006 eradication campaign,
which began on March 8, has attracted minor, but
persistent attacks. This trend is likely to
continue and possibly increase during the
eradication campaign. END SUMMARY.

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WHAT'S HAPPENED
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2. (SBU) From the PRT's perspective, May 2005
seems to have been a watershed in terms of Helmand's
security. In that month, five Afghan sub-
contractors working on cash for work program were
killed, apparently by ACM. The attack occurred in
the Babaji area of Lashkar Gah district. After that
attack, Chemonics, the USAID contractor for
Alternative Livelihoods (A/L) program, pulled out
and did not return to Helmand until September 2005.
From that time until now, the security situation has
restricted Chemonics' efforts to implement A/L
programs. Also in May 2005, a PRT civil affairs
patrol was hit by a suicide bomber, seriously
wounding two soldiers.


3. (SBU) As in many other areas of Afghanistan,
Helmand experienced a spike in violence during the
run-up to the National Assembly and Provincial
Council elections. Several candidates were killed
during the campaign; it was difficult to find out
the causes of these killings. They may have been
political/tribal in nature. It is also possible
that there were ACM connections.


4. (SBU) Arguably, the most significant security
incident in recent months occurred on February 3.
ACM elements launched simultaneous attacks in
Sangin, Mousa Qala, and Naw Zad districts. During
the clashes, the Mousa Qala district governor was
killed. Afghan National Army (ANA) forces that were
moved to the area have been attacked numerous times
since then. This was the first time that ACM
elements had launched a simultaneous attack of this
magnitude. Since then, government control of
Sangin, one of Helmand's main drug
trafficking/transit areas, has been tenuous at best.
One district chief resigned after only two weeks,
saying that he could not do the job; shortly
thereafter (early March),his successor was
assassinated.


5. (SBU) In Helmand during the period of March 3
to March 17, there were 20 confirmed reports of
"troops in contact" incidents, (including one on a
PRT civil affairs convoy); four rocket attacks;
eight improvised explosive devices; five
assassinations; and three incidents of intimidation

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against public officials. The most gruesome was the
beheading of four ethnic-Albanian Macedonians near
Gereshk, Helmand's second largest city. Several
incidents were related to the poppy eradication
campaign. Military sources expect a higher rate of
security incidents associated with the eradication,
as forces move north into areas that are more
populated and have higher poppy density.


6. (SBU) Over the past several months, we've also
seen an increase in violence towards schools and
public officials. In Naw Zad district, schools have
been closed for months. During a visit to the
district in February 2005, the district chief told
poloff that he could not predict when they will
reopen. In other districts, teachers have been
killed or intimidated into abandoning their posts.
In early March, teachers in Lashkar Gah received a
"night letter" warning them to stop teaching, as
this represented cooperation with the government.
Also in February, a local crew working for BBC
filmed a school burning in Nad Ali district. In
late January, three schools were burned in Nawa
district. Altogether, at least 60 schools (about 25
percent of the total) are closed. (Note: Since a
large percentage of open schools are in Lashkar Gah
and Gereshk, Helmand's two largest cities, the
situation in the countryside is actually more
difficult than the statistics reveal. End note.)


7. (SBU) During regular visits to districts, the
two most common concerns that we have heard are
security and official corruption. That said, there
is also widespread optimism due to the upcoming UK
deployment. This deployment will bring about 2,000
troops to the province. In addition, an ANA brigade
will also be stationed adjacent to the UK troops.
Around the province, citizens consider this good
news.

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WHY?
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9. (SBU) While the May 2005 Babaji killings were
shocking, previous events may have set the stage.
In March 2005, Dahd Mohammed Khan, a powerful
warlord and suspected drug trafficker from Sangin
district, was removed as chief of the National
Directorate of Security. He was subsequently
elected to the Wolesi Jirga. His lack of an
official position locally as well as his election to
Parliament, has probably reduced his influence in
the Sangin area, resulting in the exacerbation of
tribal/drug trafficking issues between the Alozai
and the Isakzai tribes. Also during that period,
the previous governor, Shir Mohammed, implemented a
limited poppy eradication program that reportedly
targeted his enemies and competitors. At the same
time, USAID launched a major Cash for Work program
in Babaji that could have been viewed as a threat by
those opposed to the Coalition and government. In
short, it appears that some of the non-specific but
understood boundaries became blurred, resulting in
rising tensions.


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10. (SBU) Another problem has been the growing
infiltration of ACM across the porous Pakistan
border - from the east via Kandahar and from the
south (Baram Cha district),where Helmand shares a
162 kilometer border with Pakistan. This border is
essentially unguarded and ruled by drug traffickers
and/or the Baluch tribe.


11. (SBU) The nexus of ACM, narcotics trafficking,
and law enforcement corruption also plays a role.
The drug traffickers and ACM elements have common
interests that include marginalizing the government
so that they can carry out their activities with
minimal disruption. There have been unconfirmed but
persistent reports of narcotics moving via police
vehicles and with the help of law enforcement
officials, from the senior to the most junior. Turf
battles also appear to play a role, along with
tribal issues. In late September 2005, the Lashkar
Gah district police chief and 17 other police were
killed in Baram Cha, possibly due to their attempts
to interject themselves into a drug smuggling
operation. In Sangin district, the long standing
animosity between the Isakzai and the Alozai tribes,
along with some apparent blurring of drug
trafficking boundaries, is likely one of the reasons
for the high rate of violence in that area.


12. (SBU) ACM elements also may be exploiting the
lack of governance in the districts. PRT district
visits have revealed that people are generally
disillusioned with the government. They see
themselves as, at best, no better off economically
after 4.5 years of elections and democratic
government. Thus far, the Helmand provincial and
district governments have done little for the local
population. The general perception is that most
government officials and institutions are
endemically corrupt. Thus, it is not difficult for
the ACM to stir up resentment that works against one
of the key goals of the Coalition: extending the
reach of the government.

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COMMENT
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13. (SBU) While the security situation in Helmand
is precarious, the incoming UK and Afghan troops
should have a positive impact. This is the first
time that Helmand will see a significant number of
troops since the fall of the Taliban (the U.S. has
had only a small presence in the province).
Improved security is essential if Helmand is to
develop a legitimate economy and civil society.
Governance, or lack thereof, will remain a
significant challenge for the foreseeable future.
While the appointment of Governor Daud last December
is certainly a good start, other competent and
honest public officials are few and far between.
Developing a viable civil society in Helmand is a
daunting task; doing so is essential if Helmand is
to leave violence and opium behind.

NORLAND