Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL1250
2006-03-22 12:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF: BALKH PROVINCE POLITICIANS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF 
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RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #1250/01 0811208
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221208Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9062
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2335
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2538
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5704
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1177
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001250 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF: BALKH PROVINCE POLITICIANS
DEMAND ATTA'S OUSTER

Classified By: POL COUNSELOR ANGUS SIMMONS FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001250

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND
OSD FOR BREZINSKI
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND
TREASURY FOR D/S KIMMITT, APARAMESWARAN, AJEWELL
REL NATO/ISAF/AS/NZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF: BALKH PROVINCE POLITICIANS
DEMAND ATTA'S OUSTER

Classified By: POL COUNSELOR ANGUS SIMMONS FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Mazar PRToff met with representatives from
four political groups from Balkh Province. The
representatives planned to travel to Kabul to meet with
President Karzai and formally register a complaint against
Governor Atta Muhammad Nur (a.k.a. Ustad Atta) for offenses
ranging from corruption to murder. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On February 23, PRToff met for over two hours with
members of four political parties in Balkh - the Prosperity
Party (Tajik),the Justice Party (Uzbek),the Wahdat Party
(Hazara) and a Pashtun-based party. The representatives
repeatedly stressed that either Governor Ustad Atta must be
replaced or his enemies (including the participants in the
meeting) would be prepared to return the province to a state
of civil war. They claimed that Atta's tenure as governor
had been marked by corruption, abuse of power, and murder.
Their charges included the following: A) Atta personally
planned and financed the murders of 22 political opponents,
including slain parliamentary candidate Ashraf Tamzan; B)
after a regional commander, Shafi, was implicated in a wide
variety of crimes including murder and narco-trafficking,
Atta appointed him the district chief of police for Sholgara;
and C) Atta, through a network of corrupt police,
prosecutors, and other appointed officials, has completely
undermined the rule of law in the province, to the point
where he has alienated the general populace and all major
political groups.


3. (C) The four expressed outrage that Karzai had moved many
governors away from their bases of power, while leaving Atta
in his regional stronghold, allowing him to run Balkh as a
personal fiefdom. When it was pointed out that, were Atta to

leave, Jumbesh might control the entire north, they agreed
that only a neutral governor from another region would be a
proper replacement, exerting a moderating influence on the
increasingly unstable province.


4. (C) The four claim they have all approached both Karzai
and ISAF on separate occasions regarding this issue, but that
no resolution had been forthcoming from either. They now
plan to present Karzai with irrefutable evidence of Atta's
criminal behavior in the form of a recording that captures
him planning an assassination. If Karzai continues to refuse
to act, they claim they will "return to the mountains" and
re-mobilize their respective militias.


5. (C) During the meeting, the four occasionally disagreed on
some minor points, such as where power bases were strongest,
or the degree to which Jumbesh is a destabilizing force in
the north, but all were unified in their resolve to see Atta
removed, and stuck with the collective decision to resort to
force failing a workable alternative.


6. (C) It was pointed out that civil war was not a solution
itself, but rather a failure to find a solution. All agreed,
but felt there was no other choice at this point. PRToff
encouraged the delegates to seek a peaceful solution that
would address their grievances in a constructive way, while
avoiding bringing further hardship upon the Afghan people.


7. (C) Comment: PRT Mazar-e Sharif (MeS) and Embassy have
long been concerned about Governor Atta's record, and some of

KABUL 00001250 002 OF 002


these claims (except the charge of murdering Ashraf Tamzan,
which is widely thought by the international community to
have been the result of an internal struggle) have been
substantiated ealier. The appointment of Shafi to his post
in Sholgara has been of particular concern to PRT MeS, as the
district is a known focus for anti-government activity and
Shafi, if not complicit, is certainly not helpful in that
regard. PRToff believes the concerns should be taken
seriously, as should the threats. While using militias for
political gain is a tactic common in the north, recent
reports of a significant increase in weapons purchases in the
region corroborate some of the delegates' claims. According
to the party representative, the general population is buying
AKs in preparing for what it is seen as an inevitable
conflict between the many factions in the area. While the
reasoning behind Atta's appointment is apparent - to offset
Jumbesh influence, which would otherwise dominate all levels
of politics and law in the north - it seems the cure may be
worse than the disease. Though it may be valuable to
maintain some degree of pluralization in the north, the
suggestion that a neutral governor be brought in is certainly
worthy of further consideration. As the Tajik participant
put it, "Jumbesh runs Jowzjan and Jamiat runs Balkh, how can
Karzai create this situation and not expect war?"

NORLAND