Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL1133
2006-03-16 14:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

GOA PROPOSES AUXILIARY POLICE, REQUESTS USG FUNDING

Tags:  MARR SNAR PREL EFIN AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0061
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #1133/01 0751450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161450Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8916
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEOMFD/MACDILL AFB FL HQ USCENTCOM
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2532
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5690
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0102
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001133 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: MARR SNAR PREL EFIN AF
SUBJECT: GOA PROPOSES AUXILIARY POLICE, REQUESTS USG FUNDING

REF: KABUL 1089

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: MARR SNAR PREL EFIN AF
SUBJECT: GOA PROPOSES AUXILIARY POLICE, REQUESTS USG FUNDING

REF: KABUL 1089

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The Afghan Ministry of Interior
has developed a plan for 9,210 &auxiliary police8 to
supplement the 62,000 policemen authorized for the
Afghan National Police force. It is looking for
U.S. funding to support the plan, at a cost of at
least USD 25 million for the first year. The
Afghans argue that such a plan is necessary to face
the security threat in parts of the country, and
that fielding this force would avoid the formation
of local militias outside the control of the central
government. The request is not linked to specific
concepts for employing or commanding the force nor
is it coordinated with the new, and we think sounder
concept, of creating regional reserve forces. We
think the auxiliary policemen would be essentially
untrained and open to corruption and that a
financial diversion of this size would seriously
damage other programs. We have already recently
accelerated elements of our existing program,
including the fielding of weapons and other
equipment, and will see what more can be done. We
will also ask the GOA for a more coordinated
planning effort to meet immediate security needs.
But we will say also that we have no funding for the
new proposal and that we do not agree to divert the
existing program in this way. The issue is likely
to arise during the Strategic Partnership Talks next
week. Washington needs to respond clearly along the
lines above. End Summary.


2. (C) Embassy and CFC-A representatives attended a
March 15 meeting at the NSC chaired by National
Security Advisor Rasool, with Minister of Finance
Ahady and Minister of Interior Zarar Moqbil
attending. We had anticipated a completely
different subject. The ministers briefed a plan for
the creation of an &auxiliary police force8 for 84
border and vulnerable districts. The plan would
recruit 9,210 contracted police, over and above the
62,000 included in the internationally agreed upon

Afghan National Police (ANP) fielding plan. These
auxiliary police would be locally recruited, go
through 15 days of in-province training by MoI
trainers, and be on a one-year contract. They would
wear ANP uniforms and be paid ANP salaries (post-
reform level of 5,000 afghanis per month for salary
and benefits, approximately USD 100). The contract
would be renewed yearly for as long as the security
situation warranted. The Afghan side called the
meeting in order to obtain USG agreement to pay
salaries and supply vehicles (2 per district),
uniforms, and possibly AK-47s (if not available
through DIAG) to the auxiliary police, on an urgent
basis. They estimated the total cost at USD 25
million for the first year, with sustainment costs
(primarily salaries) thereafter. (Note: OSC-A has
reviewed the figures and has determined that other
costs associated with the program would could raise
the cost to USD 31 million. End note.) We said we
would take the proposal back for review and
discussion.


3. (C) The purpose of the force as presented in this
meeting would be to fill security gaps in areas
where there are insufficient police, either because
the ANP fielding plan is not yet complete and/or
because the 62,000 figure is insufficient for
Afghanistan. In particular, the GOA side cited a
deterioration in security over the two years since
the 62,000 figure was agreed, and said these
conditions require an increased number of policemen
nationwide. The intent is to keep police forces
under MoI control, thus avoiding reliance on tribal
militias. In response to questions about using
regular ANP instead of the auxiliary police, they
said the fielding plan was too slow to meet the
immediate need in many areas and they were concerned
about losing the support of the people in many of
these districts due to a lack of government
presence. They said that as more regular ANP
complete their training and receive equipment, the
auxiliary force could be stood down. (Comment: The
62,000 figure may be worth reviewing (see next
para). However in many areas ANP presence is
insufficient not because of the fielding plan but
because &ghost8 personnel remain on the books as a
way for corrupt police chiefs to line their own
pockets. Ongoing MoI reform is intended to clean up
this abuse and increase the number of policemen
actually present in the districts. Adding temporary
policemen hired directly by police chiefs is not the
right way to solve it. End comment.)


4. (C) In discussing the 62,000-person ANP force,
the GOA reps noted that this was the ceiling agreed
upon by the donor nations and included in the recent
Afghanistan Compact security annex. Minister Ahadi
said he would much prefer it if the ceiling on the
regular ANP were lifted, so that the police could be
funded out of the regular budget, but that since
that seems not to be possible, this is a &creative
way8 of meeting the pressing security need.
(Comment: It might be worthwhile revisiting the
62,000 ceiling, but the present fielding plan for
the ANP needs to be completed before any additional
assessment of security needs be undertaking. End
comment.)


5. (C) Although poloff raised the current plan and
ongoing efforts for the establishment of regional
police commands and rapid reaction forces (reftel)
to fill the ANP security gaps rather than raising an
auxiliary police., The GOA side did not focus on
the question. They appeared to hold the position
that this auxiliary force is the only way to meet
their short-term security need.


6. (C) Dr Rassoul said that the international
community ) particularly the Germans - had not yet
been briefed on the plan, but that such a briefing,
perhaps led by President Karzai, would be the next
step once the funding mechanism had been worked out.
Minister Ahadi stressed the importance of improving
security and suggested that some U.S. funds should
be shifted from other objectives to cover this cost.
Acknowledging that the U.S. might not be able (or
willing) to meet the request, he implied that the
GOA might look at its own budget to see if it could
support the plan by reallocating GOA resources.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) While we appreciate the Afghan government,s
urgency regarding security, there appears to be an
element of panic in this proposal. We are investing
massive resources into rapidly training and
equipping the ANP, and as noted reftel we have
developed a new plan to help counter the immediate
security situation. We have also significantly
accelerated the timeline for equipping the ANP. We
will take another look at our planning to see if
there is more we can do in this regard and whether
we can further speed up what we are doing.


8. (C) What we should not do is divert resources
from the well-designed program for the ANP by
offering to pay and equip over 9,000 poorly trained,
minimally accountable auxiliary policemen. Under
the MoI proposal, these auxiliary police would be
hired by provincial police chiefs, many of whom are
tainted with corruption, and they would not have the
kind of training or background needed to provide
real protection against insurgents, narco-
traffickers, or organized crime. Indeed, it is
likely these efforts would hamper ongoing police
reform initiatives. If there were money to
undertake both the long term training and temporary
fielding of tribal auxiliaries there might be merit
in doing both. But such funds do not exist.
Moreover, delivery timelines for weapons, vehicle,
and communications have already been accelerated and
there is no additional equipment in the pipeline
that could be distributed on short notice. We also
believe that in order for any police reform to
succeed, leadership changes must be implemented
first. Thus, it is far more important to continue
focusing our efforts at reforming the Ministry of
Interior and fielding and properly equipping
relatively well-trained professional border and
uniformed policemen than to be distracted into
supporting an essentially untrained auxiliary force.


9. (C) We anticipate that this issue will be raised
during the Strategic Partnership Talks scheduled for
March 20-21. We urge Washington to make clear that
the USG does not have funds available for this
purpose and that a better approach is to work harder
on replacing corrupt and ineffective police chiefs
and speeding the creation of better trained forces
under the current program. End Comment.

NEUMANN