Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KABUL1089
2006-03-14 08:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

POLICE REFORM: REGIONAL COMMANDS AND RAPID

Tags:  MARR SNAR PREL AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHBUL #1089/01 0730852
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140852Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8854
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2519
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5677
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUERJFA/COMMCEN FT GEORGE G MEADE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0095
C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001089 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL
NSC FOR HARRIMAN/AMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016
TAGS: MARR SNAR PREL AF
SUBJECT: POLICE REFORM: REGIONAL COMMANDS AND RAPID
REACTION FORCE TO MEET NEAR-TERM CHALLENGES

REF: A) KABUL 106 B) KABUL 852 C) KABUL 662 D) KABUL
942 E) KABUL 840

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 001089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, INL
NSC FOR HARRIMAN/AMEND
CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016
TAGS: MARR SNAR PREL AF
SUBJECT: POLICE REFORM: REGIONAL COMMANDS AND RAPID
REACTION FORCE TO MEET NEAR-TERM CHALLENGES

REF: A) KABUL 106 B) KABUL 852 C) KABUL 662 D) KABUL
942 E) KABUL 840

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The GOA has a pressing need for an
Afghan National Police (ANP) that can respond to
counter civil disturbances as well as law
enforcement cases. As foreseen ref A, Ambassador
Neumann and LTG Eikenberry discussed and jointly
agreed to a revised approach developed by OSC-A and
INL. A number of changes in the police training
program will meet increased threats, particular
regional security problems, improve training and
still keep the program focused on its long term goal
of producing an accountable and civilian police
force. One aspect of this approach now accepted by
the Ministry of Interior is to develop regional
command centers as well as a redesigned rapid
reaction force. These will still need resources to
respond to the needs of provincial police but in the
long run they can become more centers of training
and control than force providers.


2. (C) The question of specialized training,
including paramilitary training for both the border
and standby police in high-risk areas, was also
resolved on the basis that it would be threat-based
and defensive in nature. While the security
situation in the south and east means that the ANP
there must be empowered to protect itself against
the lethal elements present there ) insurgents, drug
smugglers, and organized crime - the long-term
objective of the GoA and all members of the
international community is a civilian police force
that can concentrate on community law enforcement,
leaving other security tasks to the ANA. Police
training in the midst of an insurgency is a new
field and we have learned and applied important
lessons to shape the program to the real
environment. It would not be surprising if we still
have a few things to learn that may require further
change as time goes on. We will have to continue to
work with the Germans closely so that they accept

that some actions necessary to keep the police alive
and effective in the midst of an insurgency are
transitional on the road to the civilian police we
agree is the end goal. End Summary.


3. (U) OCS-A under CFC-A command (LTG. Eikenberry)
is the implementer for police training while the
Ambassador has a role in policy guidance. The two
met in late February with key staff from INL, OSC-A,
the Embassy, and CFC-A to review the police training
way ahead. They agreed on the approach and key
factors described below.

Regional Commands
--------------


4. (C) OSC-A explained the concept of regional
commands as necessary to improve the central
government,s command and control over provincial
police and facilitate cooperation between the ANP
and ANA. In a contingency, the regional command
would have the benefit of a common sight picture
(i.e. police and army disposition, location of the
disruption) and the means to effect complementary
action ) civil protection and counter-operations )
these being separate and distinct activities working
to a common end. Ambassador Neumann and LTG
Eikenberry agreed that the regional police
commanders (two-star flag officers) would have the
resources needed to reinforce their position
politically. Otherwise, provincial police chiefs
would be reluctant to give up autonomy, especially
since many of them were closely linked to provincial

governors. MG Durbin indicated that the Regional
Command is a concept still in its early stages )
commanders have been appointed, now we need to build
up their capabilities, staffs, and budgets.
Planners are aware of the need to bolster the
authority of the regional commanders by giving them
access to sufficient resources.

Rapid Response ) Quick Reaction Force
--------------


5. (C) The participants quickly identified the
availability of a police reserve as an important
element available to reinforce the ability of the
regional commander and to respond to crises. MoI,
with OSC-A support, is carrying out a reform that
will combine the police reserves and standby units.
Together they will operate as a quick reaction force
(QRF),consisting of eight battalions - five to be
located with the regional commands and three in
Kabul. Roughly 2,000 ANP would be part of this
force, which could be rapidly deployed from capital
or regional headquarters in case of need. (Note:
GoA Presidential airlift assets could be diverted to
this purpose in case of emergency. CFC-A will
provide additional needed airlift until the GoA has
sufficient capability. End note.)


6. (C) Training and equipping the reorganized
standby force would come second in priority after
the border police (control of the border remains the
most critical GoA need.) Police now assigned to
standby units have been through basic training but
need advanced training at the unit level. This
force, once redesigned and properly trained, will
provide an essential near-term capability for the
ANP, and in so doing will enhance emergency response
capacity ) a growing concern within the GoA. As
such, the timeline is critical, in order to
preclude the Afghan government from reconstituting
local militia forces to meet pressing security
emergencies they fear otherwise unprepared for.
Both LTG Eikenberry and Ambassador Neumann noted the
need to work closely with President Karzai, his
senior leadership, and the Parliament to get their
full support for the ANP.

Regional Variations in Advanced Training
--------------


7. (C) Agreement was reached also on the question of
regional variation in ANP training in order to
respond to security situations in different parts of
the country. In particular, they discussed whether
a need exists for a paramilitary dimension and the
unique training entailed. It was agreed that any
additional training should be clearly sized to the
actual threats to policemen and be defensive in
nature. ANP troops should not be taught offensive
counterinsurgency or high-end paramilitary tactics
at the Regional Training Centers ) any paramilitary
training considered essential to their mission could
be taught by military police and police mentors
based at the PRTs. It was agreed that the long-term
goal of the international community, including the
U.S., is to develop a civilian police force that
whose primary duty will be community law
enforcement. Developing paramilitary skills for the
police in some areas, while essential in the short
run, should not be allowed to undermine this goal.


8. (C) There is concern among many in the
international community, particularly the Germans,
about a paramilitarization of the police force.
While countries recognize the immediate need for ANP
patrolmen to learn the skills needed to protect
themselves, they would like to see an end-state in

which the ANP are sharply differentiated in roles
and responsibilities from the ANA. In executing
orderly, responsive, and complementary actions by
the ANSF, sharply differentiated roles are
essential. As such, all agreed that it would be
helpful if the police program planners could better
articulate this, as well as the long-term goals of
the reform, in a form that could be shared with the
Germans and other international partners to obtain
their understanding and agreement. OSC-A agreed to
take on this tasking. Once we are able to brief a
comprehensive plan (beyond our existing intention)
to transition through the insurgency to a fully
civilian oriented force, Ambassador Neumann
undertook to work on raising the German,s comfort
level with our plans - while recognizing that German
ideological comfort cannot be allowed to hold up
vital training to keep ANP alive in the midst of an
insurgency.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) While reforming a police force as corrupt and
incapable as the ANP will take time, the GoA faces
pressing immediate needs. In recent security
assessments, governors of key provinces such as
Zabol, Paktika, Helmand, and Kunar told GoA senior
leadership that they needed more police, as well as
better equipment and training for the police they
already had (ref c). Recent incidents in Herat (ref
d) and Faryab (ref e) have also brought into high
relief the ineffectiveness of the ANP in some areas.
The focus on developing regional commands and a
fully-trained rapid reaction force should alleviate
some of these concerns, as well as other issues
raised several months ago in ref a. Meanwhile, both
we and the Germans are continuing our programs of
leadership reform and training for both officers and
patrolmen, programs that are vital to the GoA,s
long-term objective of a capable, competent, and
honest police force.

NEUMANN