EREKAT URGING ABU MAZEN TO TAKE TOUGH STAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000795

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OPS CENTER - PASS TO S PARTY, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG PBTS IS KPAL KDEM
SUBJECT: EREKAT URGING ABU MAZEN TO TAKE TOUGH STAND
TOWARDS HAMAS


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a February 22 meeting with NEA DAS
Dibble and the Consul General, PLO Chief Negotiator Dr. Sa'eb
Erekat said that he had urged Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to stand firm against
Hamas. Erekat, who speculated that Hamas could announce the
formation of the government as early as the week of February
27, said that he would also advise Abu Mazen to "fire"
Hanniyah without delay if Hamas failed to live up to the
terms outlined in Abu Mazen's February 18 PLC speech. Erekat
feared an emasculated PA presidency, with Abu Mazen
undermined simultaneously by an empowered Hamas and Israeli
determination to proceed with "unilateral" measures.
Regarding the status of the USG request for the return of the
USD 50 million of U.S. assistance, Erekat said that he
understood the importance of the issue and had conveyed those
sentiments to Abu Mazen. Erekat agreed that Abu Mazen needed
to explain his intentions during the upcoming visit of the
NEA Assistant Secretary. End summary.

Erekat Urging Tough
Stand by Abu Mazen
--------------


2. (C) PLO Chief Negotiator Dr. Sa'eb Erekat described to
DAS Dibble and the Consul General the contents of the
February 21 letter Abu Mazen delivered to Hamas PM-designate
Isma'il Hanniyah:

-- Recognition of a two-state solution.
-- Agreement with the terms of the Quartet Roadmap.
-- Acceptance of "one gun, one authority."

Erekat said that the letter requested that Hanniyah form the
next Palestinian Government on the basis of these terms.
While Hanniyah reportedly told Abu Mazen that Hamas would
study the contents of the letter, Erekat thought that Hamas
would likely offer an alternative program to the one outlined
by Abu Mazen.


3. (C) Erekat speculated that Hamas would require less
than three weeks to form the cabinet, and suggested that an
announcement on the formation of the government could come as
soon as the week of February 27. Forming the cabinet would
not be difficult, Erekat said, asserting that reports of
Hamas interest in establishing a National Unity Government
were a public relations ploy rather than an indicator of
Hamas intentions. Erekat stated that Fatah would refuse to
join a Hamas-led government, but noted the possibility of
some individual defections within the faction. Salam Fayyad
would not join the government, but Mustafa Barghouthi might.
Erekat said that independents like Gaza PLC member Ziad Abu
Amr, who won a PLC seat with support from Hamas, were likely
selections for the next cabinet. While downplaying prospects
of Fatah participation, Erekat noted that the head of the
Fatah bloc in the PLC, Azzam al-Ahmad, was meeting with Hamas
officials in Gaza to discuss the possibility of forming a
joint Hamas-Fatah cabinet. Erekat said that he told al-Ahmad
to request from Hamas a written document outlining its
political program. (Note: Al-Ahmad met Gaza Hamas leader
Mahmud al-Zahar on February 22. According to Palestinian
media reports, al-Ahmad said that Fatah would consider
joining a coalition government provided that Hamas agreed to
the political principles of Fatah and the PLO. Al-Ahmad
indicated that a final decision to join the government would
be made by the Fatah leadership. End note.)


4. (C) Erekat said the West should consider Hamas part of
the larger context of Islamic movements in the region. He
said that he would advise Abu Mazen to maintain a firm stand,
and if necessary, immediately "fire" Hanniyah, on the basis
of Article 45 of the Palestinian Basic Law if Hamas failed to
adhere to Abu Mazen's political program. (Note: Article 45
states that "the President shall have the right to remove him
(the Prime Minister),and to accept his resignation." The
Law does not specify justifications for the PM's removal from
office. End note.) Erekat suggested that an immediate
showdown with Hamas was preferable to a drawn-out situation
that would only weaken Abu Mazen further.

Israel, Hamas Tying
Abu Mazen's Hands
--------------


5. (C) Erekat said that Israel's predilection toward
"unilateral" steps while maintaining limited contact with the
PA would ultimately play into Hamas' hands. While there is
some contact with the Israelis on economic and security

issues, Erekat said that there were no active political talks
between the PA and the senior Israeli leadership. Erekat
reported that he was unsuccessful in arranging a meeting
between Abu Mazen and Shimon Peres in Amman. He surmised
that Israel was in search of a Palestinian "non-partner," who
would accept Israeli unilateral measures. Hamas would also
prefer this situation as it placed minimal pressure on the
movement to recognize Israel and required limited contact
with Israel on quality-of-life issues such as Palestinian
access to basic services, including water and electricity.
Hamas had also shown its capacity to overcome prior
challenges and would likely display adeptness in
circumventing roadblocks put in place by Israel and the West.
Erekat labeled the future relationship between Israel and
Hamas as a "marriage of convenience," noting that recent IDF
operations in the northern West Bank and Gaza focused
primarily on Fatah militants. Meanwhile, Hamas had generally
remained silent in the wake of these Israeli measures.


6. (C) Erekat said that the current situation had deflated
Abu Mazen's spirits. Nevertheless, Abu Mazen was not
considering resigning from the PA presidency, partly to avoid
a political vacuum that would place Hamas PLC Speaker Abdul
Aziz Dweik as interim President for up to 60 days until new
elections were held. Instead, Abu Mazen was banking on the
resumption of permanent status negotiations with Israel to
avoid political isolation. Erekat said that he had tried to
dampen Abu Mazen's hopes for the resumption of these talks,
especially as there appeared little interest from Israel.
Erekat opined that Abu Mazen's challenge in the coming period
would be to maintain credibility; otherwise, he faced the
prospects of the PA presidency becoming more of a figure-head
position.

Erekat: "Abu Mazen Seeking
Reassurance From USG"
--------------


7. (C) The Consul General noted that Abu Mazen was facing
a problem with the USG for failing to respond expeditiously
to the requested return of USD 50 million in U.S. assistance.
Negotiations with PA presidential advisor Muhammad Mustafa
had faltered due to Mustafa's seeming attempts to drag out
the process. Erekat agreed that the issue was serious and
indicated that he had conveyed those sentiments to Abu Mazen.
Despite this problem, Erekat said that the USG should
carefully consider the sort of message it wanted to convey to
Abu Mazen during the upcoming visit of the NEA Assistant
Secretary. Abu Mazen felt abandoned, said Erekat, not only

SIPDIS
by Israel, but also by the U.S. and his Fatah colleagues.
The Consul General responded that Abu Mazen must provide a
clear description of what he intends to do on the political,
economic, and security front once a new Hamas-led government
comes to power. DAS Dibble noted that Abu Mazen would have
to tell us where he is going if he wants us to support him.
Erekat agreed to pass the message to Abu Mazen.

WALLES