MOI DG SALAMAH: HAMAS WILL NOT COLLAPSE QUICKLY

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 000666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2016
TAGS: ASEC KPAL IS
SUBJECT: MOI DG SALAMAH: HAMAS WILL NOT COLLAPSE QUICKLY

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: PA Interior Ministry Director General Ibrahim
Salamah told Poloff and USSC staff during a February 13
meeting that he disagreed with predictions of a rapid
collapse of a HAMAS-led government. Salamah said HAMAS is
capable of enduring international pressure for quite some
time thanks to the support of "outsiders," especially Iran,
and the willingness of Palestinians to endure hardships that
would allow HAMAS to maintain control. Salamah advocated
direct control of all the PA Security Forces (PASF) by the
President's office and said any security role for HAMAS would
lead to "civil war" because of the deep ideological and
personal differences between the Fatah and HAMAS leadership.
Salamah alleged that the UK had opened back-channel
communications with HAMAS and expressed concerns that this
would lead to official contact. END SUMMARY

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HAMAS Will Not Collapse Quickly
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2. (S) Salamah criticized the "crazy talk" emanating from
high-level Fatah officials predicting that the HAMAS-led
government would collapse rapidly under international
political and financial pressure. Salamah said HAMAS would
depend on the capacity of the Palestinian people to make
sacrifices, noting that two Intifadas had accustomed the
population to enduring hardships. Salamah predicted HAMAS
would mobilize local financial resources from zakat
committees (i.e. charities) affiliated with the movement to
provide social services. Likewise, "outsiders" )- Syria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Iran -) will support the movement
financially.


3. (C) Salamah was especially apprehensive about Iranian
support saying, "Iran will not allow HAMAS to fail" because
of its particular strategic interests in regard to Israel.
Salamah said Iran viewed HAMAS, like Lebanese Hizballah, as
"insurance" against an Israeli attack on its nuclear
facilities and said the Palestinian people would "pay the
price" in any Israel-Iran confrontation. Pressed if Iran was
capable of moving the volume of money necessary to maintain
key governmental functions, Salamah replied in the
affirmative, emphasizing Iran's vast energy wealth, but
offered no details on the particular financial mechanisms.


4. (C) COMMENT: In our view, Salamah has not fully thought
through the economic realities that HAMAS will face. Without
tax clearances from Israel or budget support from the West,
the PA will face a monthly deficit of between USD 110 and 130
million. This gap will be hard to close through sacrifice or
zakat, and Iran is likely to face difficulties in moving
amounts this large to the PA on a monthly basis. END COMMENT

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PASF Control
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5. (S) Salamah said there was disagreement between Interior
Minister Nasir Yusif's office and President Abbas regarding
modalities for command and control of the PASF under the new
government. Salamah said the President's office was
reluctant to assume direct control of all the PASF,
preferring to leave some of the PASF under a weakened
Ministry of Interior. Predictably, Salamah who is close to
the current Interior Minister favored an arrangement in which
Nasir Yusif would move to the President's office but retain
his powers over the PASF. (COMMENT: Salamah's primary
objective seems to be preserving Nasir Yusif's role. Our
discussions with the President's office have focused on
preserving control of the security forces, but without a role
for Nasir Yusif. END COMMENT)


6. (C) Salamah was fiercely critical of any plan giving HAMAS
a security role and demurred when asked if he felt President
Abbas intended to show strong leadership on this issue.
Salamah said HAMAS would "turn any security force into an
army, even Civil Defense" (firemen, paramedics, etc).
Likewise, Salamah said the deep personal and ideological
differences between HAMAS and Fatah would lead to a "civil
war" if HAMAS were given any role in security. In support of
this point, Salamah recounted a colorful vignette about how
he had severely beaten senior HAMAS political leader and PLC
member-elect Muhammad Abu Teir with his "own hands" when the
two were imprisoned together by the Israelis during the
1980s. "These people used to curse me when I came to their
homes to arrest them" during PASF operations in the mid-1990s
commented Salamah, implying the HAMAS leadership has similar
grievances with other high-ranking security chiefs.

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Fatah Needs Time to Rebuild
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7. (C) Regarding Fatah, Salamah said the movement needs time
to rebuild in preparation for new elections. Using an Old
Testament analogy suggesting a long-term strategy, Salamah
said )- with no evident irony -) that Fatah would have to
"wander in the desert and prepare a new generation" before it
could compete in elections. Salamah criticized PLC
member-elect Muhammad Dahlan's efforts to assume leadership
of Fatah following the HAMAS victory, describing Dahlan as
irredeemably "corrupted in the eyes of the Palestinian
people." Salamah offered no specifics about leaders he
viewed as capable of leading Fatah, but said that the
movement must begin looking towards grassroots leaders and
rebuilding the movement's role in social services.

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UK Back Channel to HAMAS?
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8. (C) Salamah alleged that the UK had activated back-channel
communications with HAMAS. (NOTE: Salamah is a close contact
of the UK Consulate. END NOTE) Salamah said that Alastair
Crooke, former EU Security Advisor, was in communication with
the HAMAS leadership. Salamah viewed this negatively and
described it as a preamble to more official contact.
(COMMENT: We have seen other reports about Crooke's contacts
with HAMAS, but no indications that he is acting on behalf of
HMG. END COMMENT)

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Quote in Newsweek Article
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9. (C) USSC PAO provided Salamah with an advance copy of a
"Newsweek" article in which Salamah is quoted suggesting that
a Fatah-HAMAS civil war might be preferable to a HAMAS-led
government. Salamah at first backed away from the quote
saying, "I didn't say it exactly as they put," before asking
apprehensively "They aren't going to publish this in
Palestine, are they?"

WALLES