Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM581
2006-02-08 14:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

ABU MAZEN'S OFFICE STRATEGIZING FOR HAMAS-LED

Tags:  ASEC IS KDEM KPAL KWBG PBTS PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHJM #0581/01 0391446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081446Z FEB 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0232
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 6227
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0425
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3121
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2890
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0928
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0054
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000581 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: ASEC IS KDEM KPAL KWBG PBTS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: ABU MAZEN'S OFFICE STRATEGIZING FOR HAMAS-LED
GOVERNMENT


C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 000581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: ASEC IS KDEM KPAL KWBG PBTS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: ABU MAZEN'S OFFICE STRATEGIZING FOR HAMAS-LED
GOVERNMENT



1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Advisor Ghaith al-Omari told
Consul General February 7 that his office is working to
formulate a response to HAMAS's victory in the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) elections. Al-Omari said the PA is
considering a number of ideas to strengthen presidential
control over security and other governmental functions and
preparing a major speech by Abu Mazen to the PLC that will
address key post election issues. Al-Omari argued that "too
quick" a collapse of the HAMAS-led government would give the
movement political cover for its failings, empower hardline
elements within HAMAS and deny Fatah needed time to rebuild
in preparation for new elections. Al-Omari said better
advanced coordination is needed before the next high-level
visit by USG officials and that Abu Mazen will seek specifics
on how the USG plans to support him. END SUMMARY

--------------
Abu Mazen Speech will Address
Key Post-Election Issues
--------------


2. (C) Al-Omari reported that Abu Mazen's office is preparing
a major policy address to the new PLC. While some people in
the President's office are pushing for a "nothing speech," he
-- along with PLO Executive Committee member Yasir 'Abd Rabbo
-- is advocating for a strong speech that would reaffirm the
necessity of continued compliance to international
commitments, delineate presidential and legislative powers,
and set Abu Mazen's political agenda in line with what was
"clearly a vote for change." The Consul General responded
that the international community and the USG, as well as the
Palestinian people, would be looking for a strong message
from Abu Mazen and signs that he intends to show decisive
leadership in the wake of the elections.

--------------
PASF Control
--------------


3. (C) Al-Omari said that the Fatah leadership is looking
into ways to strengthen the President's office, but that Abu

Mazen could not afford to do anything that contradicted the
PA Basic Law. That said, al-Omari opined that Abu Mazen
needed to exercise direct control over all the security
forces. Al-Omari noted that the responsibilities of the
Civil Police were essentially limited to "directing traffic"
and the National Security Force (NSF) was overstaffed and
"basically worthless anyhow." Abu Mazen should concentrate
his efforts on making sure the "strong people" report
directly to him. (NOTE: The future of the Preventive
Security Organization (PSO) is a key issue to be resolved.
END NOTE)


4. (C) In regard to the Palestinian National Security Council
(NSC),al-Omari said the President should appoint security
chiefs to the NSC to balance the influence of the ministerial
members who are likely to be affiliated with HAMAS. (NOTE:
The presidential decree establishing the NSC specifies that
the Prime Minister, Interior Minister and Finance Minister
are all NSC members. END NOTE) Al-Omari said a NSC with the
right composition could function as a parallel Interior
Ministry, ensure the PASF serve the interests of the
President, and bring HAMAS into security decision-making but
in a minority role. He dismissed rumors that Abu Mazen had
decided to appoint Interior Minister Nasir Yusif as an
empowered Presidential Security Chief commenting, "Nasir
Yusif is pushing Nasir Yusif." Al-Omari cautioned that Abu
Mazen's decision on this issue would likely depend heavily on
the USG view.


5. (C) Al-Omari added that Abu Mazen is considering other
measures to strengthen the role of President's office, such
as creating departments to oversee programming and
implementation of the President's orders within each of the
ministries. The departments would have oversight functions
rather than deliver actual services. He added that it was
difficult to get Abu Mazen to make a decision on any of these
issues because of the "dysfunctional" authority relationships
in the President's office saying, "Every day there is a new
special advisor of some sort."

--------------
The One-Year Plan

--------------


6. (C) Al-Omari urged caution on USG efforts to isolate the
HAMAS-led government, arguing that if HAMAS failed too
rapidly it would strengthen the most extreme elements in the
movement and give HAMAS a political excuse for its failure.
Furthermore, Fatah needs time to rebuild and prepare for new
elections. For these reasons, he said thinking in Abu
Mazen's office on a timeframe for HAMAS failure leaned more
to the "one year range."


7. (C) Consul General asked where Abu Mazen's office
expected funding to come from. Al-Omari appeared perplexed
by the issue, saying "perhaps the Arab states," adding that
the Europeans were "eager to find a way to continue funding"
the PA. Consul General replied that any European funding for
the HAMAS-led government would have negative repercussions
because it implied European recognition of HAMAS. Consul
General urged a more realistic look at the PA's dire
financial straits, saying funding to the PA will dry up the
moment the USG "stops picking up the phone" to rally support
for the PA. Consul General commented that al-Omari's
suggested timeframe put the international community in the
politically awkward position of finding a way to "bankroll
the bad guys, without recognizing them, until the good guys
are ready for elections."

--------------
Better Preparation Needed for
Next High-level Visit
--------------


8. (C) Al-Omari described Abu Mazen as frustrated after his
last meeting with A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams saying better
advanced coordination is needed before the next high-level
meeting. He suggested a working-level meeting with Abu
Mazen's representatives at the start of the next visit, so
the President's office has more time to prepare substantive
responses to USG areas of concern. Al-Omari suggested the
USG needs to have a clear message on what type of support it
is prepared to give Abu Mazen, rather than merely providing
"free advice."

WALLES