Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM1985
2006-05-16 16:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

AL-KIDWA ON FINANCES, HAMAS, OLMERT, AND

Tags:  PREL KPAL KWBG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0014
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #1985/01 1361626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161626Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2176
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001985 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: AL-KIDWA ON FINANCES, HAMAS, OLMERT, AND
INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION

REF: A. JERUSALEM 1917


B. EMAIL: WILLIAMS/WILLIAMS/WALLES 15 MAY 06

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001985

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: AL-KIDWA ON FINANCES, HAMAS, OLMERT, AND
INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION

REF: A. JERUSALEM 1917


B. EMAIL: WILLIAMS/WILLIAMS/WALLES 15 MAY 06

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) In May 16 meeting with the Consul General, newly
appointed presidential advisor for diplomatic and political
affairs Nasser al-Kidwa pushed for immediate release of money
in Arab League accounts. He said Hamas had discussed the
idea of a NUG with Abu Mazen, who had warned that any
government that did not accept Quartet requirements would not
be successful. On the upcoming Olmert trip, al-Kidwa advised
the US to make statements of support for the Palestinians
similar to those articulated during Abu Mazen's last visit to
Washington. Al-Kidwa said Abu Mazen would represent the
Palestinians at the UNGA and offered a formula in which Sa'eb
Erekat would be the Palestinian representative at the
upcoming BMENA Education Ministerial in place of a Hamas
minister.

--------------
New Position
--------------


2. (C) Al-Kidwa described his new position as presidential
advisor for diplomatic and political affairs. He expressed
concern about the appearance of a parallel government, and
about the number of advisors proliferating in the Office of
the President. He characterized his assistance as help "for
the time being" and focused on PLO embassies. (Comment:
al-Kidwa commented on the appointment of Rawhi Fattouh as the
Personal Representative of President Abbas (Abu Mazen) with
standard praise, leaving the impression that he thought
himself a better choice. End comment).

--------------
Financing the PA
--------------


3. (C) Al-Kidwa said that financing for the Office for the
President is urgently needed and that Abu Mazen is asking
donors for support. Al-Kidwa asked for US assistance in
assuring possible donors (singling out the Spanish and
Norwegians) that such donations are permissible. Al-Kidwa
argued strongly for immediate release of the funds in Arab
League accounts in Cairo, saying it is one thing for the
international community to discourage donors from giving, but

something completely different for members of the
international community (i.e., the US) to block the
disbursement of money that had already been donated. He said
that only $55 million is present in the accounts and
estimated that Hamas would only be able to collect only
another $50 million in the future. Given current PA operating
costs, he estimated that even a complete transfer would not
significantly assist Hamas and might be worth it in terms of
changing the public debate.


4. (C) Consul General reiterated the US position on the need
for any Palestinian government to adhere to the requirements
set out by the Quartet. He stressed our preference for an
international mechanism that would allow Israel to transfer
clearance revenues, and our opposition to the payment of
salaries. He explained that, ideally, all incoming money -
from Europe, the Gulf, and Israel - would be handled through
this mechanism. Al-Kidwa disagreed with the idea of a single
channel, asking rhetorically whether this was the first move
to "trusteeship?" He said that Arab states, in particular,
would be unlikely to participate in this type of fund, and
that they were likely to point to their donations emanating
from Arab League requirements as a reason.

--------------
Dealing with Hamas
--------------


5. (C) Al-Kidwa thought the Hamas government could continue
for another one-to-two months before reaching a crisis point.
He said part of his work with the Presidency now involves
the articulation of "solid arguments" against Hamas.
Al-Kidwa spoke of the need for a "real National Unity
Government" (NUG),one with a political program and
government negotiated and agreed upon by all factions. On the
"minus side," he observed that any such government would
inevitably include Hamas figures. On the "plus side," he

noted that any successful effort would be blessed by a
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC),and would represent a
significant change.


6. (C) Al-Kidwa related that Abu Mazen had discussed a NUG
with the Hamas leadership in Gaza, and warned them that such
a government would not be successful -- even with technocrats
-- if it did not make the necessary policy changes, including
acceptance of Quartet conditions. Al-Kidwa commented that he
did not believe a "technocratic" government would work: he
did not know where the necessary technocrats could be found,
he did not think such a government would be allowed to
accomplish much, and he observed that the formation of such a
government would allow Hamas to avoid making the necessary
decisions for change. Al-Kidwa said these ideas would be
discussed during the National Dialogue scheduled to be held
May 23-24. He also said the National Accord Document
produced by leading Palestinian prisoners (ref (a)) would be
on the agenda. Al-Kidwa said the prisoner's initiative had
several positive elements; Consul General agreed, but pointed
out that it still did not meet the Quartet's requirements.


7. (C) Al-Kidwa said the "buzz" among the Palestinian
political community posited two alternative explanations
regarding US policy towards Hamas:

-- The US is ready, in some respects, to deal with all
incarnations of the Muslim Brotherhood -- including Hamas --
as a strategic hedge against the role of Osama bin Laden and
other Islamic fanatics; or:

-- The US wants Hamas to fail, "period," because of
interests in the region and concern about the Muslim
Brotherhood coming to power as a substitute for existing
governments.

Consul General pointed out in response that Hamas is a
terrorist organization that has killed Americans, and this
strongly influenced our view of the movement.

--------------
Olmert's Trip
--------------


8. (C) Al-Kidwa said the upcoming trip by Israeli PM Olmert
to the United States would be closely watched by
Palestinians. US views regarding unilateral disengagement
and "final borders" would receive extra scrutiny. He
predicted that, if President Bush were to formulate his
message along the lines of his public remarks during Abu
Mazen's visit last year to Washington, then Palestinian and
Arab audiences could come away with a positive message. If,
however, the US signals that it could live with Israeli ideas
on unilateral disengagement and final borders, then a bad
situation could become much worse. Consul General expressed
his understanding, but also cautioned al-Kidwa that Olmert is
likely to receive a very positive reception upon his first
trip to the United States as Israeli Prime Minister.

--------------
Representation at International Meetings
--------------


9. (C) Consul General raised the issue of Palestinian
attendance at international fora such as the UNGA and the
upcoming May 23-34 BMENA meeting to be held in conjunction
with the World Economic Forum (WEF). Al-Kidwa said the UNGA
was "easy" and that he expected Abu Mazen to represent the
Palestinians.


10. (C) Regarding the BMENA meeting, al-Kidwa said that Abu
Mazen had already taken care of the issue of Palestinian
representation at the Sharm al-Shaykh WEF meeting, with the
assistance of the Egyptians. While FM Zahar had sought an
invitation, Abu Mazen instead decided to attend himself,
along with PLO Chief Negotiator Sa'eb Erekat. Al-Kidwa
suggested that the Palestinians treat the BMENA meeting as an
offshoot of the WEF meeting, and use the same delegation,
perhaps having ex-professor Erekat attend the Education
Ministerial. Al-Kidwa said he would check on the matter, and
in the meantime suggested that we work with the Government of
Egypt to ensure no Hamas attendance.
WALLES