Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM1917
2006-05-12 16:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

PALESTINIAN PRISONERS PROPOSE "NATIONAL ACCORD

Tags:  PREL KPAL KWBG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #1917/01 1321611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121611Z MAY 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2083
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001917 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PRISONERS PROPOSE "NATIONAL ACCORD
DOCUMENT"

REF: OSC:GMP20060511542002 WAFA NEWS AGENCY MAY 10 2006

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001917

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN PRISONERS PROPOSE "NATIONAL ACCORD
DOCUMENT"

REF: OSC:GMP20060511542002 WAFA NEWS AGENCY MAY 10 2006

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The "National Accord Document" put out by prominent
Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails on May 10 has been
placed on the agenda of the "National Dialogue" due to be
held on May 24-25. However, initial tepid Hamas reactions
have exacerbated concerns among Palestinian observers that
the National Dialogue will be largely ceremonial, and may do
little to promote Palestinian unity.

--------------
Document Details
--------------


2. (U) The National Accord Document (full text in ref) is
described by WAFA - the PA's official news agency - as
calling for "Unity, Closing Ranks, and Supporting the PLO and
the National Authority - President and Government." It is
signed by prominent Palestinian prisoners:

-- Fatah - Marwan Barghouti
-- Hamas - Sheikh Abdel Khaliq Natsheh
-- PFLP - Abd-al-Rahim Malouh
-- DFLP - Mustafa Badarinah
-- PIJ - Bassam al-Saadi


3. (U) The document features 18 points of agreement as
representing a minimum national Palestinian consensus; the
following are the most significant:

-- the Palestinian people seek to establish an independent
state with Jerusalem as its capital, on all the territories
occupied in 1967;
-- the right of return for refugees;
-- the liberation of all prisoners and detainees;
-- expediting implementation of the Cairo Understandings of
2005, particularly the entry of Hamas and PIJ into the PLO,
and the role of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people;
-- reiterating the option of resistance, while also employing
all other means of negotiations, political, and popular
activities to end the occupation;
-- drawing up a Palestinian plan for the unification of all
factions;
-- mobilizing Arab and Islamic support for the Palestinian
people;
-- maintaining a balance between the President and the Prime
Minister;
-- ending the "unjust siege" imposed on the Palestinian
people by the U.S. and Israel.


--------------
Reactions
--------------


4. (C) President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) announced his
"adoption" of the document late on May 10, describing it as a
realistic political vision which "to a large extent is in
harmony with what I am thinking of." Sources in the
President's office say he plans to put it on the agenda of
the National Dialogue, which is now set to start on May 24.


5. (C) Hamas PLC member Mushir al-Masri told reporters that
he had not seen the document and said it is too early to
judge its authenticity. He said that Hamas signer Abdel
Khaliq Natsheh and all imprisoned Hamas leaders in Israeli
jails are politically relevant, but that the document had not
been formally approved by the Hamas leadership. He expressed
opposition to anything in the document that might be
construed to represent recognition of Israel. Fatah PLC
member Issa Qaraqi opined that the document represents the
consensus of all factions and would be an acceptable starting
point for the National Dialogue. He took issue with Masri's
points, saying that Hamas needed to reconsider its positions
on a range of issues and that Abu Mazen had asked Hamas
leaders during recent meetings to agree to principles similar
to those contained in the document.


6. (C) Fatah leader and former PLC member Qadoura Faris said
that Hamas would make a significant mistake if it failed to
endorse this document, particularly as it is signed by
important jailed factional leaders. He thought the document

represented a half-way point between all the factions
(Comment: In fact, PIJ included a reservation regarding
negotiations. End comment). He also expressed concern with
Masri's points, saying that hopes for progress in the
National Dialogue are bleak if Hamas is not able to agree to
these principles. Faris, noting Abu Mazen's declaration that
the document would be put on the agenda for the National
Dialogue, observed that the Dialogue would not be worth
holding if Hamas refuses to endorse the document - and that
Hamas would be the party to bear the consequences.

--------------
National Dialogue Update
--------------


7. (C) The PLO Executive Committee, meeting on May 11, agreed
to issue invitations for the National Dialogue to be held on
May 24 and 25. The meeting will be held simultaneously in
Gaza and Ramallah, and under the auspices of Abu Mazen. The
agenda is to include consideration of the current economic
and political situation, national unity, Israeli PM Olmert's
Convergence Plan, and restructuring of the PLO. The National
Accord Document is to be considered under the national unity
rubric.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Prisoners play an important role in Palestinian
society; the support of Marwan Barghouti and other factional
leaders lends increased significance to the document, which
embodies a number of long-standing Palestinian goals. The
document is a positive step in the Palestinian political
context, but it does not meet the Quartet's requirements.
Local media commentary has suggested that its language
regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state on lands
occupied in 1967 could represent a back-door way for Hamas to
accept the existence of Israel. In sum, the initiative could
be a positive development if properly used by Abu Mazen.
Attention now shifts to Hamas' reaction. Palestinian
observers continue to be pessimistic about the success of the
National Dialogue unless and until Hamas is seen to agree to
the principles contained in the National Accord Document.

WALLES