KARNI CROSSING ATTACK: INTRA-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?

S E C R E T JERUSALEM 001704

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2026
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: KARNI CROSSING ATTACK: INTRA-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?

REF: A. USDAO TEL AVIV IS 261608Z APR 06 IIR 6 849 0340

06/MID-DAY KARNI CROSSING ATTACK

B. JERUSALEM 1622

Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) The April 26 attack on the Karni crossing (details ref
(a)) appears to have been the work of the Popular Resistance
Committees (PRC),according to PA security sources and an
April 26 conversation between Consul General and Fatah PLC
member Mohammed Dahlan. The PRC has officially denied any
involvement. Unlike the attacks the same day against the MFO
in the Sinai, the Karni attack was apparently not a suicide
mission, and the attackers reportedly intended to detonate
the explosives in the vehicle by remote means once the bombs
were in the proper position. There were three Preventive
Security Organization (PSO) officers injured in the attack,
but no fatalities among the attackers or on the Israeli side
of the crossing. The attackers are currently in PSO custody.


2. (S) Ref (a) and other sources indicate that the Preventive
Security Organization (PSO),which continues to man the
Gaza-Israel crossings, was instrumental in preventing the
attackers from doing serious damage. The Hamas government
has been rebuffed by President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) in
its efforts to take control of the lucrative border
crossings, as well as an attempt to install PRC leader Jamal
Abu Samhadaneh in a senior Interior Ministry post. Abu
Samhadaneh's appointment was seen by many Palestinians as a
reaction to the elevation by Abu Mazen of Gaza PSO chief
Rashid Abu Shubak to the internal security chief position
within the MOI (ref (b)),and tension has been mounting in
recent weeks between the PRC and PSO/Fatah elements in Gaza.


3. (C) Karni crossing did not open on April 27. On the
morning of April 27, according to Palestinian contacts, both
Israeli and Palestinian crossing personnel began taking up
their positions, thus suggesting that the crossing would be
open for the day. However, the Palestinian security
personnel were slow to arrive, reportedly due to a lack of
progress on efforts to secure additional
reinforcements/security enhancements following the April 26
attack. By the time Palestinian security took their
positions, the Israeli personnel declined to open the
crossing and departed the area.


4. (S) Comments: The April 26 attack appears to confirm
Israeli threat reporting about Karni, a chain which predates
the coming to power of the Hamas government. The attack also
could be related to intra-Palestinian tension; a move against
a PSO-controlled border post by the PRC, leading to damage or
Karni's closure, could be part of an effort by the PRC (and
perhaps Hamas) to undermine the status of Abu Shubak.
Finally, the PSO performed well, but the attack will
complicate efforts to keep the crossing open.

WALLES