Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM1348
2006-04-04 07:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

EREKAT ON THE WAY FORWARD

Tags:  KPAL PGOV IS PREL PTER 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #1348/01 0940754
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040754Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1336
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001348 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: KPAL PGOV IS PREL PTER
SUBJECT: EREKAT ON THE WAY FORWARD


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001348

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2016
TAGS: KPAL PGOV IS PREL PTER
SUBJECT: EREKAT ON THE WAY FORWARD


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles, per reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During a March 31 discussion, Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) member and PLO Negotiations Affairs
Chief Sa'eb Erekat told NEA A/S Welch, DAPNSA Abrams, LTG
Dayton and Consul General that President Abbas (Abu Mazen)
must focus on three areas in the coming months: revitalizing
Fatah, building the PA President's office, and finding a way
to restart permanent status negotiations with the Government
of Israel. Erekat argued that a national referendum on a
framework agreement with the Government of Israel is a means
of moving forward with the Roadmap and undermining Hamas.
Erekat said he viewed the results of the Israeli elections as
a positive development because they showed that Israelis do
not support either continuing the "occupation" or proceeding
further with unilateral withdrawal from the Palestinian
territories. Erekat pushed for USG assistance to strengthen
the Presidential Guard and argued the USG should consider
continuing support for infrastructure projects on a
case-by-case basis. END SUMMARY

--------------
Top Priorities for Abu Mazen
--------------


2. (C) Erekat opened the meeting by saying that Abu Mazen
must make progress on three "parallel tracks" in the coming
months. First, Abu Mazen must take strong steps to revitalize
Fatah in preparation for "what is coming after HAMAS."
Second, Abu Mazen must build capacity in the President's
office, not only by building up the Presidential Guard but
also by building capable economic, political, and
communications departments in the President's office. Erekat
offered the technocrat-heavy PLO Negotiation Support Unit
(NSU) as an example of how these departments would function
and asked for USG assistance. Third, Abu Mazen must find a
way to "move towards an endgame" with the GOI, i.e. restart
discussions of permanent status issues.


3. (C) A/S Welch responded that forcing the HAMAS government
to accept the Quartet criteria or fail by refusing should be

the fourth priority for Abu Mazen. Erekat acknowledged this
point and described his three priorities as supporting that
goal. (NOTE: Erekat later added this to his list of
priorities during a recap at the close of the meeting. END
NOTE) A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams added that Fatah reform is
the issue for which Abu Mazen has the most control and the
USG would be watching closely to see if Abu Mazen chooses to
exert strong leadership in this area. Erekat responded that
no one is more enthusiastic than Abu Mazen about "getting
rid" of troublesome Fatah Central Committee (FCC) members.
In regard to USG support for building capacity in the PA
President,s office, A/S Welch said the USG would need
further details on the proposal before it could offer any
response.

Erekat Offers National
Referendum Idea
--------------


4. (C) DAPNSA Abrams voiced skepticism about conditions for
moving forward with permanent status issues, pointing out
that the USG and international community could not ignore
HAMAS' victory in the PLC elections. Erekat countered that
Abu Mazen had been elected on a peace platform and offered
the idea of a national referendum on "permanent status
parameters" as a means of highlighting the discrepancy
between HAMAS' program of armed resistance and the desire of
the Palestinian people for a negotiated settlement and a two
state solution. Erekat opined that a successful referendum
would create a crisis for the HAMAS government.

--------------
Israeli Elections Are Opportunity for
PA-GOI Negotiations
--------------


5. (C) Erekat gave an optimistic take on the March 28 Israeli
elections saying the failure of Kadima to gain a strong
mandate and Likud's poor performance showed that there is "no
Israeli majority for proceeding with unilateralism or
continuing the occupation." Erekat described the mixed
results as a positive development because further Israeli
disengagement from the West Bank in the absence of
negotiations would be a "reward for HAMAS." Erekat said he
is in touch with his "friends in Labor" and predicted that
they would join the government after extracting concessions
from Kadima on key portfolios and social issues. Erekat
predicted the new Israeli government would eventually proceed
with further West Bank disengagement but added that this must
be done in the context of negotiations.

--------------
USG Support for Presidential Guard
--------------


6. (C) Erekat pushed for USG assistance to strengthen the
Presidential Guard. Erekat emphasized that "when the
confrontation with HAMAS happens" Abu Mazen will need a force
of about 10,000 men that is well-trained, properly equipped
and capable of protecting him. Erekat noted that according
to the PA Basic Law if "anything happened to Abu Mazen" HAMAS
PLC speaker Aziz Dweik would assume the presidency. LTG
Dayton responded that the USG would need further details on
the training and equipment needs of the Presidential Guard,
noting that providing assistance to the PA security forces
would be difficult for the USG at this point. DAPNSA Abrams
added that Abu Mazen should work on convincing the GOI that
strengthening the Presidential Guard is a good idea.

--------------
Support Infrastructure in Jericho
--------------


7. (C) Erekat took advantage of the high-level USG visit to
argue for continued USG support for infrastructure projects
in his PLC constituency, Jericho. Erekat criticized the
wholesale curtailment of USG assistance for infrastructure
projects and argued the USG should consider continuing them
on a case-by-case basis saying, "it makes no sense to treat
the mayor of Jericho the same as the HAMAS mayor in
Qalqilya." A/S Welch responded that the USG had decided not
to focus on infrastructure projects now in order to maximize
pressure on the HAMAS government.


8. (U) NEA A/S Welch cleared this message.

WALLES