Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JERUSALEM1346
2006-04-04 06:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Jerusalem
Cable title:  

SENIOR PA ADVISOR:"WE'RE COUNTING ON THE

Tags:  PREL KPAL KWBG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0029
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJM #1346/01 0940636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 040636Z APR 06
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1331
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001346 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: SENIOR PA ADVISOR:"WE'RE COUNTING ON THE
INCAPABILITY OF HAMAS."


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001346

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE AND IPA; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: SENIOR PA ADVISOR:"WE'RE COUNTING ON THE
INCAPABILITY OF HAMAS."


Classified By: Consul General Jake Walles. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) "Al-Ayyam" editor Akram Hanniyyah told visiting NEA
A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams on April 1 that he expects Hamas
to focus on governing rather than politics or resistance in
the short term, but that he believes the challenge of
actually governing PA controlled areas would prove too much
for the movement. He denigrated the new cabinet members and
said that Hamas still had no real plan or capability to
govern. Hamas is likely to give Abu Mazen room to negotiate
with the Israelis and the U.S., but any resulting agreements
would need to be subject to a national referendum. Abu Mazen
is in the process of appointing special assistants within the
office of the President to help cover significant issues, but
these individuals would not function as a shadow cabinet. Abu
Mazen would maintain charge over the National Security Forces
and would stand-up a body, reporting to the President, that
would control senior officer promotions. However, Abu Mazen
would also issue a decree assigning those forces to the
Interior Minister for specific tasks and missions. Hanniyyah
said that Fatah as a party is making necessary changes
gradually, the Fatah Old Guard is losing influence, the
choice for Palestinians is really only between Fatah and
Hamas, and highlighted the Fatah PLC members as the ones to
watch.


2. (U) Attendees:

Palestinian
--------------

Akram Hanniyyah

U.S.
--------------

NEA A/S David Welch
DAPNSA Elliot Abrams
Consul General
NEA Staff Assistant
PolChief (notetaker)

--------------
Hamas Governance Prospects
--------------


3. (C) Hanniyyah said that there had been an intellectual
"awakening" as Palestinian society came to grips with the
newly sworn-in Hamas cabinet. He said the early focus of
Hamas would be governance rather than engaging in partisan
politics or armed resistance, and described the movement as
having a "lust for power" that would focus on the eventual
establishment of an Islamic state. He thought that Hamas

would never recognize Israel, beyond the current de facto
characterization. Hanniyyah said Hamas would likely cede
dealings with Israel and the United States to President
Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen),but they would ask that any
agreement reached by Abu Mazen be approved in a national
referendum. In the meantime, he saw Hamas as looking for a
four-to-six month grace period as they faced increased
"grilling" from the Palestinian people, the international
community, and from within the movement itself.


4. (C) Hanniyyah denigrated the Hamas ministers, saying they
are an unimpressive collection that seemed to consist mainly
of clerics and sheikhs, with educational credentials not
necessarily appropriate to their ministries. He projected
difficulties ahead for Hamas financing; while Arab League
members had scrambled to send financing to the PA before the
new cabinet was sworn in (thereby avoiding disputes with the
U.S. and other interested parties),it was neither clear
where Hamas would get additional funding nor whether Hamas
truly recognized the scale of the financial problems facing
it. He quoted Hamas leader Khalid Mishael's recent comments
in Bahrain, wherein Mishael described Hamas as having two
alternatives: accepting U.S. and Israeli conditions - which
the movement would never do - or being patient and trusting
that God would provide. Hanniyyah was skeptical, believed
Hamas was being too optimistic, and thought in fact that
Hamas had absolutely nothing to offer the Palestinian people
in terms of governance.


5. (C) A/S Welch and Mr. Abrams previewed upcoming U.S.
statements on assistance to the Palestinian people and our
focus on supporting the people rather than the government.

Hanniyyah was supportive, saying the Palestinian leadership
couldn't openly or officially support such a distinction, but
that it was key to demonstrate that the U.S. and other donors
were not abandoning the Palestinian people.

--------------
Abu Mazen Activities
--------------


6. (C) Hanniyyah said Abu Mazen is in the process of
appointing special assistants within the office of the
President to cover important issues; he differentiated these
assistants from any sort of "shadow cabinet." Hanniyyah
expected about four to five positions to be created, and
noted that foreign policy had always been the responsibility
of the President. He said that Abu Mazen might restore the
negotiations committee, making it smaller than before, but
perhaps including Hamas PM Ismael Hanniyyah or another senior
Hamas official - not to negotiate, but rather to monitor.


7. (C) In response to a query from Mr. Abrams about the
future of the PA Security Forces (PASF),Hanniyyah said that
Abu Mazen would maintain control over the National Security
Forces, but would delegate their operational usage to the
Interior Minister for specific missions and tasks. He said
that Abu Mazen would activate the officers' committee
provided for in the National Security Law, a board that would
approve the promotion of senior PASF officers and thereby
assure their allegiance to the President. Hanniyyah did not
believe Hamas would rush to take over the security portfolio,
nor to absorb their al-Qassam forces into the PASF.


8. (C) Welch and Abrams stressed that the Israelis are
looking for a Palestinian partner that is credible and
effective. Hanniyyah said Abu Mazen is that partner and
that, over the long term, the Israelis would need
Palestinians who would recognize their country and its
borders; he did not believe that Hamas could ever be that
party. He urged that incoming Israeli PM Olmert build a
relationship with Abu Mazen in order to "corner Hamas."

--------------
Future of Fatah
--------------


9. (C) Hanniyyah said that more Palestinians are now seeking
to become members of Fatah, and that he saw slow and gradual
positive change inside the organization. He commended Fatah
members for their discipline in not joining what eventually
became a Hamas-only cabinet. Hanniyyah thought that the
party's "Old Guard" and associated institutions such as the
Fatah Central Committee are losing power, and urged observers
to keep focused on Fatah members in the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) as examples of new Fatah
leadership. He said Fatah is going back to its original
roots, and is also considering the establishment of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a public policy
institute through which to develop policy and an agenda.


10. (C) Hanniyyah stressed the importance of supporting a
renewed Fatah, saying that the poor showing of "third-way"
candidates in the recent PLC elections demonstrated that
Hamas and Fatah are the only real Palestinian parties. He
said that progress within Fatah is being spearheaded by its
younger members and that Abu Mazen welcomed these efforts.
He reiterated the need to watch Fatah PLC activities, and
thought that two potential sensitive areas for Hamas would be
payment of salaries and progress on the issue of Palestinian
prisoners in Israeli jails.


11. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this cable.
WALLES