EREKAT ON JERICHO DEMARCHE, USG ASSISTANCE, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L JERUSALEM 001004

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE; NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MUSTAFA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016
TAGS: KPAL PGOV IS PREL PTER
SUBJECT: EREKAT ON JERICHO DEMARCHE, USG ASSISTANCE, AND
CROSSINGS

REF: SECSTATE 29011

Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Chris Stevens, per reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: PLO Chief Negotiator and PLC member Sa,eb
Erekat told Consul General during a March 9 meeting that he
feared the withdrawal of U.S./U.K. Jericho Monitoring Mission
(JMM) personnel would negatively impact civilians living in
Jericho if the GOI takes military action against the six
detainees or tightens security restrictions on the city.
Erekat urged the U.S. to carefully calibrate humanitarian
assistance to Palestinians to support the goal of
demonstrating HAMAS, inability to govern while minimizing
Palestinian suffering. In regard to next steps with the
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA),Erekat promised to
advocate pragmatism within the PA and make members of the
Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) available to ConGen staff for
preliminary discussions on a second Gaza-Israel crossing.
END SUMMARY.

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JMM Demarche
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2. (C) The Consul General provided Erekat with a copy of the
joint U.S./U.K. letter to President Abbas on the JMM -- the
original was delivered to Abu Mazen,s office on March 8 --
and informed him that the U.S. and U.K. planned to withdraw
their monitors if the PA did not take immediate action to
improve prison security and comply with the Jericho
monitoring arrangements (reftel). Erekat said ending the
monitoring mission was a &bad idea8 and civilians living in
Jericho would likely be harmed by resulting IDF military
action and tightened security restrictions on the city.
Erekat predicted Abu Mazen would likely cave under pressure
to release the Jericho detainees, resulting in IDF action to
kill or apprehend them. Erekat requested USG assistance in
attaining assurances from the GOI that they would not move
against the six detainees if they remained in the prison and
suggested -- with no apparent irony -- one possible solution
would be to move the six detainees back to the Muqa,ata in
Ramallah. Likewise, Erekat suggested ending the monitoring
mission without receiving assurances from the GOI regarding
the disposition of the detainees could be &bad for the
security of the U.S. and Britain8 because PFLP and other
militant factions would likely blame the U.S./U.K. for any
IDF military actions against the detainees.


3. (C) Consul General responded PA non-compliance with the
Jericho monitoring arrangements, failure to provide adequate
security for the U.S./U.K. monitors, and the political
activities of the detainees themselves had made the JMM
&untenable.8 The PA could choose to comply with the
Jericho monitoring arrangements or come to a new
understanding with the GOI regarding the disposition of the
detainees, but the U.S. would no longer stand between the two
sides.

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USG Assistance to Palestinians
--------------


4. (C) Consul General briefed Erekat on the ongoing
interagency review of USG assistance to Palestinians,
explaining that all support after the formation of the new
government would be "narrowly focused" on humanitarian
assistance and channeled through NGOs and international
organizations. Erekat said it would be important for the USG
to emphasize the continuity of assistance to the Palestinian
people, even after USG support for the PA stops. Erekat
asked for &special consideration8 for projects in his
district and plans to build up Fatah-affiliated NGOs as a
part of efforts to rebuild the movement.


5. (C) Erekat urged caution on predictions of a quick failure
by the HAMAS-led government. HAMAS cares little for the
welfare of the predominantly Fatah-affiliated Civil Service,
whose salaries constitute the bulk of PA expenditures.
Erekat emphasized that HAMAS is a &Muslim Brotherhood
organization8 and would not forfeit power easily, especially
if Fatah refuses to give HAMAS an excuse for its failure to
govern. Consul General replied that HAMAS would be hard
pressed to raise the USD 150 million per month needed to meet
governmental expenses, explaining the international community
was pushing for a near-term confrontation with the HAMAS-led
government to minimize Palestinian suffering.

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Crossings
--------------


6. (C) With regard to next steps on the AMA, the Consul
General told Erekat that the USG was anxious to &begin the
conversation8 about opening a second crossing between Gaza
and Israel to create redundancy and facilitate the movement
of goods. To that end, it was important that Interior
Minister Nasir Yusif implement the USSC's draft plan to
augment security measures at Karni crossing. Erekat said he
would forward that message and promised to make Negotiation
Support Unit (NSU) staff available to the ConGen to come up
with ideas on opening a second crossing. While Abu Mazen has
&raised concerns8 about the viability of Kerem Shalom
because of its limited capacity for processing trucks, Erekat
said he would urge pragmatism so that &we don,t punish Gaza
anymore.8

STEVENS