GOI EFFORTS STOKE OPTIMISM FOR POSO PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 009160

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO KVPR CVIS ID
SUBJECT: GOI EFFORTS STOKE OPTIMISM FOR POSO PEACE

REF: A. A. 05 JAKARTA 07558 INVESTIGATION INTO POSO
BOMBING

B. B. 05 JAKARTA 07862 TENTENA BOMBING (SURABAYA)

C. C. 05 JAKARTA 14513 CHILDRENS' BEHEADINGS
(SURABAYA)

D. D. 05 JAKARTA 14783 POSO VIOLENCE CONTINUES
(SURABAYA)

Classified By: Classified by David R. Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary. GOI initiatives spearheaded by the Indonesian
National Police (INP) are moving conflict-ridden Central
Sulawesi toward peace, according to top INP investigators
focused on the area. The arrest of the terrorists behind
many of the violent attacks since the 2001 Malino peace
agreement--including last year's Tentena bombing and
schoolgirl beheadings--are key to their optimism that a new
peace agreement between the area's Christian and Muslim
populations is in reach. The previously shaky relationship
between the INP and the Armed Forces (TNI) was repaired at a
June meeting where they reached agreement on a broader
INP-led strategy to rebuild public support for peace.
Renewed INP attention and recent progress are reason for
optimism; however, GOI attention must remain focused on the
area long enough to smooth over communal tensions before
extremists can launch fresh attacks. End Summary.


2. (C) Recently successful efforts in Central Sulawesi led by
the Indonesian National Police (INP) suggest momentum for
peace is building in an area plagued by over six years of
interreligious communal violence. Embassy contacts in early
July, including INP investigators, point to the May 2006
arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked terrorists
responsible for recent attacks, improved local INP-Armed
Forces (TNI) cooperation, and renewed public support for
peace as reasons for optimism. The INP's Deputy
Investigations Chief and top CT investigator, Major General
Gories Mere, is particularly confident that recent
developments will end the violence and signal a new beginning
for the troubled area.


3. (C) The 2001 Malino peace agreement brokered by now Vice
President Jusuf Kalla ended the larger scale clashes that
killed over 1,000 people from 1999-2001, but sporadic attacks
have continued. The worst attack since the agreement was
signed occurred in May 2005 when a bomb killed 23 people and
injured over 100 in a marketplace in Tentena, Central
Sulawesi (Ref A and B). Moved by the late October 2005
beheadings of three school girls near Poso (Ref C) and
frustrated by slow progress on several other near-by cases,
INP Chief General Sutanto ordered INP CT Taskforce ("Team
Bomb") investigators to Sulawesi in late 2005 to take over
the investigations. In January, the INP stood up the Central
Sulawesi Security Operation Command (KOOPSKAM),a temporary
investigative team led by Inspector General Paulos Purwoko, a
seasoned INP investigator with a good reputation and a strong
friendship with Mere.

Confessions Link JI to Poso Violence
--------------

4. (C) The KOOPSKAM and Team Bomb investigative combo has
been a one-two punch to cracking unsolved cases. At least
three of the JI-linked terrorists arrested in May confessed
to a string of heinous attacks, including last year's
schoolgirl beheadings and Tentena market bombing. Embassy
contacts have identified the main suspects as Hasanudin (aka
Hamza),Lilik Purwanto (aka Haris),and Irwanto Irano (aka
Irwan). The INP reportedly transferred the suspects to
Jakarta in early July and announced that they expected the
trial process to begin shortly.


5. (C) The INP released portions of the suspects' videotaped
confessions to the local media in May, and we later obtained
a copy from Nasir Abas, a reformed ex-JI Mantiqi III head who
now works side-by-side with INP CT investigators. In the
video, each suspect separately described in detail his
involvement in several of the attacks, uniformly citing
revenge for Christian attacks on Muslims and government
inaction as their driving motivation. According to local JI
expert Sidney Jones, who has extensively researched militant
networks in Sulawesi, the three suspects are listed as JI
members in documents uncovered by the INP during the 2003
arrest of Achmad Roihan (aka Sa'ad, Mat Ucang, et al),deputy
of Mantiqi II under Abdullah Anshori (aka Abu Fatih).
Confirming their JI ties, Abas told us he knew them from his

JAKARTA 00009160 002 OF 003


days at JI camps in the Southern Philippines, and later as a
mantiqi leader. Under INP direction, Abas met with the three
suspects separately for several hours after their arrest and
convinced them to cooperate with authorities, leading to the
taped confessions.


6. (C) We have pieced together the following information on
the suspects from media reports and Embassy contacts:

-- Hasanudin (aka Hamzah) was arrested May 8 in Poso. Since
October 2002, he headed JI's Poso wakalah. Hasanudin
previously had spent several years in the Southern
Philippines at JI's Camp Hudaibiyah. He is married to the
daughter of Adnan Arsal (also seen as Arsel or Arsol),a well
known Sulawesi Muslim radical with ties to the violence
there. The INP interrogation of Ustadz Sahal (also Sa'al),a
teacher at Arsal's pesantran, Al Amanah, led the INP to
Hasanudin. As demonstrated in his taped confession,
Hasanudin is well spoken and fluent in jihadist rhetoric. He
is suspected of being the mastermind behind at least most of
the attacks.

-- Lilik Purwanto (aka Haris) was arrested May 5 in Tolitoli.
He is one of the operational planners in the JI Poso
wakalah. He is a suspect in the May 2004 assassination of
GOI CT prosecutor Feri Silalahi, the July, 2004 assassination
of Reverend Susianti Tinulele, and the November 2004
beheading of a Christian village chief suspected of having
been a police informant and embezzling government refugee
assistance. He also may have participated in the murder of
Iwayan Sumaryasa with Ipung and Mhd Yusuf, both of whom were
sentenced to nine years in early July. He is originally from
Sulawesi, and his confession suggests he has been deeply and
personally affected by large-scale Christian-Muslim communal
violence in the past.

-- Irwanto Irano (aka Irwan) was arrested May 5 with Haris in
Tolitoli. He is a suspect in the 2004 Susianti
assassination, the 2005 Tentena bombing, and the 2005
schoolgirl beheadings. Like Haris, Irwan is also from
Sulawesi and likewise personally justified his attacks as
vengeance for earlier communal violence.


7. (C) Other suspects arrested by the INP in Sulawesi in
recent months include Taufik (aka Opik) and Jendra (aka
Rahmat, Asrudin). Taufik was arrested May 8 in Palu and is
suspected of involvement in the July 2004 shooting of Helmi
Tobiling, the wife of a TNI soldier assigned to Sulawesi, and
the schoolgirl beheadings. Jendra was among those arrested
May 5 in Tolitoli and is also a suspect in the Helmi murder.
Abas told us that INP investigators had the names of other
suspects tied to the attacks and planned more arrests in July
and August. Mere privately explained to us in early June
that an INP informant close to the JI-linked Sulawesi
militant group Anak Tanah Runtuh (ATR) had agreed to assist
the INP in arresting at least an additional five suspects
involved in the schoolgirl beheadings and Tentena bombing.
Mere said in mid-July that Basri, a Javanese JI member
associated with ATR, topped the INP's wanted list in Central
Sulawesi. Jones told us that approximately 15 out of ATR's
estimated 20 active members remained at large.


8. (C) The renewed INP activity in Central Sulawesi since
January has frightened the area's concentration of militants,
according to private comments to us by top INP investigator
Benny Mamoto. He said INP information suggested many
jihadists in Sulawesi had recently returned to their homes
elsewhere in Indonesia. Also, many of the radical ustadz
with known links to JI and its Al Mukmin pesantran in Solo,
had abandoned their teaching positions in Sulawesi and
returned to Central Java to lie low. In further
developments, Mamoto told us that Adnan Arsal, who is one of
the more radical voices in that area, was publicly
embarrassed by his son-in-law's publicized confession and had
lost some of his charisma and grassroots influence. Despite
Arsal's participation in the 2001 peace accords and his joint
statements with Christian leaders condemning specific
attacks, Mere told us July 14, the INP believed Arsal was
involved in orchestrating much of the violence and social
friction but that the INP had not been able to build a case
against him. Mere compared Arsal's role in the Sulawesi
conflict with the role of JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir in planting the seeds of conflict.

INP's Game Plan
--------------

JAKARTA 00009160 003 OF 003



9. (C) Mere, who is originally from Sulawesi, understands the
need to gain public grassroots involvement and told us that
the INP's current objective was to use the arrest of those
responsible for the recent violence to convince local leaders
that peace was in reach. The INP still felt the sting of the
botched attempt in April to arrest suspected Tentena bomber
Taufiq Belaga (also Bulaga),when angry villagers had chased
off the police and set fire to their motorcycles, an
experience the INP did not want to repeat, Mere noted.
(Note: The INP told us previously that the two policemen were
local police assigned to surveil the suspect, not make an
arrest.)


10. (C) Mere took an important initial step when he reached
out to soothe strained relations between INP and Indonesian
military (TNI) leaders at a June 25 meeting in Poso. Mere
said militant groups have previously used disinformation to
pit the TNI and INP against each other. The new regional INP
chief joined Mere at the meeting, as did Team Bomb Commander
Surya Dharma and Nasir Abas, to brief TNI on the details and
significance of the arrests. According to Abas, both TNI and
INP leaders agreed to seek public grassroots commitment to
peace by meeting with local officials, religious leaders, and
other influential figures in the conflict area to explain the
arrests and urge them to actively promote cooperation with
the authorities. Once the INP is confident they have gained
broader public support, a point Mere optimistically expects
to reach in the coming weeks, the INP will move to arrest the
additional suspects.


11. (C) Mamoto described to us an even more ambitious and
longer term INP plan that includes a new peace agreement
among the conflict area's various groups, reviving the
economy, and bringing in moderate Islamic ustadz to
neutralize the influence of radical and jihadist teachings,
like those of JI. Reaching beyond the typical law
enforcement purview, Mere told us the INP continued to seek
the support of other agencies under the Coordinating Ministry
for Politics, Law, and Security, and had made direct appeals
to Vice President Yusuf Kalla. Mere said he had briefed
senior GOI officials several times and received widespread
agreement on the INP's recommendations, but so far had seen
little to no action.


12. (C) Despite some intricate connections among jihadist
networks involved in the conflict, lack of a unified front
among the hodgepodge of radical elements there may work in
the INP's favor. According to Jones, the noticeable absence
of a JI chain of command beyond the wakalah in these recent
JI-linked cases supports the theory that the JI organization
is less hierarchical than before and that at least some JI
cells operate with significant autonomy. INP investigators
hold similar views and told us they seek to exploit this
condition to further divide and defeat the remaining
extremists.

COMMENT
--------------

13. (C) The GOI decision not to renew the KOOPSKAM charter
when it expired on July 3 was a testament to their confidence
that authorities can maintain the current advantage.
However, despite INP optimism, the authorities face an
enduring legacy of violence, and the GOI's attention span has
often been too short to resolve the underlying frictions.
Although area's communities stand united against corruption,
particularly that involving humanitarian aid for those
displaced by the conflict, emotions on both sides run deep
and potential sources of friction remain. Broad economic
disparities largely mirror religious fault lines, with the
less prosperous Muslim communities lagging behind. Many of
the area's Muslims arrived via the GOI's transmigration
program from more populated islands, like Java and Madura. A
proposal to create a new province in the area, if it comes to
fruition over the next year, may further raise tensions as
religious groups seek to balance representation. As long as
the issues remain starkly defined in Christian-versus-Muslim,
Central Sulawesi likely will continue to attract the
attention of radical Islamists outside of Sulawesi eager to
fan the flames.

PASCOE