Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA8506
2006-07-06 10:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

YUDHOYONO AND HOWARD BURY THE HATCHET IN BATAM

Tags:  PREL PTER AS ID 
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OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #8506/01 1871019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061019Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6876
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9696
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3179
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA 0073
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 9887
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0937
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE 0426
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0433
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY 0752
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 008506 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER AS ID
SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO AND HOWARD BURY THE HATCHET IN BATAM

REF: A. CANBERRA 941 (AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS ON
THE MEND)

B. JAKARTA 4464 (AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM GRANT)

JAKARTA 00008506 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charles N. Silver, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission. Reas
on: 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 008506

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER AS ID
SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO AND HOWARD BURY THE HATCHET IN BATAM

REF: A. CANBERRA 941 (AUSTRALIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS ON
THE MEND)

B. JAKARTA 4464 (AUSTRALIAN ASYLUM GRANT)

JAKARTA 00008506 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charles N. Silver, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission. Reas
on: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. After a three-month chill in bilateral ties
following Australia's decision to grant temporary asylum to
42 Papuan asylum seekers, Prime Minister John Howard and
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sealed the two
governments' reconciliation with a lightweight, feel-good
one-day meeting on Batam island on June 26. Ministerial
delegations then reviewed the entire bilateral agenda at the
Eighth Indonesian-Australia Ministerial Forum in Bali on June
27-29. While the Australians seemed focused on salvaging the
many important practical aspects of the bilateral
relationship, the GOI was primarily concerned with extracting
Australian reaffirmations of respect for Indonesian
sovereignty and non-interference in Indonesian affairs. This
was effected in an exchange of letters between Howard and
Yudhoyono that cleared the air for the summit. An Indonesian
source stressed that Australia's generous response to the
June 3 Central Java earthquake was the beginning of the end
of the rift, which chilled all official contacts in Jakarta
with the GOA. End summary.


2. (C) After a three-month rift following Australia's
extension of temporary visas to 42 Papuan asylum seekers on
March 23 (reftel A),Indonesian President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono and Australian Prime Minister John Howard publicly
sealed their two governments' reconciliation with a one-day
meeting on the island of Batam on June 26. According to
Australian diplomatic sources in Jakarta, the crisis had
impacted every aspect of the bilateral relationship. At the
height of the tiff, Indonesian officialdom avoided any and
all contacts with Australian diplomats, and most ongoing
cooperation programs of cooperation were put on hiatus.

Letters Clear the Air
--------------


3. (C) An exchange of three letters cleared the way for the
Batam summit. On June 15, Prime Minister Howard wrote

President Yudhoyono about the release of Abu Bakr Ba'asyir
(ABB). Howard urged that ABB, as a leader of an organization
registered by the UN as a sponsor of terrorism, be subject to
restrictions in compliance with UN Security Council
Resolution 1267, including a ban on foreign travel. In his
June 21 reply, SBY noted that Indonesia was also a victim of
terrorism; reiterated that the GOI prosecuted ABB to the full
extent of its law and had abided by the court's verdict in
the case; and would act to prevent Indonesia from becoming a
"sanctuary, hiding place, or staging point" for terrorists
operating either domestically or overseas. SBY stated that
Indonesia would implement "all international obligations and
conventions" to eradicate terrorism.


4. (C) A second letter from Howard to SBY, dated June 24, was
devoted largely to Papua. Howard reiterated the GOA's
respect for Indonesia's territorial integrity, including its
sovereignty over Papua. The Prime Minister also pointed out
that the GOA's code of conduct for NGOs operating in
Indonesia prevented it from funding organizations "that
operate contrary to the laws and policies of either country."
The Prime Minister further stressed that he did not wish to
see Australia become a staging point for separatism in
Indonesia. An Australian diplomatic source in Jakarta told
us that the GOI had particularly welcomed this point, since
it addressed concerns about the potential activity of Papuan
expatriates in Australia. During his meeting with SBY in
Batam, PM Howard reinforced this point by saying that if the
GOI had information about illegal activity by Papuan groups
in Australia, the GOA would follow up appropriately. Howard
noted that such activities did not include exercising freedom
of speech.


5. (C) These letters cleared the air for the brief informal
summit between Yudhoyono and Howard on Batam on Monday, June

26. According to our Australian source, the summit covered

JAKARTA 00008506 002.2 OF 003


little new ground, and served mainly as a public
reconciliation. Our source reported that negotiating the
letters' content was a difficult process, complicated by
differing approaches by the Indonesian Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) and the Office of the President. The DFA took
a hard line, and repeatedly attempted to wrest concessions
from the Australians such as a joint statement containing
expressions of contrition on the part of the GOA. Also,
Prime Minister Howard's letter on ABB initially provoked
irritation in some quarters, and the DFA hinted that the
planned summit might be canceled. However, President
Yudhoyono's staff, more concerned with moving the
relationship forward, sent a consistent message to the
Australians of wanting the rough patch in relations to be
contained, and did not support the DFA demands. In the end,
the two leaders did not issue a joint declaration at Batam.

Reconciliation on Batam
--------------


6. (C) The Batam summit's most substantive event was an
hour-long bilateral meeting between Yudhoyono and Howard. In
their discussion, SBY welcomed PM Howard's offer of a 30
million Australian dollar relief package in response to the
Yogyakarta earthquake. On Papua, SBY thanked the PM for his
letter on the subject, and said that although he did "not
want to meddle" in Australia's internal political processes,
he welcomed the GOA's plans to issue new guidelines for
offshore processing of refugees and asylum seekers. SBY
expressed his support for Australia's approach to
peacekeeping in East Timor. The two leaders agreed to
continue work on a bilateral Framework Security Agreement,
aiming to finalize it by December. Our Australian Embassy
contact said it was the GOA's belief that this was the most
practical way to codify the security relationship. The two
leaders also discussed the possibility of a prisoner transfer
agreement, a measure which would allay recent tensions over
high-profile arrests of Australian citizens in Indonesia.
Our contact suggested that the DFA and nationalist
politicians might object to this, since the agreement might
be perceived as of greater potential benefit to Australia
than to Indonesia.


7. (C) On external issues, the two leaders agreed that the
membership of the East Asia Summit be kept at its present
number as the process is consolidated. SBY raised Iran,
expressing optimism that Iran would consider the EU-5's
latest proposal. He noted that during his recent Mideast
trips, leaders had pressed him to persuade Iran to reduce
tensions in the region.


8. (C) The rest of the Batam program was light on substance,
and was intended as a public display of personal rapport
between the two leaders. These events included a walk on the
beach; a meeting in which the two spouses participated,
devoted in part to disaster relief and charitable activities;
and a dinner.

Ministers Follow Up In Bali
--------------


9. (C) Following the summit, high-level delegations met in
Bali for the Eighth Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum
(IAMF). The GOI was represented by an 11-minister strong
delegation including Foreign Minister Wirajuda and led by
Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Boediono. Foreign
Minister Downer headed the five-minister Australian
delegation. On June 29, the Ministers issued a lengthy
declaration (appearing in full on the Australian foreign
minister's website, www.foreignminster.gov.au),which
stressed many of the same points touched on by the heads of
government and stating shared aims in areas including avian
flu, non-proliferation, transnational threats, illegal
logging and fishing, and trade and investment. It noted the
Indonesian ministers' request that Australia reconsider its
travel advisory, which is affecting Indonesia's tourism
industry. On counter-terrorism, the declaration said the
IAMF had agreed to convene a new sub-regional ministerial
later this year to discuss strengthening cooperation. This
new group will reportedly include Indonesia, Australia, the

JAKARTA 00008506 003.2 OF 003


Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, according to
a Jakarta-based Australian diplomat. The declaration also
restated the goals of concluding a prisoners transfer
agreement and Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation by
the end of 2006.

Indonesia: It's About Respect
--------------


11. (C) While the GOI agrees that the bilateral relationship
is now back on track, the Indonesians were more pleased by
Australian affirmations of respect for Indonesian sovereignty
than inroads into practical areas of cooperation. Commenting
on the recent strains in the relationship, Zaenal Abidin of
the DFA's East Asia directorate said that the GOI's main
objective in both the Batam summit and the IAMF was placing
the relationship on a basis of mutual respect and securing
Australian reaffirmation of Indonesian sovereignty and
commitment to non-interference in internal Indonesian
affairs, particularly in connection with Papua. He said that
these principles were also the GOI's primary reason for
pursuing the Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation.
Abidin commented that it was natural that two neighbors as
different as Indonesia and Australia would have significant
and sometimes acrimonious differences, but that the GOI had
recognized that that the time had come to heal the rift over
the Papuan asylum issue. Significantly, he said that
Australia's swift and generous response to the June 3 Central
Java earthquake, which was instantly forthcoming despite the
ongoing diplomatic row, had done much to soothe Indonesian
pique. Abidin noted that Prime Ministers Howard's phone call
to SBY relaying his condolences was an important early step
in the beginning of the thaw.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Jakarta's relations with Australia remain culturally
and psychologically fraught. The Indonesians are quick to
take umbrage at any note of disrespect - real or imagined -
on the part of the GOA, and strongly resent racist overtones
in coverage of Indonesia by the Australian tabloid media.
Moreover, many GOI officials perceive the Papuan problem
through the prism of the East Timor experience. That was a
national humiliation for Indonesian functionaries
indoctrinated into the state-promoted ideology of the
Soeharto era - many of whom are still ensconced in the middle
and upper echelons of the Indonesian bureaucracy. They have
not forgotten Australia's 1999 reversal of its longstanding
acceptance of East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia, and
fear that something similar could happen with Papua. The GOI
is fully aware of the agitation on behalf of indigenous
Papuans emanating from Australian NGOs and Australian-based
Papuan expatriates. This is not the last time that the GOA
will have to reassure the Indonesians on this matter.


13. (C) On the Australian side, there is the feeling in
Jakarta that while the relationship is back on track,
implementation of the various goals and potential agreements
will take much work. Our Australian colleagues report that
the DFA in particular harbors officials with anti-Australian
views. As a result, they expect DFA actions will not always
be in consonance with the policy tone emanating from the
Presidency.
PASCOE