Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA7661
2006-06-16 09:50:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

NORTH SUMATRA AVIAN INFLUENZA CLUSTER - LESSONS

Tags:  TBIO AMED CASC EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KFLU 
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VZCZCXRO1296
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #7661/01 1670950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 160950Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5957
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA PRIORITY
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/BUMED WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9622
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0902
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1892
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1819
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3485
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 007661 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/IET, A/MED AND G/AIAG (Lange)
DEPT FOR OES/FO, OES/EID, OES/PCI, OES/STC AND OES/IHA
DEPT PASS TO USDA/FAS/DLP/HWETZEL AND FAS/ICD/LAIDIG
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USDA/FAS/MOLSTAD AND FAS/ICD/PETRIE
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USDA/FAS/FAA/DYOUNG AND USDA/APHIS
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USAID/ANE/CLEMENTS AND GH/CARROLL
DEPT ALSO PASS TO HHS/STEIGER AND BHAT
PARIS FOR FAS/AG MINISTER COUNSELOR
CANBERRA FOR APHIS/DHANNAPEL
ROME FOR FAO
USPACOM ALSO PASS TO J07

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO AMED CASC EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KFLU
SUBJECT: NORTH SUMATRA AVIAN INFLUENZA CLUSTER - LESSONS
LEARNED


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 007661

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/IET, A/MED AND G/AIAG (Lange)
DEPT FOR OES/FO, OES/EID, OES/PCI, OES/STC AND OES/IHA
DEPT PASS TO USDA/FAS/DLP/HWETZEL AND FAS/ICD/LAIDIG
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USDA/FAS/MOLSTAD AND FAS/ICD/PETRIE
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USDA/FAS/FAA/DYOUNG AND USDA/APHIS
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USAID/ANE/CLEMENTS AND GH/CARROLL
DEPT ALSO PASS TO HHS/STEIGER AND BHAT
PARIS FOR FAS/AG MINISTER COUNSELOR
CANBERRA FOR APHIS/DHANNAPEL
ROME FOR FAO
USPACOM ALSO PASS TO J07

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO AMED CASC EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KFLU
SUBJECT: NORTH SUMATRA AVIAN INFLUENZA CLUSTER - LESSONS
LEARNED



1. (SBU) Summary. The May 2006 avian influenza (AI) outbreak
in a North Sumatra family represents the largest human H5N1
cluster to date and brought with it intense worldwide media
attention to Indonesia's AI response capacity. A look back
at the response to the cluster by the Government of
Indonesia (GOI),the World Health Organization (WHO),and
U.S. Government agencies reveals both positive and negative
elements. On the positive side, the Ministry of Health
(MOH),Ministry of Agriculture (MOA),and WHO quickly
scrambled teams to North Sumatra upon learning of the
outbreak and the testing process for samples collected from
suspected AI cases went smoothly. Both the WHO and GOI
collaborated well with representatives of the Naval Medical
Research Unit (NAMRU-2) and Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) in Indonesia under challenging
circumstances. Less positively, the WHO/MOH response teams
were poorly organized and senior GOI Ministers struggled
with public relations. With the Ministry of Agriculture's
(MOA) efforts to control AI in backyard poultry still in
their infancy, we expect human AI cases to continue in
Indonesia along with occasional family clusters. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) On June 9, we gathered representatives from USAID,
NAMRU-2, the Economic Section, and the CDC to review the
combined GOI-WHO-USG response to the May 2006 North Sumatra
AI cluster. As of June 13, 8 blood-related members of a
family in Simbelang village and Kabanjahe town, Karo

District, North Sumatra Province have been identified as
H5N1 cases, with 7 fatalities. Laboratories at the CDC
and/or Hong Kong University have confirmed seven H5N1 cases.

Challenging Outbreak Investigation
--------------


3. (SBU) In general, the circumstances of the cluster
investigation proved highly challenging for all parties.
The family and other residents of the towns were distrustful
and suspicious of MOH staff from Jakarta and reluctant to
cooperate. In addition, the extended family and local
community were hesitant to cooperate fully with outside
health experts as a result of local superstitions, a general
distrust of western infectious disease concepts, and the
shock of the loss of seven members of their extended family.
Such beliefs are common in Indonesia, and we expect similar
cultural hurdles to arise in future cluster investigations.


4. (SBU) Another complicating factor was that late reporting
by the afflicted family delayed the initial recognition of
the H5N1 cluster. Clinicians at the local district hospital
in Kabanjahe and Saint Elizabeth Hospital in Medan did not
suspect H5N1 in the index case, likely because there had
been few AI outbreaks reported among poultry flocks in the
area. As a result, doctors diagnosed the index case with
pulmonary tuberculosis, and the subsequent six cases were
not suspected as H5N1 cases until they were hospitalized at
Adam Malik Hospital in Medan.

Key Lessons Learned
--------------


5. (SBU) In our view, the key lessons from the outbreak and
subsequent cluster investigation include the following:

JAKARTA 00007661 002 OF 004



General
--------------

--A noteworthy success of the outbreak investigation was the
efficient cooperation between the MOH, NAMRU-2, the CDC, and
the Hong Kong University Laboratory on specimen shipment,
H5N1 testing, viral isolation and sequencing. The
Indonesian National Institute of Health Research and
Development (Litbangkes) or NAMRU-2 tested samples received
in Jakarta and reported initial results to health care
responders in North Sumatra within 48 hours. They shipped
samples within 24 hours to the WHO-Influenza/H5N1 Reference
Laboratories at the CDC and University of Hong Kong for
confirmation and virus sequencing. Within one week of the
initial outbreak report, the CDC and HKU had confirmed the
in-country results and completed full genome sequencing of
isolated viruses. As a result, scientists were able to
conclude that the North Sumatra viruses did not appear to
have acquired any characteristics that might suggest
increased transmission among humans.

--Given the successful and rapid collaboration on laboratory
testing for suspected H5N1 clinical specimens, and the
significant USG technical expertise and laboratory capacity
on the ground in Indonesia, we are confident the USG will
likely prove able to ascertain quickly whether the virus in
future H5N1 case clusters has mutated in any significant
way. This should make it possible to make an informed
judgment quickly about whether more robust USG response
teams might be needed.

GOI Response
--------------

--Several factors complicated hospital management of most of
the H5N1 cases in the cluster. Some family members felt
distrust toward the government-operated hospital and
suspicion that oseltamivir treatment had caused the deaths
of the infected individuals. There was in general a lack of
cooperation with the medical management. Family members
refused to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) while
having close contact with hospitalized cases, but were still
allowed access to confirmed patients. Hospital staff did
not limit family member visitors and did not require family
members to wear PPE.

--More positively, the MOH quickly deployed a team to the
area on May 10, just a day after it received reports of a
possible family cluster. The MOH added a NAMRU-2 clinician
to the team, but only upon request from NAMRU-2,
demonstrating that NAMRU-2 remains under-utilized as an in-
country asset for outbreak response. Despite difficulties
with the family, MOH staff were able to obtain samples from
patients and other family members and shared them promptly
with NAMRU-2. Both Litbangkes and NAMRU-2 worked together
in the identification of all subsequent cases, including ill
nurses that emerged weeks after the outbreak in N. Sumatra.

--Although both the MOH and WHO responded promptly to the
outbreak, both are plagued by the lack of a coordinated,
well-staffed, and well-equipped rapid response team with
standard operating procedures and pre-defined roles for team

JAKARTA 00007661 003 OF 004


members. MOH staff held numerous meetings in Jakarta but
there was little effective coordination in the field. The
WHO team worked with public health officials in Karo to
conduct the key epidemiological investigations, but the MOH
did not participate. Should multiple AI clusters occur
simultaneously, we expect the MOH would have a very
difficult time mounting an effective response given the lack
of standardized rapid response teams. Building capacity in
this area should be a priority for the WHO and CDC.

--Throughout the outbreak, senior GOI officials were
extremely reluctant to admit publicly that any form of human-
to-human (H2H) transmission had taken place. This is likely
because of the perceived impact on Indonesia's economy,
concern about causing panic, and lack of understanding about
the distinction between limited H2H transmission and a
pandemic form of the virus. This reluctance continued even
as evidence mounted that limited, but non-sustained H2H
transmission was the most likely explanation for the
cluster. Not until June 11 did Coordinating Minister for
Peoples' Welfare Aburizal Bakrie acknowledge publicly that
limited and inefficient H2H transmission may have occurred;
Minister of Health Siti Fadilah Supari has failed to make
similar statements and declared that no H2H transmission
occurred in North Sumatra. We expect similar reluctance to
admit H2H transmission in future clusters, although the
UNICEF public relations campaign on AI now underway should
help educate both GOI ministers and the public about AI and
make a more sophisticated GOI public relations effort
possible.

-- The MOA response to reports of suspected human H5N1
infections in North Sumatra was also swift, although
subsequent coordination with partners and laboratory testing
were inadequate. The Director of Animal Health at the MOA
traveled to North Sumatra to investigate possible animal
H5N1 infections within 24 hours of learning of the suspected
human cases. He promptly collected samples of various
poultry, swine, and possible environmental sources of H5N1
(manure). All samples were immediately brought to Jakarta
for laboratory testing.

--Less encouraging was the initial lack of coordination
between the MOA and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). The MOA did not inform FAO of the suspected outbreak
and investigation until USAID had already alerted the FAO
about the situation. The FAO is working with the MOA to
improve coordination and has sent a joint MOA-FAO team to
North Sumatra to conduct a more thorough animal
investigation. With support from USAID, FAO has accelerated
implementation of the animal surveillance and response
program in North Sumatra and will have trained teams in the
field by the end of July. Improved coordination and better
laboratory practice should be priorities for USDA and FAO.

WHO Response
--------------

--The WHO also responded quickly to the cluster, dispatching
a half dozen experts from the WHO's Southeast Asia Regional
Office (SEARO),Geneva and Jakarta to North Sumatra within
one week of the outbreak reports. All six worked well with
the Karo District and North Sumatra Provincial health

JAKARTA 00007661 004 OF 004


authorities.

--Cooperation between the WHO, NAMRU-2, and the CDC was also
reasonably good. Although individual WHO staffers were at
times reluctant to share information on the outbreak with
NAMRU-2 and/or the CDC, our relationships with the WHO
office in Jakarta are on the upswing. The WHO office in
Jakarta has acknowledged the need to keep the USG better
informed about outbreak investigations in Indonesia.

U.S. Government Response
--------------

--The combination of NAMRU-2's relationships with
Litbangkes, and CDC TDYer Dr. Timothy Uyeki's presence in
Indonesia (and direct participation on the WHO team) gave
the USG excellent access to the outbreak investigation.
Although relations between NAMRU-2 and some Litbangkes staff
are not warm, in this instance NAMRU-2 played a central role
in the testing of samples and sent an Indonesian clinician
to North Sumatra to participate in the outbreak
investigation. In the North Sumatra and previous clusters,
Litbangkes has not directly invited NAMRU-2 to participate
in epidemiological investigations, or given attribution, but
has allowed NAMRU-2 to play a role in H5N1 testing. We
expect NAMRU-2's cooperation with Litbangkes to improve over
time given the recent appointment of a new Director General
at Litbangkes.

--The presence of CDC influenza specialist Dr. Timothy Uyeki
in Indonesia at the time of the outbreak proved to be a
major advantage, particularly because Dr. Uyeki had already
developed relationships with a number of WHO and Litbangkes
staff. In addition to providing badly needed technical
expertise to the WHO outbreak investigation team, Dr. Uyeki
also provided a crucial channel for information flow to the
Embassy and USG agencies. Given the likelihood of
additional human AI clusters in Indonesia, we continue to
recommend the CDC post a long-term TDY epidemiologist in
Jakarta as soon as possible.

--Given the GOI reluctance to publicly admit H2H
transmission of AI, we believe it would be extremely
difficult to convince them to accept a high profile USG
rapid response team in the event of future clusters, unless
there were very solid evidence the H5N1 virus had changed
sufficiently to pose a pandemic threat. We expect President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono himself would need to approve a USG
team after discussion by the Indonesian cabinet. High-level
diplomatic intervention by the Embassy and/or Washington
agencies would almost surely be required. Given these
factors, Washington agencies may want to consider a more
flexible response to future AI clusters in Indonesia where a
few experts, perhaps drawn from regional USG offices, could
quickly travel to Indonesia to augment the existing USG
presence.

AMSELEM