Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA7561
2006-06-15 04:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

INDONESIA: SIX MONTHS OF NORMALIZED MIL-MIL

Tags:  PREL MASS MARR ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #7561/01 1660402
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O 150402Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5848
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 9612
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 9861
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0896
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 007561 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: SIX MONTHS OF NORMALIZED MIL-MIL
RELATIONS

Classified By: CDA W.L. Amselem. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 007561

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: SIX MONTHS OF NORMALIZED MIL-MIL
RELATIONS

Classified By: CDA W.L. Amselem. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: A bit over six months after the
Administration moved to normalize military relations with
Indonesia the U.S. has gained traction on a broad range of
issues in ways we previously found impossible. No aspect of
our bilateral relationship has experienced more pronounced
change than in defense and security issues. On learning of
the Secretary's November decision to waive Congressional
restrictions on FY 06 military assistance, President
Yudhoyono declared that "a new bilateral relationship is now
possible." Despite ineptness in and outright obstructionism
from parts of the GOI bureaucracy, Yudhoyono has moved
forward to build a productive partnership with us and assume
a more responsible role in regional and select global issues.
Although the lingering fear that Congress could re-impose
restrictions introduces an element of restraint, Indonesia's
Department of Defense and Armed Forces (TNI) have shown
willingness to engage with us. Our ability to influence the
transformation of the TNI has taken a giant step forward.
End Summary.

TNI Regains (Some) Confidence in the U.S.
--------------


2. (C) President Yudhoyono viewed the November waiver of
Congressional restrictions on our military relationship as an
expression of support for his government and its efforts to
continue the process of democratic reform in Indonesia.
While cooperation with the Yudhoyono administration has
improved in many ways, the change in our military and
security relations has proven the most pronounced. With
Yudhoyono's appointment last February of Air Marshal Djoko
Suyanto as TNI Commander and of General Djoko Santoso as Army
Chief of Staff -- sidelining the quirky and ultra-nationalist
former Army Chief General Ryamizard Ryacudu -- the President
has in place professional, moderate, reform-minded and
U.S.-trained officers with whom we can work effectively.
Although some officers still harbor suspicions about us,
overall confidence has built within TNI that the U.S. has
committed to a long-term, normal relationship; we have gained

access and ability to influence this previously difficult to
engage institution. Building on the relations and trust that
grew during U.S. tsunami relief operations, TNI Chief Suyanto
regularly contacts PACOM Commander Fallon and Embassy DATT.
TNI now grants Embassy DAO access to subordinate commands,
once off-limits to foreign visitors. Recent visits by
ranking TNI officers to the U.S. and exchanges between U.S.
and Indonesian delegations at the Indonesia-U.S. Security
Dialogue have produced valuable exchanges.

Helping DEPHAN Increase Civilian Control
--------------


3. (C) A strong, civilian-controlled Ministry of Defense
that sets and enforces a reformist agenda remains key to our
interest in reforming TNI and ensuring that it has the
capabilities to promote regional security and respond to
civil emergencies in a professional, non-abusive manner.
Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, a civilian with a strong
reformist record, has sought U.S. assistance for several
aspects of his restructuring and reform agenda. Juwono, who
has grappled with the challenge of gaining control over the
TNI's procurement process by setting new acquisition
priorities and ending corrupt procurement practices, moved
quickly to revive Indonesian participation in the FMS system.
TNI-Air Force in December 2005 opened a $15 million C-130
parts case and TNI procurement officials have begun
re-learning the FMS system, providing a transparency of
defense expenditures unfamiliar to a generation of TNI
procurement officials. Juwono and DEPHAN explain to us that
they have developed a doctrine of "minimum essential force"
that emphasizes refurbishment of existing systems, shifting
procurement priorities away from big-ticket prestige systems
to emphasize rebuilding basic capabilities. DEPHAN has given
priority to improving the Air Force's ability to move
supplies and personnel; reviving the Navy's maritime security
role; and building the Army's civil emergency response
capability.

Helping Transform TNI With DRMS
--------------


4. (C) In a decision with possibly long-term reform and

JAKARTA 00007561 002 OF 003


professionalization consequences, Juwono in April agreed to
Indonesia's participation in the Defense Resource Management
Study (DRMS) program. Juwono's decision gives the U.S.
unprecedented ability to help transform Indonesia's defense
budget and acquisition processes, redefine TNI missions and
priorities to move from internal security missions to
external defense, and to support the modernization and
professionalization of TNI. Under the multi-year DRMS
program, TNI will open its books and internal practices to
the scrutiny of U.S. experts -- allowing a level of
transparency and U.S. influence unimaginable six months ago.
Successful completion of the DRMS program would make possible
more extensive U.S. involvement in restructuring DEPHAN and
TNI through multi-year defense budget planning and
acquisition reform programs, as done in the Philippines with
Philippine Defense Reform (PDR).


5. (C) Our newly-acquired ability to offer a full range of
cooperative programs to Indonesia has generated other
opportunities to engage DEPHAN/TNI and influence Indonesian
security reform. DEPHAN in April agreed to TNI participation
in the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP),
which will supplement PACOM activities and allow building
another web of permanent, ongoing relations with U.S. forces.
DEPHAN in May hosted a week-long inter-ministerial seminar,
conducted by PACOM's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS),that produced a proposal for a national security
coordination council that DEPHAN will incorporate in draft
legislation to reform the security sector. DEPHAN now seeks
APCSS assistance to structure and establish a "disaster
response force" within TNI that will give it the capability
to respond more effectively to Indonesia's frequent natural
disasters.

Improving TNI Capabilities: FMF, FMS, DCS
--------------


6. (SBU) Following waiver of Congressional restrictions,
which enabled resumption of FMF and FMS, Washington agencies
moved to identify funds available to Indonesia to augment the
$990K appropriated by Congress for FY06. These included
funds from Indonesia's FMF holding account and balances from
old FMS cases. Indonesia could benefit from Section 1206
funds in FY06, totaling $19.7 million, to accelerate
completion of a TNI-Navy project to establish full radar and
communications capabilities in the Malacca Strait. This
funding would jumpstart our military assistance program,
allowing us to assist projects that directly address U.S.
interests and priorities, e.g., maritime security, regional
stability and counterterrorism.

Building TNI Skills, Capacity, Professionalism
-------------- -


7. (SBU) Full IMET became available to Indonesia following
certification by the State Department in February 2005.
Indonesian officials -- and TNI officers who have benefited
from past training and those who aspire to receiving it now
-- have proven receptive to the renewed availability of
professional training courses. PACOM, following the November
normalization, has stepped up its engagement and now offers
training and exercises, including JCETs that allow the TNI to
help us achieve mutual security objectives in the region --
from maritime security and interoperability to facilitating
reform of the TNI. In addition to conferences and Subject
Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE's) addressing CT, doctrine
development, logistics, intelligence, and disaster relief,
PACOM will provide increased Joint Combined Exercises and
Training (JCETS) and bilateral exercises among services,
transitioning to an increased multilateral and joint
engagement program. Humanitarian Civil Action programs, such
as our recent effort in Nias in which U.S. forces built a
school and two bridges, put a positive face on our joint
efforts. PACOM's superb response to the tsunami and
earthquakes in 2004-2005, and more recently the earthquake in
Jogyakarta, demonstrated to the Indonesian public and TNI, as
no other U.S. effort could, the benefits of bilateral
military cooperation. The USNS Mercy will reprise its
assistance effort during the tsunami and Nias earthquakes in
2005 by returning for a several-week visit to Indonesia this
summer. Such humanitarian relief efforts generate positive
public empathy, and promote cooperation among U.S. and
Indonesian forces that can transfer to subsequent operations.


JAKARTA 00007561 003 OF 003



Moving Forward, With Deliberate Speed
--------------


8. (C) Washington agencies and PACOM moved quickly to find
the tools and resources we needed to re-launch our normalized
military relationship. Visits by Secretaries Rice and
Rumsfeld, State-led Pol-Mil talks and the DOD-led
Indonesia-U.S. Security Dialogue, and many other visits by
ranking U.S. officials and experts during the past six months
have reinforced with Yudhoyono, his government, and TNI that
the U.S. plans to remain constructively engaged over the
long-term. We have emphasized throughout that our engagement
seeks to support Yudhoyono's reform priorities, and that
increased professionalism and respect for human rights by
Indonesian security forces remain indispensable elements. As
a result, we now influence security sector reform and
capabilities in ways we only hoped for six months ago.
Challenges, nevertheless, remain. President Yudhoyono and
key officials, in opening to the U.S., must carefully tread
between nationalist and Islamist camps that find common cause
in their suspicion of increased U.S. involvement in
Indonesia. Yudhoyono has succeeded and our engagement has
struck the right balance and continues to rebuild trust. We
should continue the process we have begun, always aware of
potential political minefields both in Indonesia and in the
U.S., with the ultimate result that Indonesia becomes a
valued partner and becomes capable of assuming the
responsibilities appropriate for this populous,
Islamic-majority emerging democracy.


9. (U) We have a winner.
AMSELEM