Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA7398
2006-06-12 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

WHAT'S NEXT FOR ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR AND JEMAAH

Tags:  PTER PREL PGOV KJUS KISL KVPR ASEC AS ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5529
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #7398/01 1631052
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121052Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5669
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9594
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0889
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 007398 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND S/CT
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2026
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KJUS KISL KVPR ASEC AS ID
SUBJECT: WHAT'S NEXT FOR ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR AND JEMAAH
ISLAMIYAH?

REF: A. JAKARTA 05040 PROSECUTORS UNFAZED BY TESTIMONY

B. JAKARTA 02848 BA'ASYIR REVIEW MOVES FORWARD

C. 05 JAKARTA 10920 POLICE REPORT CHANGE IN JI

D. 05 JAKARTA 11208 GOI CUTS BA'ASYIR'S SENTENCE

E. 05 JAKARTA 11125 PRISON SENTENCE

F. 05 JAKARTA 03026 BA'ASYIR CONVICTED

G. 04 JAKARTA 10696 TERROR FINANCE: DEWAN DAKWAH

Classified By: Political Officer David Willis For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

SUMMARY
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 007398

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS AND S/CT
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2026
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KJUS KISL KVPR ASEC AS ID
SUBJECT: WHAT'S NEXT FOR ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR AND JEMAAH
ISLAMIYAH?

REF: A. JAKARTA 05040 PROSECUTORS UNFAZED BY TESTIMONY

B. JAKARTA 02848 BA'ASYIR REVIEW MOVES FORWARD

C. 05 JAKARTA 10920 POLICE REPORT CHANGE IN JI

D. 05 JAKARTA 11208 GOI CUTS BA'ASYIR'S SENTENCE

E. 05 JAKARTA 11125 PRISON SENTENCE

F. 05 JAKARTA 03026 BA'ASYIR CONVICTED

G. 04 JAKARTA 10696 TERROR FINANCE: DEWAN DAKWAH

Classified By: Political Officer David Willis For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On June 14, Jemaah Islamiyah spiritual leader Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir will leave Cipinang Penitentiary a free man,
having completed his second prison term. Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia (MMI),the political wing of JI, and an
interdenominational group of religious leaders plan to greet
the cleric upon his release. The Indonesian National Police
(INP) have no plans to re-arrest the terrorist leader, but
senior INP counterterrorism investigators told us the INP
will keep Ba'asyir under both technical and physical
surveillance. However, INP CT forces will continue to target
more operational figures, such as Noordin Mohammad Top and
Abdul Rahim, Ba'asyir's son, and any monitoring of Ba'asyir
will likely remain limited and peripheral to primary targets.
INP CT investigators have dismissed the notion that Ba'asyir
will assume an operational role with JI upon his release. At
a minimum, we can expect Ba'asyir to seek opportunities to
exonerate himself in the public eye and to seek every
opportunity to criticize the U.S. and bolster extremist
ideology. End Summary.

IMMINENT RELEASE AND RETURN TO SOLO, NGRUKI
--------------


2. (C) Officials at Cipinang Penitentiary publicly announced
that they will release Jemaah Islamiyah spiritual leader Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir on June 14 at the completion of his second

prison term. Convicted on March 2, 2005 for his role in
blessing the 2002 Bali bombings in a "sinister conspiracy to
cause a fire or explosion, resulting in deaths"(ref F),
Ba'asyir has completed this 30-month sentence, commuted by 4
1/2 months in a routine Indonesian Independence Day act (ref
D, E). GOI prosecutors most directly involved in the
Ba'asyir trials have told us they do not intend to file new
charges against the 68 year old cleric (ref A, B),and
Indonesian National Police (INP) counterterrorism
investigators said to us they have no plans to re-arrest him.


3. (SBU) Local press reports that members of Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) from the Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang,
and Bekasi areas will greet Ba'asyir upon his release.
According to the state-supported Antara News Agency, several
religious leaders will join MMI at the prison doors to
support the Indonesian system of justice. These include
Hussein Umar from Dewan Dakwah Islamiya Indonesia (ref G);
Pastor Nathan Setiabudi, the former head of the Communion of
Churches in Indonesia (PGI),an organization representing
most Protestant denominations, and one of five religious
leaders who met President Bush in 2003 during his visit to
Bali; Theo Bella, a Catholic leader; Arifin Ilham, a
highly-visible Sufi tele-preacher; and Hartono, a Buddhist.


4. (C) After his release, according to MMI's public
statements, Ba'asyir will fly to Yogyakarta en route to Solo,
Central Java. He will return to his Al Mukmin "Ngruki"
pesantran, which his son, Abdul Rahim, currently manages.
Ngruki maintains its reputation as a breeding ground for the
violent JI ideology as well as for training and recruiting
new JI members. Senior INP CT officers name Rahim as a
primary target, suspected of being JI's link with Al-Qaeda.
Deputy Chief of the INP's Criminal Investigative Division and
defacto head of Team Bomb, Inspector General Gories Mere,
told us the INP will keep Ba'asyir under both technical and
physical surveillance. However, the INP will prioritize its
limited human and financial resources to track Noordin
Mohammad Top and to investigate Rahim. Head of the INP
Special Detachment-88 General Bekto Suprapto acknowledged
monitoring of Ba'asyir may be limited but said dedicated

JAKARTA 00007398 002 OF 002


surveillance of Rahim likely would provide coverage of
Ba'asyir.

REJOINING A CHANGED TERRORIST NETWORK
--------------


5. (C) INP CT investigators maintain their assessment that
their on-going efforts have shut down the formal JI structure
that operated prior to the 2002 Bali bombings (ref C). They
recently sketched out for us JI's cell network behavior from
information gathered after arrests over the past few months,
revealing a much flatter and decentralized organizational
structure. Local JI experts agree that the hundreds of
arrests and successful prosecutions by the GOI have taken a
significant toll on JI's command and control structure and
have hampered its efforts to spread its ideology.


6. (C) INP CT officials and local JI experts consistently
raise the point that Ba'asyir likely has lost portions of the
support base he enjoyed prior to his initial arrest although
they admit that relaxed prison regulations allowing Ba'asyir
to maintain outside contacts may offset this loss. According
to International Crisis Group's JI expert Sidney Jones, JI
has been split for the past several years over support for
active bombing campaigns, and Ba'asyir has been criticized
for not taking a more forward leaning position on undertaking
terrorist attacks. If true, Ba'asyir and Abu Rusdan lead the
less-operational faction with Noordin M. Top and Abu Dujana
heading the list of those usually suspected of pushing for
more violence.


7. (C) Ba'asyir's ability to take an active role as spiritual
leader remains largely unknown but poses the greatest threat
towards increased agitation. Known more for his command of
radical doctrine than his operational leadership, Ba'asyir
has compared his indoctrination role to that of a "knife
maker" who holds no responsibility for how others use his
knives. Nasir Abas, a reformed JI member who knew Ba'asyir
and now consults with the INP on CT issues, speculates
Ba'asyir will attempt to rebuild a JI ideology. Abas
believes Ba'asyir likely will focus on building MMI, which
Ba'asyir co-founded in 2000 and still chairs. British
Embassy counterparts told us they have information suggesting
MMI's current leadership may not welcome Ba'asyir after his
release and may resist efforts by Ba'asyir to regain direct
control of the group. Whether or not Ba'asyir can take hold
of the reigns of power, we can expect him to reassert himself
in the public eye and to criticize the United States
publicly. He will certainly continue to be a strong voice in
support of extremist ideas.
PASCOE