NEGOTIATING A SOFA WITH INDONESIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 007015

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL KTIA ID
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATING A SOFA WITH INDONESIA

REF: A. AMB. PASCOE/DEP U/S LAWLESS 6/3 TELCON

B. AMB. PASCOE/ DAS JOHN 6/1 TELCON

C. JAKARTA 6912

D. STATE 88273

E. STATE 87329 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Amb. B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: We have attempted at senior levels to
obtain the same SOFA we had twice in 2005 in order to avoid
protracted negotiations over language that might threaten
both our long term position and practices already occurring
on the ground in Yogyakarta, notably with respect to weapons
and personnel entry and exit. Negotiations over a temporary
SOFA are likely to take longer than the expected length of
the ongoing deployment, especially given Indonesian
sensitivity over arms issues, made worse by publicity over
American security personnel last March. We recommend that
during his June 6 visit that the Secretary of Defense urge
renewal of our past temporary SOFA and offer to start early
negotiations on a formal government to government agreement
as part of our increased military interaction. We believe
that entering protracted negotiations on changes to a
temporary SOFA at this point could damage our ability to
negotiate a suitable formal SOFA. End Summary

Avoiding Protracted Negotiations
--------------


2. (C) As instructed in refs D and E, the Ambassador has
engaged in the past week with the Office of the Presidency
and the Foreign Minister to obtain a temporary SOFA from the
Indonesians that duplicated the two agreed to in 2005 in the
wake of the tsunami and the earthquake in Nias. The GOI has
not agreed to our proposal and submitted language that is not
only unacceptable, such as prohibiting the carrying of arms,
but would endanger actions that have already taken on the
ground, such as the possession of weapons, albeit out of
sight, by our deployed forces in Yogyakarta as an essential
element of our force protection. We have kept to a simple
approach and avoided getting into protracted negotiations
over Indonesia's language because it could weaken our ability
to negotiate a permanent SOFA. The Indonesians are likely to
stall until the deployment is over and they will use any of
our concessions against us in the future.


3. (C) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has hinted to us from
the beginning, obliquely at first, and then directly by the
Minister to the Ambassador, that it would be preferable from
the Indonesian point of view not to have a SOFA at all due to
limited deployment time of the U.S. Marine Corps medical
unit. (PACOM and Embassy are estimating 1-3 weeks.) We
believe that negotiations on points unacceptable to us in the
Indonesian text would take at least that long. For that
reason we tried to convince senior officials that the simple,
previously successful, method we proposed would be the best
solution for the events at hand.

Preserving Force Protection
--------------


4. (C) In this and the last two major deployments in the
wake of humanitarian crises in Indonesia, we have been able
to negotiate suitable force protection arrangements on the
ground with local commanders. Our personnel have had access
to arms as needed, albeit discreetly. Such informal
arrangements have been critical to our posture, including now
in Yogyakarta, located relatively close to Solo, one of the
ideological heartlands of militant Islamists. We are at the
point that to obtain the force protection language we need in
a formal document, significant negotiations will be required
in the context of a formal SOFA. We do not expect the
Foreign Ministry to accept a text that meets our needs
without extensive discussion. In the meantime, engaging the
Foreign Ministry on this will raise questions about weapons
already in Indonesia, brought in without the normal
paperwork, and may lead to an attempt by Jakarta bureaucrats
to seek their removal. Under the circumstances, we believe
the weapons best left as it is now: worked out at the local
level with no publicity. Similarly, if we point out that
U.S. forces are already entering Yogyakarta with ID's and
orders despite the Ministry's desire to exclude such language
in the temporary SOFA, they might try to block the practice.


5. (C) The visible possession of weapons has become very
sensitive to the GOI following a public flap in March during
the visit of the Secretary of State. Television footage of
State Department security personnel wearing protective
jackets and helmets and openly carrying weapons was aired
widely. The Foreign Minister was forced to explain before
the House of Representatives why we were allowed to have
"Marines", as the press called them, in "combat gear" with
weapons on city streets. He publicly criticized U.S.
behavior, although all the security arrangements were made
with prior notification and host government agreement. We
have been reminded several times since then, including by
members of the Presidential staff, to not repeat such an
incident. This issue was clearly on President Yudhoyono's
mind when he initially asked that our field hospital
personnel not wear uniforms.

Pursuing a Longer Term SOFA
--------------


6. (C) Although we are under no illusion that negotiations
would be quick and simple, in light of the increasing
frequency of deployments to Indonesia we believe that the
only solution to protect U.S. military personnel, whether in
conjunction with our renewed military engagement or recurring
humanitarian missions, is initiation of negotiations of a
general SOFA on an expedited basis. We have had training
events since the re-establishment of full military to
military relations last year involving other large
deployments of U.S. military personnel. More training is
planned in the future. In effect, if we sought a SOFA for
every event, we would require one every month or two. Given
that the Foreign Minister welcomed the exploration of such an
approach, we recommend that a formal draft SOFA text be
conveyed to the Indonesians within the next two weeks,
especially given the expected arrival of the USNS Mercy in
mid-July.

Recommended Points for the Secretary of Defense
-------------- --


7. (C) We recommend that during his visit June 6 the
Secretary of Defense deliver the following points to

SIPDIS
President Yudhoyono and the Defense Minister in support of
both the temporary SOFA and initiating the process for a
longer one:

--We have been pleased to help once again in response to the
Yogyakarta earthquake by deploying a military hospital. We
regret that your bureaucracy has not yet agreed to a
confidential SOFA in the same manner as you (or the

SIPDIS
President) instructed last year, but hope that it might still
be possible to have one to cover the current deployment of
our forces.

--Given the greatly increased engagement between our
militaries since the reestablishment of full
military-to-military relations, we believe that establishing
a formal SOFA between us is a natural complement in order to
avoid having to establish a temporary one for every discrete
event. Having an agreement would give us a clear way forward
in case of accident or incident, and support our common goal
of increased military-to-military cooperation.

-- I would propose our governments begin formal negotiations
on a Status of Forces Agreement. We can provide a draft
agreement in a very short time as a basis for negotiations.
I would appreciate it if you could instruct your negotiators
to make this a priority.

PASCOE