Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA617
2006-01-17 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000617 

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC

REF: STATE 6236

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 000617

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL IR EU AORC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA SOFT ON REPORTING IRAN TO THE UNSC

REF: STATE 6236

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. Summary: On January 16, the Ambassador followed up the
Secretary's telephone call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda

SIPDIS
seeking Indonesian support for referral of Iran to the UN
Security Council by the IAEA Board of Governors. The
Ambassador called for Indonesia to serve as a strong voice in
support in keeping with its own policies on
non-proliferation. Wirajuda affirmed that Indonesia has told
Iran that it should follow IAEA rules but suggested that a
mechanism be found for continued negotiations, not unlike the
Six Party Talks in response to DPRK actions. The Ambassador
rejoined that the talks with the EU-3 had been such a
mechanism, but now had been discarded by Tehran. The
Minister questioned whether the right time has arrived for a
referral, saying it might increase Iranian militancy. The
Ambassador rejoined that Iran's statements were already
militant, and that it should not be allowed to act without
consequence. If steps were not taken, Iran would hide its
actions behind countries such as Indonesia. While Wirajuda
said he promised the Secretary that he would look at the
issue closely, and would discuss it with President Yudhoyono,
he provided the usual list of reasons to justify Indonesian
inaction. The Ambassador will follow-up with the
Presidential Palace in order to try to stiffen Indonesian
resolve. End Summary


2. (C) In a late January 16 meeting before Minister Wirajuda
departed on a trip to Europe, the Ambassador followed up
Secretary Rice's telephone call and sought Indonesian support

SIPDIS
to refer Iran to the UN Security Council due to its breach of
commitments to the EU-3 and to its IAEA safeguard
obligations. The Ambassador argued that given consistent
Jakarta's support for non-proliferation goals, and
Indonesia's importance as the fourth largest country in the
world, it could be a powerful voice on this issue. Given our
agreement on non-proliferation goals, we would like to see
Indonesia help push for their implementation.


3. (C) Wirajuda replied that they follow the issue closely
and have consulted with the EU-3. Iran had sent a special
envoy on the topic a few months ago, and had planned another
visit, but recently canceled the trip. Indonesia has
emphasized to Iran that they should meet all their
obligations including transparency and safeguards. The
Minister said he promised the Secretary that he would look at
the issue, and would discuss it with President Yudhoyono. He
said there was a hopeful sign that Iran had shown a
willingness to follow all the rules since it had acceded to
the Second Additional Protocol.


4. (C) Wirajuda questioned whether this is in fact the time
whether Iran should be brought before the UNSC. He argued
that Iran had not yet stopped fully cooperating and that the
Indonesian view is that Iran and the EU-3 should maximize
their talks. Comparing the situation to the DPRK, which
abrogated its treaty commitments and declared it had nuclear
weapons, Wirajuda said a mechanism had been found, the Six
Party Talks, to deal with the situation. Should there not be
a mechanism for Iran as well?


5. (C) The Ambassador responded that there already had been
a mechanism for several years, the talks with the EU-3, which
Iran has now pushed aside. The U.S. had supported that
mechanism, to the point that there is domestic criticism
within the United States about it. The Iranians had thrown
the mechanism away, and it is now time to take action on the
issue. The Minister would surely not want Iran to hide
behind countries such as Indonesia as Tehran intentionally
destroyed the mechanism available to it. If this is not the
time, then when would it be?


6. (C) The Minister asked rhetorically what the consequences
might be of isolating Iran. It might become even more
militant, and successfully uses the nuclear issue as a
rallying point. Wirajuda added that he has more questions
than answers on this issue. The Ambassador replied that Iran
should not be allowed to acquire the sense that there would
be no consequences for its actions, and should not be allowed
to ignore its agreements. Threatening the world with higher
oil prices is rhetoric not heard anywhere else. We hope that
Indonesia would stand up to such tactics, and doing so would
be an important step.


7. (C) Comment: Foreign Minister Wirajuda provided all the
usual reasons for Indonesia to avoid action. The Ambassador
will follow up with the Presidential Palace in order to try
to stiffen his backbone on this issue.
PASCOE