ASD RODMAN'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 005789

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS MASS MARR PHUM KDEM KAWC TT BM TW
ID
SUBJECT: ASD RODMAN'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN FOREIGN
MINISTRY SECGEN


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Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Peter Rodman met Department of Foreign
Affairs Secretary General Imron Cotan on April 12. Both
expressed strong interest in expanding military ties. Imron
pressed for USG training for Indonesian Special Forces
(Kopassus); ASD Rodman said the USG needed to proceed
carefully with Kopassus. ASD Rodman pressed for Indonesian
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
and for an Article 98 agreement; Imron indicated the GOI
would not proceed with either at this time and specifically
highlighted the parliament's role in endorsing international
agreements, saying the Yudhoyono administration could not
proceed "unilaterally." ASD Rodman expressed interest in
accountability for human rights violations in East Timor, and
the Ambassador emphasized the importance of the Commission on
Truth and Friendship building international credibility. ASD
Rodman explained the USG interest in supporting maritime
security and safeguarding the Malacca Strait; Imron noted
Taiwan had offered use of an AWACS aircraft to assist with
aerial coverage of the Strait, but the GOI had not decided
its response to the offer. The Ambassador noted USG interest
in pursuing a SOFA with the GOI, and Imron requested a draft
for GOI study. Imron also explained GOI efforts to press the
government of Burma to democratize, voiced concern that
Indonesians might try emulating recent demonstrations in
Bangkok, and expressed hope for an improved relationship with
Australia in coming months. End Summary.


2. (U) ASD Rodman accompanied by Ambassador Pascoe, Brigadier
General John Allen, OSD/ISA Country Director for Southeast
Asia Peter Ipsen, the Embassy's Defense Attache, ODC officer,
Poloff (notetaker),and ASD Rodman's Military Assistant
called on Secretary General Imron, accompanied by two DFA
officials.

DESIRE TO REENGAGE
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3. (C) ASD Rodman opened the meeting by explaining the
context of his visit and the ongoing USG effort to restore
and expand security ties with Indonesia. The USG wanted to
be a reliable security partner and help the Armed Forces
(TNI) become a modern, capable, and professional force;
toward that end, the USG would explore ways for providing
appropriate equipment and training. Imron responded that the
United States represented a valuable strategic partner for
Indonesia. The GOI welcomed USG assistance in both the
security field and democratization.

KOPASSUS TRAINING
--------------


4. (C) On two separate occasions, Imron raised what appeared
as one of his main points for the meeting, pressing ASD
Rodman to allow potential leaders from the Special Forces
(Kopassus) to receive U.S. training. This would have the
positive effect of exposing Kopassus soldiers to different
values and norms than those prevailing in Indonesian military
circles. ASD Rodman acknowledged Imron's interest in
training for Kopassus, but stressed the importance of
proceeding in a careful manner. Rodman noted the
participation of the Kopassus Commander in the recent Pacific
Area Special Operations Conference (PASOC),but indicated
that sensitivities in Washington likely precluded robust
engagement with Kopassus in the near future.

PSI
---


5. (C) ASD Rodman suggested the GOI consider participating in
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Imron noted
that FM Wirajuda had explained the GOI's legal reasons for
not participating in PSI and added practical concerns
underpinning the GOI's reluctance: as an archipelagic nation,
Indonesia relied heavily on transportation by boat. The
Australian Navy already intercepted over 200 Indonesian ships
each year; the GOI therefore did not want to take any further
steps that could impede Indonesian shipping. ASD Rodman

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described PSI as a flexible program; every country could set
the parameters for its own participation. Rodman suggested
that the U.S. and Indonesia could begin subject matter expert
exchanges and proliferation-related elements could get
injected into bilateral military exercises as a way to
improve Indonesia's comfort with PSI. Citing FM Wirajuda's
views, Imron appeared pessimistic about the prospects of
Indonesian participation in PSI, a step backwards from
Indonesia's expressed willingness to do "PSI-like" activities
while not actually joining PSI during the A/S Hillen visit in
February.

ARTICLE 98
--------------


6. (C) Noting that over 100 countries had signed Article 98
agreements with the U.S., ASD Rodman suggested that the GOI
consider following suit. Imron said he would raise the
matter with his DFA colleagues. He implied that since the
GOI had not become a party to the Rome Statute, the GOI
questioned the need for an Article 98 agreement. More
significantly, however, he said that the administration could
not "unilaterally" conclude such an agreement without the
endorsement of the House of Representatives (DPR). Dealing
with the DPR, and especially Commission I (responsible for
defense, foreign affairs, and information),proved difficult,
painful, and time consuming for DFA. When ASD Rodman asked
if the GOI might conclude an executive agreement not
requiring endorsement by the DPR, Imron said, "we cannot
afford to do that here."

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EAST TIMOR
--------------


7. (C) ASD Rodman noted the need to show that renewed
military ties promoted progress on reform and accountability.
BGEN Allen asked for an update on the work of the
Indonesia-East Timor Commission on Truth and Friendship.
Imron, encouraged by the Commission's work, described the
Commission as "the only alternative" for resolving the prior
human rights abuses. He predicted the Commission's work
would lead to a South Africa style outcome, with people
summoned to provide accounts, mutual forgiveness, and
possible compensation for victims.


8. (C) The Ambassador suggested the GOI work to ensure a
sufficient international role in the process and noted the
possibility of Carter Center involvement. Imron acknowledged
the importance of international involvement and consultations
with NGOs. The Commission, however, still had underway
technical work, such as site visits and the collection of
evidence and statements. After this technical phase, the
Commission would consider how to consult with other
organizations. The Ambassador explained that the Carter
Center represented one alternative; others might seem equally
credible, but some international involvement would appear
needed.

MALACCA STRAIT
--------------


9. (C) ASD Rodman said the USG would like to support the
efforts of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia to ensure the
security of the Malacca Strait. Imron replied that the GOI
would accept USG equipment and training toward that end,
although he emphasized responsibility for the Strait lay with
the littoral states. Imron said Taiwan had offered to
provide equipment as well, including an AWACS plane operated
by a mixed team of Taiwanese and Indonesian pilots. The GOI
had not decided how to respond to this offer, however, as it
felt concerned about the possible reaction from China. Imron
requested that the USG provide a document explaining what
equipment it could provide.

SOFA
--------------


10. (C) Citing the upcoming visit of the hospital ship Mercy,
as well as other training programs, the Ambassador mentioned
the need for a permanent SOFA. Imron requested that the USG
provide a draft that the GOI could study; he promised to
raise the matter with FM Wirajuda and discuss it with a
"troika" consisting of the Secretaries General from the DFA,

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Defense Ministry, and Ministry of Home Affairs.

BURMA, THAILAND, AND AUSTRALIA
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11. (C) When the Ambassador asked Imron for his sense of
developments in ASEAN, Imron explained a growing sense of the
need for a "code of conduct" for ASEAN states, stating that
ASEAN could suspend Burma's membership if Burma failed to
apply a roadmap to democracy. A group of "eminent persons"
had begun studying the possibility of an ASEAN Charter,
including a provision for suspension of membership. This
would provide a useful source of pressure on Burma, which
otherwise appeared likely to become an irritant in ASEAN's
relations with the United States and EU. Although the GOI
sought to become more firm with Burma, Imron explained,
engagement remained important, to expose the Burmese to the
democratic drive within Southeast Asia, and to ensure Burma
would not be left behind.


12. (C) Imron noted recent mass demonstrations in Bangkok
caused some officials in Indonesia to worry that democracy in
the region could get "hijacked." The GOI wanted to see
whether similar (opposition) demonstrations would begin in
Manila or Jakarta. Imron expressed confidence that President
Yudhoyono could control the situation in Indonesia.


13. (C) Imron also noted that Indonesia currently had a "very
delicate" relationship with Australia, but he said that
relations had begun moving in the right direction, and he
hoped that "things will be better" within one or two months.


14. (U) ASD Rodman has cleared this cable.
PASCOE