TRAINING MOBILE BRIGADE PERSONNEL WOULD IMPROVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 003688

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR FOR D, P, S/CT, INL, DRL, AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PTER KJUS ASEC ID
SUBJECT: TRAINING MOBILE BRIGADE PERSONNEL WOULD IMPROVE
HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A. 03 SECSTATE 310662 POLICY ON BRIMOB POLICE
TRAINING

B. JAKARTA 3484 TENSION HIGH IN ABEPURA

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, reason 1.4 (B)
and (D).

Summary/Action Request
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1. (C) The deaths of 3 "Mobile Brigade" (Brimob) policemen
in Jayapura, Papua on March 16 highlight a major deficiency
in our approach to police training in Indonesia. The 2003
ban on the training of Brimob personnel by ICITAP (ref A)
prevents us from aiding the unit most in need of assistance
and the one usually tasked with handling the most potentially
violent situations. Any possible benefits to us from the
isolation of Mobile Brigade have long expired; with the GOI,
we must engage and professionalize this critical part of the
Indonesian National Police (INP). Proper training would
decrease the risk of major incidents, particularly in
Indonesia's most volatile regions. The ban on ICITAP training
of Brimob impedes the improvements we seek. We ask
Washington to end the restriction on ICITAP training of
Mobile Brigade personnel and allow them to receive training
under the same conditions (including vetting) applied to
other INP members and units. End Summary.

Brimob Lost, Scared in Clash with Protesters
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2. (C) The graphic video footage of the brutal killings of
three policemen and an air force sergeant on March 16 (ref B)
made apparent the inadequate training and skills of Mobile
Brigade forces deployed in Jayapura. Its personnel, equipped
with little more than helmets, sticks, and a few shields,
displayed meager understanding of basic crowd management and
civil disorder response techniques. When the large crowd
turned violent, the police cowered behind the few shields
they had and allowed their attackers to outflank and pummel
them from three sides with bricks and softball-sized rocks.
As their lines crumbled and they turned and ran in fear,
several from their ranks tripped, fell, and became targets
for beating and stoning by the rioters, resulting in the
deaths of three. Local police reacted with anger, prompting
the national police chief to fly in and take control of the
situation.

The Role of Brimob
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3. (C) The Indonesian police use its Mobile Brigade to
control the most potentially explosive incidents and areas.
Brimob units defend our diplomatic posts, particularly during
demonstrations, and many other prominent and potential
targets frequented by Westerners. The USG has committed to
help transform the INP into a more professional, competent
and respected law enforcement organization as it emerges from
its status as stepchild to the military. An enormous hurdle
to attaining our goals will remain if we cannot train those
INP forces charged with the toughest tasks. Mobile Brigade
units cannot operate at our level of expectations without
training up to our standards.

Engagement vs. Isolation
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4. (C) While past Brimob actions have earned them a negative
reputation, any beneficial impact from our isolating the unit
has long passed. Our 2005 Human Rights Report cites
individual incidents of extrajudicial killings, torture and a
firefight with the military. Despite these specific
incidents committed by a few, the current ban on ICITAP
training prevents us from providing all Mobile Brigade
personnel the human rights, appropriate force, and defense
techniques training that our Civil Disturbance Management
program has given other INP members and units since 2002.
This leaves Brimob personnel ill-equipped to react properly,
making them prone to overreact and retaliate with human
rights abuses. We need to engage and professionalize this
critical and potentially highly-effective INP component.

Proceed Within the Letter and Spirit of Leahy
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5. (C) Our approach must follow the letter and the spirit of
the law re training of security forces. We regularly select
INP personnel outside of Brimob for USG-funded training. In
accordance with the Leahy Amendment, we carefully vet
individuals and units for violations of human rights
violations before implementing training. We apply this

vetting to those Mobile Brigade members trained in
counter-terrorism skills under the DS/ATA program, as
specifically allowed under Department policy (ref A). Our
ICITAP training should apply the same standard to Mobile
Brigade units and personnel as it does to the rest of the
INP. We would pick Brimob units or members, apply the
vigorous vetting used in our current training programs, and
train those who make it through.


6. (C) By helping build a more capable and professional
Brimob, we would enhance GOI ability to maintain civil order
consistent with a stable, accountable, and mature democracy,
and with greater respect for human rights. Neglecting Brimob
makes no sense: it only serves to perpetuate the very
problems we hope to eliminate.

Action Request
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7. (C) We recommend scraping of current restrictions on
ICITAP training of Mobile Brigade units, and allow ICITAP to
train those units and members under the same conditions now
applied to other INP units and members.
PASCOE