A/S HILL'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003344

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID
SUBJECT: A/S HILL'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN PRESIDENT
YUDHOYONO MARCH 3

Classified By: AMBASSADOR B. LYNN PASCOE. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Indonesian President Yudhoyono March 3
described to EAP Assistant Secretary Chris Hill his plans to
press the Burmese junta to reform. During his visit to
Rangoon March 2, the President said he had urged General Than
Shwe to make progress on the national constitution, national
reconciliation and democracy. Yudhoyono said that the
Burmese leadership had three major fears: its safety;
"uncontrolled revenge" if a change in government occurs; and
conflict among the country's tribes. As a consequence, the
international community should stress, in addition to
fulfillment of the roadmap, national reconciliation and
maintenance of stability and resolution of communal problems.
Yudhoyono noted that China and India's close relationship
with Rangoon weakened the leverage of the international
community, and said he would press the Chinese leadership to
take a more constructive role. Yudhoyono welcomed the
upcoming visit by the Secretary to Jakarta and the
opportunity he would have to discuss with her the key issues
on which the U.S. and Indonesia could cooperate, including
bridging Muslim/West divisions. End Summary.


2. (C) Indonesian President Susilio Bambang Yudhoyono March
3 described to EAP Assistant Secretary Chris Hill his visit
to Rangoon March 2, which, he explained, he had undertaken in
his capacity as Indonesian President, not as an envoy of
UNSGY Annan or of ASEAN. He had emphasized to General Than
Shwe that Indonesia wanted to see progress on the national
constitution, national reconciliation and democracy.

Drawing A Picture of the Burmese Leadership
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3. (C) SBY noted he had met General Than Shwe once before,
at the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta in April 2005, and Prime
Minister General Soe Win three other times in Jakarta, Laos
and Kuala Lumpur. During SBY's visit to Rangoon, four
generals accompanied Than Shwe in the meetings. Burmese
Minister of Transportation, MG Thein Swe, accompanied SBY
throughout the visit and they talked at length. SBY said he
could now "draw a picture" of the leadership and its
concerns.

Burmese Concerns
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4. (C) Yudhoyono said that the Burmese leadership had three
major fears. First, it feared for its safety should
governmental change occur in Burma. For this reason, the
leadership had built the new capital Pyinmana, SBY said,
noting that he had learned that construction there would
include bunkers and other fortifications "like we see in
Libya." Second, the Generals fear "uncontrolled revenge" if
a change in government occurs. Third, the leadership fears
conflict among the country's ethnic groups.

Yudhoyono's Message to Than Shwe
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5. (C) Yudhoyono said, given these three major fears,
Indonesia and the international community should stress, in
addition to fulfillment of the roadmap, national
reconciliation, maintenance of stability and resolution of
communal problems. SBY noted that Burma needed a
"comprehensive solution." He added that he listened to the
leadership's arguments, and noted to them that "Indonesia had
experienced the same things in the past."

Evaluation of Burmese Leadership
--------------


6. (C) Yudhoyono noted that the Burmese "number two," Vice
Senior General Maung Aye, was in a power struggle with Than
Shwe. The number three, General Thura Shwe Mann, Chief of
General Staff in the Ministry of Defense, appeared more open.
SBY said he would keep in touch with Thura Shwe Mann, since
it could be possible to influence the situation through that
channel.

China and India Weaken Leverage
--------------


7. (C) Yudhoyono said Indonesia would work during the next

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two to three months to influence a real change. SBY added,
"to be frank," that while ASEAN pushed Burma, Rangoon was
relying on its "two biggest brothers," China and India.
China has three interests: access into Burma; addressing its
own energy consumption needs through gas and oil; and
protecting the regime from a transition to democracy. SBY
said he would contact the Chinese leadership to discuss this
and stress that there must be a smooth transition in Burma,
adding that China "can probably guarantee the security" of
the Burmese leadership.

Next Steps
--------------


8. (C) SBY is now planning next steps with his staff. He
had concluded during his visit that Indonesia must continue
the effort to press the Burmese leadership to implement the
roadmap; include Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) as part of the
national congress; seek national reconciliation; and support
conference resolve. SBY repeated he would talk to India and
China. He noted that Burma "hated" the United Nations,
making it impossible for the UN Special Envoy to meet the
leadership. This "hatred," SBY explained, resulted from
perceived "unfair UN reports" and "inappropriate behavior" by
UN agencies. SBY reiterated that "security" would provide a
way to persuade Than Shwe. In his discussions with Than
Shwe, SBY had recounted that eight years after the downfall
of General Suharto he, SBY -- an elected, retired general --
had appointed three former flag officers to his cabinet
without any problems and Indonesia had managed its transition
from military to elected-civilian rule. He added that "there
must be progress" to allow this to occur.

Aung San Suu Kyi
--------------


9. (C) A/S Hill asked if SBY had discussed ASSK. Yudhoyono
explained he had not mentioned her specifically by name, but
had told the leadership that he supported the idea of a
national congress and hoped it could include the leader of
the pro-democracy movement. A/S Hill noted that reaction in
the U.S. was very negative to the regime's continued
detention of ASSK and other human rights activists.


10. (C) In conclusion, SBY responded that to be "realistic,"
two things needed doing in Burma: 1) implement the promised
roadmap to democracy and include ASSK in the process; and 2)
seek national reconciliation and conflict resolution. Some
100,000 rebels currently existed in Burma, he noted; if the
international community told them it would support conflict
resolution, the rebels would "buy it." A/S Hill asked
whether the regime feared ASSK. SBY said he had not asked
that question; Indonesian citizens in Burma, however, had
told him they liked ASSK but doubted she could lead the
country because of the potential for communal conflict.

DPRK
--------------


11. (C) A/S Hill noted he had spoken with Indonesia's
special envoy to the DPRK Ambassador Nana Sutresna, and that
he was looking for ideas. SBY remarked "everybody is." A/S
Hill noted he was concerned by the situation with the DPRK.
SBY said he wanted to see progress in military-to-military
relations between the DPRK and ROK, and had offered to
facilitate a meeting between defense ministers. The DPRK had
responded that they could perhaps do so after the DPRK and
ROK military representatives met. A/S Hill noted that many
in Washington were losing confidence in the possibility of a
negotiated solution to the nuclear issue.

The Philippines
--------------


12. (C) A/S Hill noted that the U.S. worried about President
Arroyo's ability to remain in office. She had become
extremely unpopular and was stubborn. Her plan to change the
constitution to establish the position of a prime minister to
augment the position of president, which would become a more
ceremonial office, could possibly resolve the situation. It
would be disastrous, however, if she were unseated by
unconstitutional means, either through "people power" or
"military power" movements. A/S Hill said the U.S. had been
concerned by her imposition of a state of emergency. By

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ending the state of emergency, she had helped allay concerns
of the international community. SBY said that Indonesia also
faced a situation in which the legislature was not willing to
help solve problems but rather focused on stopping the
ongoing work of the government. A/S Hill said that the U.S.
and Philippines had an important job in Mindanao. U.S.
Special Forces were actively engaged to close gaps, collect
intelligence and act to get some of the bad guys. This is
progressing well and the U.S. did not want a governing crisis
in Manila to disrupt these efforts.

CT Cooperation with Neighbors
--------------


13. (C) SBY said that he had asked Malaysian PM Badawi to
have "real cooperation" among Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines in the Sulawesi Sea area. He had just appointed
former Indonesian National Police (INP) Chief Dai Bachtiar,
who had done a good job on counterterrorism while head of
INP, as "special envoy" to facilitate regional CT
cooperation. The biggest problem lay in Sabah, where the INP
sometimes had problems cooperating with Malaysian
counterparts. SBY reemphasized the importance of
cross-border cooperation and the need to share intelligence.
He said that PM Badawi had promised him that Malaysia could
increase its cooperation with Indonesia. Ambassador Pascoe
noted that U.S. Embassies in the region continued to work to
find ways to increase cooperation in the region and could, in
that regard, provide additional police and military training
or offer other programs if Yudhoyono identified them.

Secretary Rice's Visit to Indonesia

SIPDIS
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14. (C) A/S Hill noted that the Secretary was interested in
the Islamic world and the confrontation with the West and
would appreciate discussing this with SBY. She would also
like to discuss regional issues, A/S Hill said. Yudhoyono
responded he would talk to her openly about these issues. He
noted that he had a good talk with the Sultan of Brunei on
his just-concluded visit there and the two would do their
best to develop Islam into a moderate, tolerant and peaceful
religion. He said he needed to talk about this more
publicly: Indonesia had a silent majority but a noisy radical
minority.

Meeting with Presidential Advisor Djalal
--------------


15. (C) Presidential Advisor Dino Djalal provided A/S Hill
additional details on Yudhoyono's visit to Burma. He noted
that Indonesia had asked for a one-on-one for SBY with Than
Shwe but the Burmese refused; instead, a large meeting was
followed by a meeting with Than Shwe-plus-four on the Burmese
side and SBY-plus-four on Indonesia side. SBY has named
"dual special envoys" for Burma: Ali Alatas will be joined
by Hari Sabarno, who took SBY's place as Coordinating
Minister for Political and Security Affairs when
then-President Megawati fired SBY from the job.


16. (C) Djalal, noting that Than Shwe likes and has
confidence in SBY, said that SBY had invited him to visit
Indonesia. Djalal noted that Than Shwe had told SBY that "As
generals we both know that militaries cannot rule forever."
Djalal observed that the Junta seemed suspicious of ASEAN,
and had not, for example, informed ASEAN members of plans to
move the capital, which involved a great deal of corruption;
China, Thailand and India are making money on the
construction of the new capital.


17. (C) The one country with influence over the Junta is
China; SBY wants to work with President Hu Jintao. Indonesia
will also use the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Retreat in Bali,
April 17-18, and a possible bilateral on its margins, to
continue to press the junta to move on releasing ASSK.
Djalal said that SBY sought to keep a personal relationship
going with Than Shwe and use it to influence him. The Junta
remains suspicious of the U.S., and sees it as supporting the
Karen National Union (KNU). Djalal suggested a combination
of a hard U.S. stance and Indonesia's softer persuasion might
prove effective.


18. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Hill.
PASCOE