Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA2532
2006-02-24 11:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

SENATOR FEINGOLD'S FEBRUARY 23 MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL OREP PTER PGOV KAWC KNNP IR TT ID 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002532 

SIPDIS

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FBI FOR CTD/GAO - UC MONTOOTH
SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PREL OREP PTER PGOV KAWC KNNP IR TT ID
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD'S FEBRUARY 23 MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER WIRAJUDA

JAKARTA 00002532 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002532

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FBI FOR CTD/GAO - UC MONTOOTH
SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PREL OREP PTER PGOV KAWC KNNP IR TT ID
SUBJECT: SENATOR FEINGOLD'S FEBRUARY 23 MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER WIRAJUDA

JAKARTA 00002532 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Introduction and Summary. In a February 23 meeting
with Senator Russell Feingold, Indonesian Foreign Minister
Wirajuda expressed optimism that Indonesia's historic
experience with Islamic fundamentalism would eventually lead
to success in stemming the current threat posed by Muslim
extremists and terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. He
explained Indonesia's approach to seeking accountability for
crimes against humanity in East Timor, saying that the
bilateral Truth and Friendship Commission offers the best
prospects. With regard to Papua, Wirajuda stressed that the
Special Autonomy Law is the basis for the GOI's approach to
resolving the conflict, but he defended the GOI's policy of
excluding foreign journalists from the province. Wirajuda
explained that the GOI had decided to abstain in the IAEA
Board of Governors vote on referring Iran to the UN Security
Council because it had believed that there was still time to
reach a negotiated resolution. Wirajuda conceded that the
U.S. invasion of Iraq and detention center at Guantanamo had
damaged America's image in the eyes of many Indonesians. End
Summary.

Counter-Terrorism and Muslim Extremism
--------------


2. (C) Senator Russell Feingold, accompanied by Ambassador
and professional staff members Grey Frandsen and Evan
Gottesman, met with Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan
Wirajuda on February 23. Senator Feingold greeted Foreign
Minister Wirajuda, recalling their last meeting at a
Washington luncheon hosted by Senate Majority Leader Frist.
He stressed the importance of the United States' relationship
with Indonesia, saying that he personally was engaged on
bilateral issues including military-to-military relations;

the 2002 murders of two Amcits near Timika, Papua; and human
rights. He asked Wirajuda to offer an assessment of the
current terrorist threat in Indonesia. Wirajuda said that
the terrorists' goal was creation of an Islamic state. He
then offered a historic perspective, noting that Indonesia
had dealt with this issue since independence in 1945. He
explained that Indonesia's founding fathers had rejected the
option of making Indonesia an Islamic republic, and opted
instead for a pluralistic society. Again in the 50's and
60's, the GOI had fought armed insurgencies seeking to impose
sharia law in South Sulawesi, Sumatra, and West Java.
Currently in Indonesia, he said, there were groups that used
the democratic process to press for sharia law, while others
have turned to violence. However, because of its historic
experience with earlier groups advocating these goals,
Indonesia has not been as shocked as some of its neighbors by
the emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).


3. (C) Senator Feingold inquired whether Wirajuda believed
that JI was growing stronger or weaker. Wirajuda said that
particularly following the killing of the bomber Azahari, it
appeared that JI was growing weaker. He said that
Indonesia's historic experience shows that the vast majority
of Indonesians reject violent approaches. The GOI's strategy
for combating extremists involves "empowering the moderates"
by promoting domestic and international inter-faith dialogues.


4. (C) Senator Feingold commented that he was encouraged by
this approach, pointing out that many Americans were not
aware of Indonesia's tradition of religious moderation.
Wirajuda agreed, saying that Indonesian Islam is different
from forms of Islam that occur in an Arab cultural context.
Islamic extremists in Indonesia, he said, had adopted or were
influenced by Arab cultural traits.

East Timor
--------------


5. (C) Senator Feingold said that another of his concerns was
crimes against humanity committed during Indonesia's
occupation of East Timor. He said that he welcomed the
creation of the Commission on Truth and Friendship, but
stressed that there must be accountability for past crimes.


6. (C) Wirajuda acknowledged that previous efforts, such as

JAKARTA 00002532 002.2 OF 003


East Timor's Serious Crimes Unit and Indonesian prosecutions,
had proven unsatisfactory. After initial debate, he said,
GOI and the Government of East Timor had agreed to set up the
Truth and Friendship Commission as an initiative to establish
accountability. Wirajuda said, however, that the
Commission's Terms of Reference stipulated that it would
provide an amnesty and would not lead to further
prosecutions. He stressed that the Commission was primarily
a means to promoting greater reconciliation. Wirajuda noted
also that the governments of Indonesia and East Timor were
making good progress on other residual issues such as border
demarcation.


7. (C) Senator Feingold responded that while he continued to
urge that those responsible for crimes against humanity in
East Timor be prosecuted, he welcomed other efforts to
promote closure. He commented that this matter continues to
require serious attention.

Papua
--------------


8. (C) Turning to Papua, Senator Feingold said that he was
increasingly concerned about conditions in that region,
including underdevelopment, heavy-handed tactics by the
Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI),and an influx of non-Papuan
settlers. He stressed that the United States fully supports
Indonesia's territorial integrity, and asked what strategy
the GOI has taken to address the Papuan problem.


9. (C) Wirajuda explained that the armed insurgency in Papua
was insignificant, and certainly not comparable to the Aceh
conflict. He explained that the GOI was trying to fully
implement Papua's Special Autonomy Law, which provides for
increased revenue sharing with Papua's provincial and
district governments, but corruption and poor capacity were
serious problems for those levels of administration. With
regard to the division of Papua into two provinces, which has
been challenged by both Papuan and foreign critics of the
GOI, Wirajuda pointed out that Papua New Guinea - the eastern
half of the island - is divided into 20 provinces.


10. (C) Senator Feingold stressed that he was concerned by
reports of human rights violations in Papua, and asked about
the GOI's policy of forbidding foreign journalists access.
Wirajuda responded that the GOI "must be selective" because
the activities of journalists could "jeopardize efforts to
settle the problem." Indonesia's visa policy was generally
liberal, he said, but the GOI was nonetheless wary of
journalists who might "fan the flames" of conflict. The
Ambassador urged the GOI to reconsider its position, pointing
out that in Aceh, permitting access to journalists has
resulted in improved media coverage. Keeping Papua closed,
he said, hurts Indonesia.


11. (C) Senator Feingold thanked Wirajuda for the GOI's
progress on case of the murders of two American citizens in a
2002 shooting in Timika, Papua. He asked how Wirajuda
envisioned next steps in the case. Wirajuda responded that
the GOI remains committed to seeing the case through to a
trial and convictions, but was concerned about the affair
potentially being exploited by Papuan separatists. He said
that everyone within the GOI had agreed with the decision to
move the venue of the trial from Jayapura to Jakarta, where
it would create less agitation among separatists. Senator
Feingold assured Wirajuda that he would remain engaged on the
matter.

Iranian Nuclear Program
--------------


12. (C) Senator Feingold invited Wirajuda to explain
Indonesia's decision to abstain during the recent IAEA Board
of Governors vote on whether to refer the Iranian nuclear
program to the U.N. Security Council. Wirajuda reiterated
Indonesia's commitment to non-proliferation, but also to the
inalienable right for NPT signatories to develop nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. He said that in talks with
Iran, Indonesia had encouraged it to pursue Russia's offer to
develop a joint program, to continue dialogue with the EU-3,

JAKARTA 00002532 003.2 OF 003


and to permit IAEA inspectors to continue to monitor Iran's
activities. The problem, Wirajuda said, was a "lack of
trust." In the end, Wirajuda said, Indonesia had abstained
on the vote because it believed that there was time to reach
a negotiated settlement before the March 6 meeting of the
IAEA Board of Governors.

Indonesian Perceptions Of U.S. Policies
--------------

13. (C) Senator Feingold asked the Foreign Minister whether
U.S. policies in Iraq had negatively impacted Indonesian
perceptions of the U.S. Wirajuda said that this had been the
case "at first," and that some Indonesians were concerned
that there was an escalating confrontation between the
Christian and Muslim worlds. Senator Feingold asked whether
this had also been a factor in Indonesia's thinking on the
Iranian nuclear program. Wirajuda conceded that this was a
factor in terms of domestic perceptions of the issue, but
repeated that the GOI's decision to abstain had been mainly
driven by the desire to give diplomacy more time to work.
The Minister said that he privately believed that the U.S.
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay was hurting the United
States' image. He had personally agreed with the Malaysian
Foreign Minister's call to shut down Guantanamo, although he
had chosen not to express this publicly.


14. (U) CODEL Feingold has cleared this message.
PASCOE