INDONESIA-U.S. POLITICA-MILITARY TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 JAKARTA 001819

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA-U.S. POLITICA-MILITARY TALKS

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) Summary: U.S. and Indonesian delegations held a day
of political-military talks February 1 to explore expanded
bilateral cooperation following the U.S. decision in November
to end restrictions on military-to-military relations. The
U.S. delegation, led by Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary
of State for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
proposed that the U.S. and Indonesia focus security
cooperation on interoperability; improvement of capabilities
of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) for disaster relief,
maritime security, and regional stability; and defense reform
and increased civilian control of TNI. The U.S. team briefed
on the U.S. relationship with China, the Global Defense
Posture Review (GDPR),the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI),the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and
Article 98 agreements. The Indonesian delegation, led by
Harry Purwanto, Director for North and Central America in the
Department of Foreign Affairs, emphasized in its presentation
on regional perspectives and security priorities the
importance of safeguarding Indonesia's territorial integrity
and Indonesia's "active commitment to world social justice
and peace." He described ASEAN's contribution to regional
security and Indonesia's commitment to strengthen the
organization.


2. (C) A/S Hillen, when reviewing bilateral
political-military relations, assured the Indonesian
delegation that the U.S. had lifted all sanctions.
Indonesia's hard work to build democratic institutions and
reform TNI, and the reaction to cooperation between Indonesia
and the U.S. during tsunami relief efforts, had greatly
facilitated the U.S. decision. However, many of the issues
that caused friction in the past remained and both sides
should exercise caution that issues not "bubble up" again.
BG Abdul Cholik, Director of International Cooperation at the
Department of Defense (DEPHAN),emphasized Indonesia's
internal security and stability when he briefed on
Indonesia's defense priorities. Among the "general policy
descriptions" to fulfill these interests were improvement of
TNI professionalism, development of national strategic
industries, establishment of early warning capability, and
development of "minimum regular force, reserve and supporting
forces." Procurement of weapons should accord with the GOI
political directive that TNI develop the "minimum essential
force" necessary to address threats.


3. (C) A/S Hillen underscored the value of the opportunity
the talks provided for the two delegations to learn from each
other, and emphasized that the two countries should maintain
momentum, talk often, maintain transparency and exchange
information on what is happening in the field. He also
stressed that the U.S. and Indonesia should now work to find
common approaches to global problems -- for example, energy,
freedom of movement, Iran and DPRK non-proliferation. To
maintain support for a normal military-to-military
relationship, the two countries must also achieve concrete
results to demonstrate that cooperation pays dividends and
that we have moved forward and crossed a threshold. Purwanto
responded that bilateral relations had "never been better"
and that Indonesia was now duty-bound to fulfill the promise
made possible by the window that the U.S. had opened.
Purwanto opened the door to possible "PSI-like" cooperation
with the U.S. and a mechanism other than an Article 98
agreement to address U.S. non-surrender concerns. End
Summary.


4. (SBU) Dr. John Hillen, Assistant Secretary of State for
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, February 1 led a
Washington delegation to political-military talks with
Indonesia that included BG Jeffrey Remington, JCS/J5; LTC
Phil Clemmons, JCS/J5; Mr. Peter Ipsen, OSD/ISA; and Jane
Bocklage, DOS PM/RSAT. Embassy Jakarta DCM Lewis Amselem,
DATT COL Joseph Judge, ODC Chief Kenneth Comer, and POL
Officer Pepper Richhart joined the delegation. Harry
Purwanto, Director for North and Central America in the
Department of Foreign Affairs, organized and led the talks
for the Indonesian government. He was joined by officials
from the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of
Defense, TNI Headquarters, TNI's Intelligence Agency (BAIS),
Indonesian National Police (POLRI),National Intelligence
Body (BIN),and Department of Communications.

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Introductory Remarks

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United States
--------------


5. (C) A/S Hillen described the importance the U.S. placed
on the talks and told the Indonesian delegation that the U.S.
wanted to cement unbreakable ties between the two countries
and maintain the momentum achieved by the Administration's
decision to normalize the military-to-military relationship
in November, 2005. 2005 constituted a seminal year for the
bilateral relationship and the end of the "embargo" had
allowed the U.S. to move forward. Such progress only became
possible because of the significant progress Indonesia had
made in areas of accountability, cooperation and
democratization -- issues very important to the U.S. A/S
Hillen stressed that the U.S. Congress and the Administration
would continue to focus on those critical areas and would
look for ways the U.S. could help Indonesia continue such
reform.


6. (SBU) A/S Hillen said that U.S. proposed to focus
security cooperation efforts on three broad principles:

1) Interoperability;

2) Improvement of TNI capabilities, in particular for
disaster response and engagement to promote maritime security
and regional stability;

3) Defense reform and increased civilian control over the
military.

A/S Hillen reiterated that a very positive air now existed in
the Pentagon and in the State Department that could issue in
a new era of cooperation between the U.S. and Indonesia.

Indonesia
--------------


7. (C) Purwanto thanked the U.S. delegation for America's
attention and interest. He explained that after embracing
democracy, Indonesia had reached a crucial point at which the
government must give strong proof to the Indonesian people
that democracy was the right choice. This was not easy, he
added. Purwanto described the transnational problems facing
Indonesia: illegal fishing, logging, illicit drugs,
trafficking in persons. He explained the challenges posed by
Indonesia's extensive boarders and coastline. He said that
because of Indonesia's limited resources, the GOI welcomed
assistance from the United States based on equality and
mutual respect. He expressed Indonesia's willingness to
reinforce common values, reduce misperceptions and synergize
efforts.

-------------- ---
U.S. Views on China, GDPR, GOPI, PSI, Article 98
-------------- ---

U.S.-China relationship
--------------


8. (SBU) A/S Hillen described the bilateral U.S.-China
relationship as complex and one in which both partners needed
to do more to understand the other. He said the U.S. wanted
for China to succeed, noted that China was one of the largest
trading partners for the U.S. and stressed that geopolitical
competition with China was not inevitable. He noted that the
U.S. wanted a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan/China
relationship and had concerns regarding the lack of
transparency in the military and China's military buildup in
Southeast China.


9. (C) Purwanto responded that China made itself felt in
Southeast Asia, adding that India had also a significant
presence in the region. Southeast Asia shared borders with
both; if China increased its military capacity, it must
transit the Southeast Asian region wherever it went.
Likewise, as India expanded, it would want markets and access
to Southeast Asia. Purwanto asked for U.S. views on the
consequences for Southeast Asia of increased Chinese and
Indian power. Southeast Asian countries were concerned
regarding the regional balance of power, he noted, adding
that the region's "vision" had been good when it established
ASEAN to avoid conflicts in the region.


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10. (C) A/S Hillen responded that the U.S. had underway an
important initiative to build a new strategic relationship
with India, which included defense, political and economic
cooperation. He explained that U.S. policies toward India,
China and Southeast Asia were developed on their own terms;
while interconnected, these policies dealt with countries on
their own terms -- and Indonesia deserved that the U.S. do
this with it as well. Geopolitics matter -- relations with
China and Southeast Asia depended on each country's "weight."
This presented opportunities for Indonesia to play an
important role. BG Remington added that the U.S. and much of
the world had engaged China to encourage transparency; the
U.S. hoped its engagement would encourage China not to
develop a military force that would challenge the sea lines
of communication in Southeast Asia. The U.S. wanted by
engaging China to create a responsible partner; if China were
to threaten the region it would put at risk political
structures and econom
ies in the region.

Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR)
--------------


11. (SBU) A/S Hillen explained that the U.S. was working to
transform its foreign policy and security apparatus. He
noted changes in the Department of Defense and efforts in the
GDPR to transform the U.S. force position. He described
efforts within the State Department to shift the focus of
activity and positions from Europe to the Middle East, Africa
and Asia. BG Remington briefed on the GDPR.


12. (C) Purwanto observed that the threats the U.S. now
faces were non-traditional -- for example, terrorism -- and
the U.S. could not prevail with force alone. Had the U.S.
changed its strategy when deploying? Was the U.S. preparing
for old conflicts or had it developed a new paradigm to fight
terrorism and to help others? A/S Hillen agreed with
Purwanto that non-traditional threats required new responses,
and that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) called for
them. He added that the war on terror had political,
economic, informational and operational dimensions; success
depended on political legitimacy and economic development.
In one of the most important lines in the QDR the Pentagon
recognized the importance of non-military aspects of
conflicts.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
--------------


13. (SBU) A/S Hillen described the genesis of GPOI in the
2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit, and explained that the
initiative's five-year goals are to: 1) train and equip
global peacekeeping troops; 2) support deployment of
peacekeepers though assistance for lift and sustainability;
3) increase gendarme and police capabilities. He noted that
Thailand, Mongolia, Malaysia and Bangladesh were already GPOI
partners.


14. (SBU) Purwanto responded that Indonesia had established
a new task force at the Department of Foreign Affairs and a
training center to increase Indonesian PKO capabilities. He
noted that Indonesia since independence had contributed to
peacekeeping forces under UN auspices in many parts of the
world. The new peacekeeping center would encourage
Indonesian scientists and others to assist in Indonesian PKO
efforts; they would also focus on development of equipment.
He noted that Indonesia until now sent peacekeepers only to
operations under UN authority, and had not yet considered
other frameworks.


15. (SBU) A/S Hillen assured Purwanto that GPOI did not
compete with UN peacekeeping activities. He explained that
the U.S. had wanted the UN take over the PKO in Dafur, Sudan,
but that the OAU currently had the force there. The UN could
be one tool, but the U.S. had seen many examples -- the
tsunami relief effort was one -- in which waiting for the UN

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to respond would have taken too much time.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
--------------


16. (C) A/S Hillen said Washington needed good news about
Indonesia for the new mil-mil relationship to endure. The
relationship involved mutual commitments. In that regard,
the U.S. would like for Indonesia to join PSI. Doing so
would send an "important and profound signal" to Congress and

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would help build mutual trust.


17. (C) Purwanto responded that the GOI appreciated the
briefings on PSI given by visiting U.S. teams, but the GOI so
far had not decided to participate. Because of the high
value Indonesia placed on the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS),and the importance to Indonesia of maintaining
its territorial integrity and borders, Indonesia did not want
to join any arrangement it perceived not in line with UNCLOS.


18. (C) A/S Hillen said he appreciated GOI willingness to
consider U.S. entreaties to join PSI, and emphasized that 95
percent of PSI activity would occur in port, not on the high
seas, and UNCLOS would not come into play. He added that
many participants in PSI are firm supporters of the rule of
law and they saw no contradiction between PSI and UNCLOS or
their own national laws.


19. (C) Purwanto reiterated that Indonesia had long been
known for its strong commitment in multilateral fora to
non-proliferation and disarmament. Indonesia shared the U.S.
commitment to "eradicate the bad guys" engaged in
proliferation. Although Indonesia was not in a position to
"join" PSI, would there be any possibility for Indonesia and
the U.S. to develop a "different framework but still do
everything in PSI without joining PSI," Purwanto asked. He
added that "room for Indonesia to cooperate is still open."


20. (C) A/S Hillen responded that, in the end, finding an
alternative to PSI would be better than doing nothing at all.
The U.S. and Indonesia should not confuse means and ends,
and ends are important in this case. However, Indonesia may
still want to consider PSI because means take on symbolism.
In his trips to Congress to request funding for Indonesia, he
wanted to describe Congress Indonesian commitments, shared
commitments; PSI and other types of cooperation would matter.
The GOI should keep in mind activities we could undertake
jointly to demonstrate to Congress and to the Indonesian
Parliament that we are building and sharing trust and
sacrifice in partnership with each other.

Non-Surrender Agreement or SOFA
--------------


21. (C) A/S Hillen urged Indonesia to conclude a
non-surrender agreement or robust status of forces agreement
(SOFA) with the U.S. He referred to past efforts to come to
agreement on an Article 98 Agreement, said he understood the
large number of issues and the complexity of reaching an
agreement, but said that the U.S. and Indonesia should
continue their dialogue on this issue. He noted that the
Secretary would likely raise the issue during her visit to

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Indonesia. The U.S. deemed an agreement important for the
sake of the relationship and A/S Hillen therefore requested
the forbearance of the GOI to consider a non-surrender
agreement with the U.S.


22. (C) Purwanto explained that having just embraced
democracy, the Indonesian government must reflect the
positions of all stakeholders -- and some oppose conclusion
of an agreement that could facilitate impunity for human
rights abuses. Further, because Indonesia is not a party to
the Rome Statute, it need not consider a non-surrender
arrangement. Under the Indonesian legal system, the
government must have the approval of parliament for any
agreement involving political, security or human rights
issues. The GOI needed "time to digest" the U.S. offer
before responding and presenting such an agreement to the
Indonesian people. A/S Hillen repeated that the U.S. and
Indonesia could also consider a robust and permanent SOFA.
He noted, nevertheless, that over 100 countries had signed
Article 98 agreements with the U.S. Purwanto suggested that
it might be possible to address U.S. concerns through an
agreement other than an Article 98 agreement, such as a SOFA.

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Indonesian Regional Perspectives, Security Priorities
-------------- --------------


23. (C) Indonesian delegation head Purwanto emphasized in
his presentation on regional perspectives and security
priorities the importance of protecting Indonesia's
territorial integrity and Indonesia's "active commitment to
world social justice and peace." He mentioned Indonesian
peacekeeping efforts in countries with internal conflicts
(Cambodia and Southern Philippines) and GOI mediation efforts

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in the South China Sea.


24. (C) Purwanto explained that ASEAN had "re-energized
itself for stronger cooperation in ASEAN and with its
dialogue partners" to address issues such as
counterterrorism, maritime security, infectious diseases,
disaster relief. The original ASEAN members established the
organization to end conflict in the region, and its success
in doing so had allowed members to focus energies to
resolving internal problems.


25. (C) Indonesia occupied a strategic location and remained
a "relatively young archipelagic and littoral country,"
Purwanto said. Indonesia was in the early stages of assuming
responsibility for maritime security and welcomed assistance
from friendly countries. In the Malacca Strait, Indonesia
had undertaken joint activities with other littoral states.
Indonesia had established a new coordinating agency for
maritime security, "BAKROKAMLA," within the Coordinating
Ministry; members include representatives from Sea
Communications, Coast Guard, and the Navy. User states were
free to offer assistance "without being intrusive."


26. (C) Purwanto expressed appreciation for steps by the
U.S. Administration to support democracy in Indonesia and to
end restrictions on military-to-military relations. He noted
that with the Armed Forces Law of 2004 civilian control over
the military had been firmly established. He said that
Indonesia wanted to "go past arms exports from the U.S." and
sought closer collaboration to include joint development and
co-production of weapons in Indonesia. He concluded that
Indonesia had much left to do to reorganize its armed forces.


27. (C) The U.S. delegation asked about future developments
in ASEAN. Purwanto said he believed that the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) could help with confidence building measures,
through more dialogues, to prevent potential conflicts and
build trust and stability in the region if connected to the
Strait of Malacca. This could provide real and practical
cooperation. Purwanto repeated the suggestion he made in the
earlier session that Indonesia was willing to work with the
U.S. outside the framework of PSI and was "looking for ways
to build a mechanism" to do so.

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Review of U.S.-Indonesia Pol-Mil Relations
--------------


28. (C) A/S Hillen opened the U.S. review of bilateral
political-military relations by assuring the Indonesian
delegation that the U.S. had lifted all sanctions. He
emphasized that the President and Secretary had put their
political reputations at stake by doing so. The U.S. was
aided in its decision to normalize military relations by
Indonesia's hard work and by the reaction to cooperation
between Indonesia and the U.S. during tsunami relief efforts.
However, many of the issues that caused friction in the past
remained and both sides should exercise caution that issues
not "bubble up" again. A/S Hillen suggested, for example,
that there were some security units that the U.S. would be
unable to work with. The Embassy had submitted a robust plan
for increased military assistance to Indonesia, which the
State Department supported. Several programs were available
to bolster assistance, for example provision of excess
defense articles (EDA). In the current fiscal year, USD 1
million was available for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
and USD 792 thousand for IMET. Vetting of individuals/units
receiving training remained a legal requirement. It may
become necessary, as we map out the mil-mil relationship, to
make some tough decision, A/S Hillen cautioned, because
considerable congressional scrutiny remains.


29. (C) The Defense Resource Management Study Program could
serve as an important tool for TNI reform, and could help the
Administration demonstrate Indonesian seriousness in reform.
The U.S. and Indonesia needed to address some logistical
issues -- such as completion of an Access and Cross Servicing
Agreement (ACSA) and a 505 Agreement -- as well. A/S Hillen
noted that the defense cooperation ideas Purwanto had
proposed earlier seemed intriguing; cooperation could begin
government-to-government and the two governments could
subsequently press for industrial cooperation. ODC Chief LTC
Comer noted that the Embassy had already set in motion
discussion of an ACSA with the Indonesian Department of
Defense (DEPHAN); BG Cholik responded DEPHAN Secretary
General Syfrie Samsudin had concurred with conclusion of an

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ACSA. Purwanto observed that such practical considerations
constituted the "heart of the matter," and asked for further
details on a 505 Agreement, which Embassy officers promised
to provide.


30. (C) BG Cholik asked whether the lifting of restrictions
would be permanent, because this would affect planning and
budgeting for the Defense Department and TNI. A/S Hillen
replied that lifting of the "embargo" was permanent and no
time limit applied. However, the two governments needed to
"rush through the open window with good news and actions" to
demonstrate progress in outstanding issues and the value of a
normalized relationship. He repeated that the Administration
would not revisit the decision, unless a major event -- to
include human rights problems -- drove such a review. A/S
Hillen reiterated that the Administration had moved past the
decision to lift the embargo -- but significant scrutiny of
the relationship would continue. This applied as well to
vetting, done in accordance with the Leahy amendments, the
application of which a number of critics of Administration
policy would examine closely. The Administration would
continue to push, but the better it could demonstrate
concretely the wisdom of the decision to normalize, "the
better off we will be." A/S Hillen added that at times
disappointment would arise or decisions from the U.S. side
would appear unfair; however, both sides must exercise
caution and not risk the overall program by pushing through
an activity that could jeopardize it.


31. (C) Purwanto said that Indonesia needed to guarantee the
security and safety of its waters and would focus on maritime
security. A gap in equipment -- particularly the lack of
compatible equipment -- could hinder maritime security
cooperation with other countries. Purwanto asked that U.S.
ensure compatibility with army equipment for any equipment it
provides for maritime security. Further, the U.S. (through
the ICITAP program) has provided Indonesia's Maritime Police
small boats, but that trained personnel remained inadequate;
he asked that the U.S. consider additional training for
trainers -- to include programs in the U.S. -- for the
Maritime Police. A/S Hillen agreed with the importance of
supporting Indonesia's maritime security efforts: this was
clearly in U.S. security interests, given the importance of
Southeast Asia; it helps deter aggression and enhance
security; and it would improve interoperability, enabling
Indonesian forces to work better among each other and with
allies and partners.

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Indonesian Defense Priorities
--------------


32. (C) BG Cholik, Director of International Cooperation at
DEPHAN, emphasized Indonesia's internal security and
stability when he briefed on Indonesia's defense priorities.
The "threats and disturbances" to Indonesia he listed
included "sea and air security threats" and international
terrorism, but were far more focused on internal threats:
separatism; radicalism; communal conflicts; destruction of
the environment; natural disasters and their impact;
international crime; illegal immigration. Cholik broadly
sketched broad Indonesia's "national interest" as
guaranteeing "the welfare of all of the Indonesian people who
are within the 'unitary state of Indonesia (NKRI)' which is
based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution."


33. (C) BG Cholik said Indonesia's "permanent strategic
interest" was to "guard and protect the country's sovereignty
and the unity of Indonesia and the country's honor from every
threat, form outside as well form inside the country."
Indonesia's "urgent strategic interests" include: fighting
and overcoming the international terrorist threat; overcoming
the threats and disturbances of armed separatism; counter
radicalism; solve communal conflict and help rehabilitation;
overcome and prevent international crime; assist civil
government (local government).


34. (C) Among the "general policy descriptions" Cholik
described to fulfill these interests were improvement of TNI
professionalism, developing national strategic industries,
establish of early warning capability, and develop the
"minimum regular force, reserve and supporting forces."
Procurement of weapons should correspond to actual and
potential threats, the GOI political directive that TNI
develop the "minimum essential force" necessary to address
them, and the capabilities of national defense industries.

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35. (C) Weapons procurement priorities for the TNI Army are
purchase of arms and tactical vehicles; human rights
simulator for shooting training; and engineering equipment.
For TNI Navy DEPHAN prioritized patrol craft; transport
ships; and corvettes. Air Force procurement priorities are
maritime patrol aircraft; transport aircraft; and radar. For
the TNI generally, DEPHAN prioritizes counterterrorism
equipment. Cholik noted that "international terrorism is the
enemy of all the world community and must be fought together
by the international community," noting that terrorism had
become a threat to the safety of the nation and a threat to
democracy and civil society. He described the
counterterrorism units within TNI and POLRI and the role of
the Counterterrorism desk within the Coordinating Ministry
for Political, Security and Legal Affairs (MENKOPOLHUKAM).


36. (C) A/S Hillen expressed interest in further discussion
of Indonesian strategic thinking and for the Indonesian
delegation to expand its description of the threat
environment. Indonesia's focus on maintaining the country's
territorial integrity was clear, but with the end of the
conflict in Aceh, what concerns did Indonesia have in
addition to Papua? A/S Hillen asked whether the government
would own national strategic industries or did the GOI
contemplate private/public ownership? A/S Hillen noted that
BG Cholik had described weapons procurement priorities for
each service; based on U.S. experience, combined procurement
programs had benefits.


37. (C) Purwanto replied that despite the costs associated
with national strategic industries -- which compete with
other priorities for national resources -- Indonesia "as an
independent country wanted to be as independent as possible"
and meet its own needs. He noted that Indonesia had such
industries, but the larger among them needed assistance.
Also, for economic reasons -- Indonesia had 36 million
unemployed -- Indonesia needed to restore its economy and
sourcing defense materiel in Indonesia would assist. Further
development of these industries would also provide experience
and allow creativity.


38. (C) Of the threats facing Indonesia, separatism is the
most important, followed by "infiltration" of the country for
political reasons and economic reasons (e.g., illegal logging
or smuggling),Purwanto explained. The potential remained
for "horizontal conflicts," a third type of threat, because
of political or economic reasons (competition for economic
resources). A fourth threat, according to Purwanto, was the
accessibility of "ideas" made possible through globalization:
individuals could become radicalized through exposure to
foreign ideas; terrorism, for example, had been built up
because of foreign ideas. Fifth, natural disasters and
pandemic diseases that "appeared inexplicably" in Indonesia
posed threats, too. Sundawan, from the National Intelligence
Service (BIN),added that a potential threat could arise from
competition over natural resources in the sea; Indonesia
needed to strengthen the Navy to protect from illegal fishing
and other attempts to take Indonesian resources. He added
that Indonesian sovereignty over its outer islands remained
problematic and the GOI needed to take measures to
exercise/demonstrate sovereignty there. Strategic planning
for counterterrorism remained important, and intelligence
exchanges and information sharing could assist in this
effort. Indonesia needed U.S. assistance to improve
professionalism, although interoperability remained
difficult, Sundawan concluded.

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Moving the Mil-Mil Relationship Forward
--------------


39. (C) In concluding, A/S Hillen underscored the value of
the opportunity for the two delegations to learn from each
other during the day's meetings. He proposed several
principles that Indonesia and the U.S. could follow as they
moved forward:

1) Keep up momentum, talk often, let the political system
know that we are talking;

2) Maintain transparency; exchange information on what is
happening in the field;

3) Find good news, package it, sell it to build support for a
continuation of programs;

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4) Work toward interoperability -- to facilitate Southeast
Asian security cooperation, PKOs, and to enable our two
democracies to help solve problems;

5) Work to find common approaches to global problems -- for
example, energy, freedom of movement, Iran and DPRK
non-proliferation; the U.S. and Indonesia will build
understanding of each other by work together on such issues;
this may involve some risk-taking as we find common
approached; we need to become "entrepreneurs" in this;

6) Achieve concrete results to demonstrate that cooperation
pays dividends; as a practical matter, when the Secretary
visits Indonesia soon we should have results we can deliver
to demonstrate we have moved forward and crossed a threshold.



40. (C) Purwanto seconded the recommendation that the U.S.
and Indonesia should maintain momentum. This first pol-mil
meeting provided a good start. Thanking the U.S. delegation,
he said that bilateral relations had "never been better" and
that Indonesia was now duty-bound to fulfill the promise made
possible by the window that the U.S. had opened.


41. (U) A/S Hillen cleared this cable.
PASCOE