INDONESIA: A/S HILLEN'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001818

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016
TAGS: MASS MARR PREL PGOV ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA: A/S HILLEN'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE
MINISTER JUWONO

REF: JAKARTA 0858

Classified By: POLITICAL OFFICER RAYMOND RICHHART. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary John Hillen February 1
described to Indonesian Defense Minister the "great
anticipation" in the U.S. regarding Indonesia and the U.S.
desired a robust relationship with Indonesia. Juwono told
A/S Hillen he would do whatever necessary to strengthen this
relationship, which had become very important economically
and politically for Indonesia. A/S Hillen praised Juwono for
the reforms the GOI had made in the Indonesian Armed Forces
(TNI),and explained that the U.S. had a number of ways it
could assist Indonesia improve TNI's capabilities. Juwono
assured A/S Hillen that support from the United States
safeguarded the foundations of democracy and permitted their
development into greater substance as a working democracy.
Juwono described the important role TNI continued to fulfill
in safeguarding Indonesian territory and noted GOI
investigation into the killing of a Papuan youth by TNI. End
Summary.

Robust U.S. Relationship with Indonesia
--------------


2. (C) A/S Hillen praised Juwono for the reforms Indonesia
had made in the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Juwono
replied that the credit for the transformation of TNI
belonged to President Yudhoyono and Coordinating Minister
Widodo, both of whom had already begun their efforts years
earlier and continued them today. Hillen described "great
anticipation" in the U.S. regarding Indonesia and described
new geo-strategic thinking in the U.S. He said Secretary
Rice wanted a robust relationship with Indonesia, that she
was determined, and that she had the President's ear. The
Secretary considers Indonesia as a pivotal state for

SIPDIS
geographic, religious, Asian and strategic reasons, and would
continue to do whatever necessary to make the bilateral
relationship with the U.S. important to Indonesia.


3. (C) Juwono replied he would also do whatever necessary to
strengthen this relationship, which had become very important
economically and politically for Indonesia. He observed that
Indonesia had still far to go economically and that
Indonesia's transition depended on how the "situation played
out economically." Otherwise, the country would just "muddle
through." Support from the United States safeguarded the
foundations of democracy and permitted their development into
greater substance as a working democracy. Juwono explained
that Indonesia's middle class amounted to less than 15% of
the population and that the country's GDP of USD 1300 per
year was about that of China; Indonesia must quadruple that
number, he said.

TNI Role in Safeguarding Indonesian Territory
--------------


4. (C) Juwono said that much of Indonesia's future depended
on how the GOI managed its transition from an authoritarian
regime to a full democracy and safeguarding Indonesian
territory remained an important aspect of such management.
A/S Hillen noted that the agreement that the GOI signed
August 15 with the separatist Free Aceh Movement, which ended
almost thirty years of fighting there, would help put an end
to such territorial concerns. Juwono explained that on both
extremes of the country -- in Aceh in the west and Papua in
the east -- Indonesia must do more. Those areas "need to
feel a part of the Indonesian mainstream on more equitable
terms," but Papua remained a "triple minority" with different
religion, ethnicity and culture.


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that Papuan leaders complained
that the TNI presence had become too large, and that reports
indicated TNI planed further troop buildups there. Juwono
responded that he did not believe this true and that NGO's
had exaggerated increases. TNI had relocated
non-locally-based troops had rotated others out of Papua;
better airlift capabilities could allow TNI to have fewer
troops there also. Juwono added he believed it normal for
Indonesia to emphasize security in the province. During the
conflict in East Timor, TNI was concerned that Papua might
attempt to break away as well.


6. (C) Juwono said that the GOI had discussed troop levels

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in Papua and believed that a combined TNI and Indonesian
National Police (POLRI) presence of 15,000 was appropriate,
but the GOI could decide to change this. He acknowledged
this remained probably "5,000 too many for Papuans." He
added that the Ministry of Home Affairs currently was
discussing the issue. The Ambassador noted that Papuans
appeared more receptive to a POLRI presence. He added that
he was encouraged to learn of the internal GOI discussion of
the issue, since the U.S. had heard TNI had increased its
presence there.


7. (C) Juwono recounted that he had received a delegation of
20 Papuan leaders to discuss the death of a Papuan boy
January 20 when TNI soldiers opened fire on a crowd in the
remote town of Waghete (reftel). Juwono agreed that the GOI
should investigate the matter, and the GOI was looking at
police reports, which claimed the group in which the boy had
demonstrated had resorted to violence. Juwono added that the
GOI was "looking at the issue from both sides."

Uses For U.S. Military Assistance
--------------


8. (C) A/S Hillen asked whether bilateral military
cooperation could assist in stitching such disparate areas of
Indonesia together by giving TNI greater humanitarian
assistance capacity. He added that the U.S. wanted to
strengthen regional stability, which could also bolster
domestic security. Juwono agreed that sea lines of
communication remained important, noting that 46 percent of
gas and oil from the Middle East passed through the straits
of Malacca or Lombok. Safe passage remained critical for the
stability of China and Japan, and important for the U.S. as
well.


9. (C) Juwono said that Indonesia's defense budget amounted
to only USD 2.8 billion -- one half that of Singapore.
Indonesia "piggybacked" on Singapore and Malaysia for the
maritime security of the Strait of Malacca. A/S Hillen said
he thought this wise, adding that the U.S. now did everything
in coalition with others. He added he found great
opportunities for Indonesia in such cooperation in terms of
jointness and interoperability. Juwono explained that
Indonesia would focus primarily on improving TNI's
capabilities in transportation and lift, and that it "did not
aim for high-profile strike capability." TNI's C-130 fleet
was very useful for transporting troops to trouble spots as
well as providing humanitarian relief. Juwono expressed
appreciation for PACOM's recent provision of a fleet hospital
to TNI.


10. (C) A/S Hillen explained that the U.S. had a number of
ways it could assist Indonesia to improve TNI's capabilities.
In addition to FMF, direct commercial sales had become
possible, as well as the provision of excess defense articles
-- which, however, required conclusion of a bilateral
agreement. PACOM Commander Admiral Fallon, the Department of
State, and other U.S. agencies continued to explore many
avenues for U.S. assistance. A/S Hillen stressed the
importance of describing to Congress bilateral activities and
accomplishments. Conclusion of an Article 98 Agreement and
Indonesian support for the Proliferation Security
Initiative's (PSI) Statement of Principles would signal
progress in the relationship. The U.S. and Indonesia could
work together on programmatic aspects of the normalizing
mil-mil relationship.

Selling the Relationship in Washington
--------------


11. A/S Hillen noted that a shift in emphasis toward Asia
had occurred in the State Department, and that, as a
consequence, it was "a good time to discuss how we can lean
forward in Indonesian-U.S. relations and how to package that
relationship in Washington so we can sell it." The
Ambassador noted to Juwono that the investiture of the new
TNI Chief of Staff would provide an excellent opportunity for
the GOI to make clear statements regarding the direction of
reform in TNI. Juwono agreed, noted that General Sutarto,
when he became Chief of Staff three and a half years earlier,
had expressed sensitivity to civilian control and changes in
TNI. Now, TNI is waiting for the civilian government to
"take up the reins of power and act responsibly."


12. (C) Juwono said that the "biggest issue in Indonesia"

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was governance by civilian groups; donors had assisted at the
local level with some success. The Ambassador said the U.S.
wanted to know how it could help bolster civilian control of
TNI, adding that assistance to strengthen civilian
procurement system could help. The visit of A/S Hillen and
BG Remington constituted part of an early effort to determine
how the U.S. could best become part of the reform process.
He added that Lt Gen (ret) Edwin Smith, President of PACOM's
Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS),would
visit soon to explore ways the Center could assist in
improving general education within TNI and with the
establishment of an NSC-type body in Indonesia. A/S Hillen
added that DOD programs could assist in evaluating TNI
progress and needs. Juwono replied that Indonesia was "one
of the most under-managed countries in the world" and well
behind Thailand and the Philippines.

A Universe of Possibilities Exits
--------------


13. (C) A/S Hillen said "everything is on the table" and
that although detractors would exist, a "universe of
possibilities" now existed. He added that Ambassador Pascoe
was pressing for an ambitious program and that the U.S.
welcomed the broad recognition of Indonesia as a pivotal
state. Juwono emphasized that the U.S. should "not give
Indonesia too much money" because of its limited absorptive
capacity and that the "right amount has to be calculated."
He recalled that during his tenure as Minister of Education,
the World Bank had provided more assistance to education than
the country could absorb, with consequent waste and
distortions. A/S Hillen assured Juwono that the U.S. wanted
a program that increased and built capabilities. Juwono said
he hoped the U.S. could send more mid-grade officers to the
U.S. for training; A/S Hillen replied that the U.S. hoped to
increase funding levels for IMET programs.


14. (C) BG Remington said that the current window of
opportunity for U.S. assistance to TNI was very large and
that the U.S. could now undertake a number of rather
important initiatives. The U.S. needed to show progress and
build a strong, active program with Indonesia by the end of
the current U.S. administration. He agreed that the U.S. did
not, however, want to "overwhelm" Indonesia.


15. (C) The Ambassador noted that he was struck that
Indonesia shared greater similarities in its democratic
transition with countries in Eastern Europe than with other
Asian countries. The U.S. brings to the table fifteen years
of experience in Eastern Europe, in which it developed a
variety of approaches, not a "one-size-fits-all" program.
Countries elsewhere had experienced many of Indonesia's
needs; the U.S. had successes in its programs with them and
could discuss with Indonesia bureaucratic transitions. U.S.
experience in training Georgia's Coast Guard, when it could
not train the Navy, was such an example.


16. (C) A/S Hillen repeated that bilateral cooperation must
outlast the current administrations of either country. He
said that when he looked out ten years he could see Indonesia
comfortable in military coalitions. The Ambassador added
that the U.S. would be pleased to assist Indonesia to
cooperate with Malaysia and the Philippines. In its combined
activities in the Sulawesi Sea, for example, the U.S. could
assist in planning and provide other support.


17. (U) A/S Hillen cleared this cable.
PASCOE