HELPING DENMARK AND OTHER EUROPEANS WEATHER THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001651

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, DS/ITA AND DS/IP/EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2014
TAGS: PREL KISL PTER ASEC ID DA
SUBJECT: HELPING DENMARK AND OTHER EUROPEANS WEATHER THE
CARTOON STORM

REF: A. JAKARTA 1456 (INDONESIANS VENT)


B. JAKARTA 1507 (DEMONSTRATION AT U.S. CONSULATE)

C. JAKARTA 1622 (MEETING WITH POLICE)

D. STATE 20453 (ASSISTING DENMARK)

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe. Reason: 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: We have maintained close and cooperative
contact with our Danish and Norwegian diplomatic colleagues
as violent demonstrators have targeted Danish and American
diplomatic missions. We have offered various types of
security assistance and weighed in with the GOI at senior
levels to assure adequate protection for all diplomatic
missions and personnel, particularly those of nations most
closely associated with the cartoon flap. We will continue
to provide whatever assistance we can, including the
housing/protection of the Danish Ambassador. However, to
safeguard our own personnel and facilities, our assistance
should remain out of the public eye. End Summary.


2. (C) We reported (ref A) on a rowdy February 3
demonstration outside the Danish Embassy, noting the
potential for a possible spillover on U.S. interests in
Indonesia. Danish diplomats took a low-profile over the
weekend. We established contact with the Danish DCM on
Monday morning February 6. He informed us that the Danish
Ambassador had met officials of the GOI Department of Foreign
Affairs to raise security concerns, but had not received GOI
assurances of additional police protection for Danish
diplomatic facilities. He agreed to stay in close contact on
related developments, but said the Danes did not require USG
assistance. We later learned that Austria, in its capacity
as EU Presidency country, had failed to secure an appointment
at the Department of Foreign Affairs to raise security
concerns until late Monday afternoon.


3. (C) The Ambassador also called the Danish Ambassador to
discuss the evolving demonstration situation on Monday and
offered to provide whatever assistance the Danes required.
In addition, the Danish and U.S. Consulates General in
Surabaya remained in close communication regarding a planned
demonstration outside both Consulates. The acting chief of
the Danish Consulate declined RSO Surabaya's offer of
assistance. Violent demonstrations subsequently took place
at both sites, and both sustained property damage and closed
(ref B). We contacted police officials before and during the
protests to urge adequate protection. Later that day, we
held an EAC and contacted Presidential advisor Andi
Mallarangeng to request additional security presence for all
diplomatic missions, particularly those of European countries
affected directly by the cartoon flap and that might not have
the contacts to request police assistance. Andi informed us
that President Yudhoyono had ordered the GOI National Police
Chief to provide enhanced security to all diplomatic
missions. The Ambassador could not make contact with the
Danish Ambassador that evening, but conveyed the information
to the Austrian Ambassador. He also asked the British
Ambassador to weigh in with his police contacts (and his
less-seasoned EU colleagues) to ensure a more robust GOI
security presence at EU embassies.


4. (C) We followed up on our security concerns and
Mallarangeng's assurance in a February 7 meeting with senior
police officials, who told us that we would see no repeat of
the February 6 protests (ref C). They also said that orders
had gone out to regional police chiefs to increase security
at all diplomatic facilities. The Ambassador conveyed this
information to the Danish Ambassador, and met the Norwegian
and Swedish Ambassadors to discuss their security concerns.
Their embassies occupy office in the same high-rise tower as
the Danish Embassy, which remains closed. The Swedish and
Norwegian ambassadors asked RSO to examine their existing
security arrangements and offer suggestions. The Ambassador
and Ambassador Cain in Copenhagen discussed our efforts to
assist the Danish mission in Indonesia.


5. (C) After an early morning February 8 Ops Center call
asking us to provide protection to the Danish Ambassador, we
contacted him and again offered assistance. The Danish
Ambassador and DCM advised RSO that they had moved to a local
hotel and felt concerned about their personal safety. RSO
transported the two men in an armored vehicle with local
security escort to a U.S. Embassy-owned residential compound
that also includes the Marine House, where they have

quartered on a temporary basis. The two Danes told us they
plan to stay in Indonesia for an additional 1-2 days to
facilitate the departure of Danish nationals pursuant to a
Danish government travel advisory. We have increased
security coverage at the residential compound, and will
provide security for needed travel by the two men around
Jakarta. The Danish Ambassador said his security concerns
stem from death threats by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI),
a thuggish local group that staged the embassy and consulate
demonstrations. Past FPI threats of violence (e.g., threats
to kill American diplomats at the time of our liberation of
Iraq) have not come to pass.


6. (C) Also February 8, we had frequent contact with the
Danish Ambassador and the acting chief of the Danish
Consulate in Surabaya regarding a planned demonstration in
that city. As before, we offered any assistance required.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) We have and will continue to provide whatever
assistance our Danish and Norwegian diplomatic colleagues
request. Due to concerns over the safety of our own
personnel and facilities, our assistance should remain behind
the scenes and out of the public eye.
PASCOE