Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA13497
2006-12-15 09:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

INDONESIA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

Tags:  PREL PHUM AORC UNSC ID 
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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2479
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0226
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 3823
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 1216
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0086
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 7468
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013497 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG, PDAS WARLICK, IO/UNP, AND
EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM AORC UNSC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL


Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013497

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG, PDAS WARLICK, IO/UNP, AND
EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM AORC UNSC ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA ON THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL


Classified By: B. Lynn Pascoe, Ambassador. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Indonesia's election to the UNSC demonstrates
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) desire to raise
his country's international profile. We have recently seen
the emergence of a more flexible, multi-faceted style of
Indonesian diplomacy, particularly where SBY's personal
initiatives and interests come into play. SBY's personal
focus on improving bilateral ties with key powers should help
us deal with Indonesia on the UNSC. Leading Foreign Ministry
(DEPLU) personnel, however, trained in New York and Geneva,
remain steeped in traditional (and unhelpful) views of the
Non-Aligned Movement. We have urged the GOI to base its
foreign policy on its interests as a large democratic nation,
leaving the NAM behind. We will have to make clear that GOI
positions on the UNSC will receive high level attention in
Washington and could have repercussions on our bilateral
relationship.


2. (C) To promote constructive Indonesian behavior on the
UNSC we will need to reach out to senior levels of the GOI on
critical votes; make it clear that Indonesia is important to
us as an influential emerging democracy, not as the voice of
the NAM or the OIC; and encourage the GOI to seek practical
solutions rather than rhetorical responses to crises in areas
like the Middle East. We anticipate some level of Indonesian
cooperation on North Korea, Burma, and, depending on the
specific issue, Iraq and Lebanon. The most difficult issues
will be Israel, Palestine, and the Peace Process. The
biggest question mark is the Iranian nuclear issue, where
Indonesia has said some of the right things, but resisted
concrete action. End Summary.

Steeped in the Values of the NAM
--------------


3. (C) Indonesian foreign policy is steeped in its identity
as founder of the Non-Aligned Movement. Generations of
Indonesian diplomats have been indoctrinated in the following
foreign affairs orthodoxy:

-- The NAM: Since 1948, Indonesia has carefully pursued a
policy of non-aligning with either superpower - whether there
were two superpowers or only one. Indonesia still resists
the appearance of aligning with U.S., at times in visible
contradiction to its own interests or domestic policies.
This policy orientation was deepened when the GOI helped
found the NAM as host of the 1955 Bandung Conference. The
GOI organized a major 50th anniversary commemoration last
year, attended by some 70 world leaders. Many Indonesian
policymakers still see a relevance of the Non-Aligned
Movement in a post-Cold War context that is difficult to
justify.

-- OIC/Muslim solidarity: Indonesia is eager to assert
solidarity with other Muslim countries for domestic as well
as foreign policy reasons, although Indonesia is not a leader
within the Organization of the Islamic Conference itself.

-- A lingering "Asian values" mentality on human rights: The
GOI usually opposes what it considers confrontational Western
approaches on human rights, although there has been some
change with regard to Burma. Sensitivity here remains strong
since Jakarta has been a well-justified target of criticism
on human rights issues, especially for abuses in East Timor.
Indonesia's policy of "no naming and shaming" based on this
history has caused it to associate itself with the most
reprehensible regimes in many UN votes.


4. (C) Notwithstanding this legacy, SBY is the most
outward-looking Indonesian President to date. With both
military and civilian education in the U.S. as well as
personal experience in peacekeeping missions, he is confident
in his dealings with us and is growing in office. His
decision to participate in UNIFIL illustrated his desire to
be part of a solution, not just criticize from the sidelines.


5. (C) The GOI is also cultivating more robust bilateral

JAKARTA 00013497 002 OF 004


relationships with its regional neighbors and other major
powers. Human rights are not off-limits as a discussion
topic, and the GOI has supported inter-faith dialogues
between Indonesian and foreign religious leaders. The GOI
has shown considerable creativity and boldness in promoting
the ASEAN Political and Security Community and the ASEAN
Charter, both of which break with the organization's past
indifference to domestic political values. The GOI was at
the forefront of ASEAN's successful push to include India,
New Zealand, and Australia in the East Asia Summit. In
short, we may be witnessing the emergence of a more creative
and constructive Indonesian diplomacy - driven from the top
down.

The Domestic Component
--------------


6. (C) That having been said, SBY must contend with domestic
political constraints. U.S. policies on Iraq, Afghanistan,
Israel-Palestinians and many aspects of the war on terrorism
are deeply unpopular in Indonesia. The reality is that much
of the Indonesian public, press and Parliament believe the
U.S. is biased against Muslims in the foreign policy arena,
even when they welcome bilateral cooperation. SBY and his
government must be careful with appearances when they deal
with us and this domestic sentiment will color unhelpfully
their Security Council decision-making. SBY will not want to
add to the many headaches from either the nationalist or
Islamist opposition camps, both of which will make hay out of
any perceived pandering to US demands.

Indonesia on The UNSC: A Challenge For U.S. Diplomacy
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Indonesia's upcoming tenure on the UN Security Council
presents a challenge for U.S. diplomacy. The GOI's Security
Council agenda is sketchy, but senior officials have
nonetheless made a few priorities public. One is to get the
UNSC more involved in Israel-Palestine Peace Process.
Another is to "bridge the gap" between the Security Council
and the General Assembly, although it is not clear what this
means. The Indonesians also appear to believe they have a
mandate to be the voice of the OIC and the NAM on the
Security Council.


8. (C) Indonesia's approach to diplomacy is to avoid
disharmony and to build consensus via compromise. On the
Security Council, this tendency will sometimes take the form
of unwelcome efforts to water down our resolutions on matters
of fundamental importance to us. However, Indonesia is also
highly averse to standing in the way of an emerging
consensus, and is unlikely to block any resolution supported
by all members of the P-5. This means that Indonesia will
not play the role of a spoiler on the Security Council.


9. (C) In the UNGA and the Human Rights Council, Indonesia
has strictly followed, except with respect to Israel, a
policy of opposing country-specific resolutions. In the
UNSC, the GOI will not be able to avoid addressing
resolutions on individual countries, but in these cases will
probably resist sanctions.

Indonesia Faces the Issues
--------------


10. (C) North Korea: Indonesia may be helpful to us on
Korean peninsula issues. The GOI recognizes that the DPRK is
a threat to regional security, and acknowledges that UNSC
Resolution 1718 is legally binding on all UN member states.
Last summer, the GOI issued a strong statement condemning the
DPRK's missile test and canceled a planned visit by SBY to
Pyongyang. The GOI is a strong supporter of the Six-Party
Talks, but in the past has pursued its own diplomatic
initiatives as a complementary effort. We should work with
Japan to push the GOI for strong UNSC action on North Korea.


11. (C) Burma: The GOI acknowledges that the situation in
Burma is unacceptable, and has been exasperated by the
stubbornness and erratic behavior of the SPDC. The
Indonesians are concerned that the junta is bringing ASEAN
into disrepute, and were relieved when Burma relinquished its

JAKARTA 00013497 003 OF 004


turn as the organization's chairman. Foreign Minister
Wirajuda recently hinted publicly that Indonesia is no longer
willing to protect the SPDC against international actions.
However, Indonesia prefers to address the problem bilaterally
and in an ASEAN context. The GOI has consistently pursued a
policy of "constructive engagement" with Rangoon, believing
that the SPDC can learn from Indonesia's own transition from
military-dominated autocracy to democracy. The GOI would
probably support UNSC resolutions expressing concern over
conditions in Burma and support for the SYG's special
representative, but would abstain on or oppose explicit
punitive action.


12. (C) Iraq: We may be able to work with Indonesia on Iraq.
In recent weeks, SBY and Foreign Minister Wirajuda have set
forth the vague outlines of a plan for Iraq. They have
called for an international conference; a reconciliation
process among sectarian groups in Iraq; an international
reconstruction and rehabilitation program; and introduction
of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force made up of forces from
Muslim states. While these ideas are unclear in key aspects,
we believe they show Indonesia's leaders sincerely want to be
helpful and are willing to consider contributing troops if
conditions are right. Indonesia is showing signs of taking
Iraq seriously, and this may translate into a constructive
attitude on the Security Council.


13. (C) Lebanon: Indonesia's contribution of 850
peacekeepers to UNIFIL should lead them to realistic
positions on Lebanon in the UNSC. We should not expect,
however, Indonesian support for actions against Syria or Iran
without strong P-5 consensus.


14. (C) Middle East: Indonesia would like to be taken
seriously as a player on Middle East Peace Process issues.
As with Iraq, this is an area where SBY would like to see
Indonesia as part of the solution rather than a critic on the
sidelines - but he will face tremendous domestic pressure on
any relevant resolution. Indonesia has called for a revival
of the "Road Map" in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and has
dispatched an envoy to the region. The GOI is a strong
proponent of a two-state solution but does not recognize
Israel, despite cultivating some official contacts in New
York and elsewhere. We should dissuade the Indonesians from
simply espousing a generic OIC line and encourage them to
focus on practical outcomes. Over time, this engagement
might begin to make a dent in Jakarta's current knee-jerk
policy in this area.


15. (C) Iran: As we saw when Jakarta abstained in the
February 2006 IAEA Board of Governors vote, we cannot take
Indonesia for granted on the Iran nuclear issue. While the
GOI has called for Iran to live up to its NPT obligations, it
has resisted acknowledging that Iran's nuclear program is for
other than peaceful purposes, and has consistently opposed
"coercive" approaches to the problem. The Indonesians
persist in suspecting - despite widespread assurances to the
contrary - that the international community's actions on
Iran's nuclear program somehow have implications for their
own plans to develop civilian nuclear energy.


16. (C) Iran is admired by many Indonesian Muslims, and
President Ahmadinejad received a warm welcome during his
visit to Jakarta last May, although his hard line took SBY by
surprise. This public sympathy imposes significant political
constraints on Indonesia's Security Council options.
Indonesia may well introduce compromise language on Iran
resolutions and will resist siding in the Security Council
with the U.S. against a fellow Muslim country, unless faced
by a strong P-5 consensus.

Engaging Indonesia on The UNSC
--------------


17. (C) In our dialogue with the GOI on Security Council
issues, we should consistently invoke Indonesia's status and
influence as the largest democracy in East Asia and the
largest majority-Muslim democracy in the world. We should
clearly signal that these factors are our basis for engaging
Indonesia, not its role as self-appointed voice of the NAM,
OIC, or any other bloc. We should appeal to the GOI to

JAKARTA 00013497 004 OF 004


demonstrate its new commitment to democracy and improved
observance of human rights in its foreign policy decisions.
In short, it is time for Indonesia's foreign policy to catch
up with the positive evolution we have seen in its domestic
institutions. Indonesia is now a democratic giant, not a NAM
dwarf.


18. (C) Since impulses for change in Indonesian foreign
policy tend to originate with President Yudhoyono and his
staff, the U.S. must be ready to reach out to this level on
critical UNSC votes. A senior Department official should be
designated as interlocutor on Security Council matters with
Indonesian National Security Advisor Dino Patti Djalal.
Calls from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Wirajuda would
help -- at least causing him to think twice before
acquiescing to unhelpful positions developed by his staff or
falling back on unhelpful instincts. On votes of the very
highest importance, the President should consider calling SBY
directly.


19. (C) As a Security Council member, Indonesia will
undoubtedly be the source of some disappointments and
frustrations. But in recent years, Indonesia's domestic
political system has changed in positive ways that many
observers - including Indonesians - had long deemed
impossible. There is no reason this change cannot occur in
its foreign policy as well. The best way to promote such
evolution is by patiently and respectfully challenging
Indonesia to live up to its new values. We hope that over
the longer term, this will result in a more flexible and
constructive Indonesian approach to foreign affairs both in
the UNSC and elsewhere.
PASCOE