Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA13392
2006-12-04 10:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

SBY'S CT RECORD AFTER TWO YEARS: A MIXED BAG

Tags:  PTER PGOV PREL KJUS ASEC KISL ID 
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VZCZCXRO5221
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #3392/01 3381004
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041004Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2331
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0166
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1181
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 013392 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT AND EAP/MTS
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/4/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KJUS ASEC KISL ID
SUBJECT: SBY'S CT RECORD AFTER TWO YEARS: A MIXED BAG

REF: A. JAKARTA 12602

B. JAKARTA 9160

C. JAKARTA 9443

D. JAKARTA 11663

E. 05 JAKARTA 14173

F. 05 JAKARTA 12423

G. JAKARTA 12773

H. JAKARTA 9424

I. USDAO JAKARTA IIR 6 845 0464 06

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 JAKARTA 013392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT AND EAP/MTS
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/4/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KJUS ASEC KISL ID
SUBJECT: SBY'S CT RECORD AFTER TWO YEARS: A MIXED BAG

REF: A. JAKARTA 12602

B. JAKARTA 9160

C. JAKARTA 9443

D. JAKARTA 11663

E. 05 JAKARTA 14173

F. 05 JAKARTA 12423

G. JAKARTA 12773

H. JAKARTA 9424

I. USDAO JAKARTA IIR 6 845 0464 06

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Two years into the Yudhoyono Administration, Jakarta
remains stalwart in its commitment to identify, arrest, and
convict terrorist operatives. The combination of strong
political support for tactical CT operations and substantial
international assistance has enabled Indonesian law
enforcement to make significant progress towards dismantling
the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror network. Attempts to
develop a coherent national CT strategy lag far behind,
however, and the momentum for fresh CT initiatives that we
reported a year ago seems to have dissipated (ref E). The
SBY administration has been reluctant to mold ongoing
initiatives into a comprehensive strategy for addressing the
terrorist threat. The continued ambiguity surrounding the
status of the National CT Coordinating Desk is illustrative
of a general failure to set up effective interdepartmental CT
structures. Successful institution building has taken place,
most notably the creation of a new CT and Transnational Crime
Task Force at the Attorney General's office, and improved
internal police coordination. However, these initiatives
reflect primarily the efforts of individual elements within
the government in concert with the foreign donor community
rather than a unified approach by the SBY administration.
End Summary

Improved Tactical Environment for GOI CT Investigators
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Since President Yudhoyono was elected in 2004, several
key successes in Indonesia's effort to combat terrorismhave

made the overall atmosphere more supportive of tactical CT
efforts. Lead police CT investigators tell us that
Yudhoyono's appointment of General Sutanto as Indonesian
National Police (INP) Chief in June 2005 dramatically
improved the operating environment for the INP's CT units, as
well as in other key areas, such as police reform and
corruption investigations. The INP's efforts in pursuit of
terrorist suspects, led by DS/ATA-trained Detachment 88
anti-terror units and "Team Bomb", scored a series of
successes against terrorists linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
after the October 2005 Bali bombings. The killing of JI
bombmaker Azahari and a key apprentice in a Malang, East Java
police raid in November 2005 was a major blow to JI
capabilities. Several arrests prior to and following the
raid were also critical in breaking up elements of terrorist
mastermind Noordin Top's Java network. Likewise, an April
2006 police raid in Wonosobo, Central Java killed two more
top JI lieutenants and led to the arrest of at least two
others. These raids also netted dozens of assembled
explosive devices like those used in vest- or backpack-style
suicide bombs. Numerous other JI-linked terrorists have been
arrested and tried, including 12 linked to the 2005 bombings.
Top and several other key JI operational figures, however,
continue to evade what has been characterized as the largest
manhunt and police dragnet in the INP's history. Several
Embassy contacts believe that Top may attempt to continue the
pattern of yearly bombings with an attack before the end of
the year (ref A).


3. (C) The INP scored major successes in conflict-ridden
Central Sulawesi over the past year (ref B). The arrest of
three suspected terrorists thought to be behind many of the
violent attacks since the 2001 Malino peace
agreement--including last year's Tentena bombing and
schoolgirl beheadings--led some Embassy contacts to claim in
July that a new peace agreement between the area's Christian
and Muslim populations was within reach. The trials of these

JAKARTA 00013392 002 OF 005


three JI-linked militants began in Jakarta in November. INP
officials have been optimistic since at least June that they
would make more arrests of Central Sulawesi militants known
to fan the conflict, stating that several key militants were
under police surveillance and that arresting them was largely
a timing issue. The INP has wanted to avoid a backlash to
the arrests from within the Muslim community and has
solicited the support of local Muslim leaders to surrender
the suspects voluntarily, although an INP CT investigator
told us in early December that these efforts by the INP to
encourage community cooperation largely had been
unsuccessful. Street violence triggered by the August
execution of three Christian men convicted of a 2001 attack
against Muslims, and a series of bombings targeting both
Muslim and Christians over the last few months has threatened
the fragile peace and tempered optimism. Vice President
Yusuf Kalla is from Sulawesi and has taken an active interest
in solving the conflict for several years. The INP and an
increasing number of GOI officials, including Kalla, accept
that the area has been a breeding ground for Indonesia's
terrorists. Kalla's public statements in recent weeks
identified the militants as "terrorists" and encouraged
authorities to prosecute them under Indonesia's CT law.

Presidential Support for Limited Military CT Role
-------------- --------------


4. (C) After the October 2005 terrorist attacks in Bali,
Yudhoyono publicly called for the Indonesian Armed Forces
(TNI) to assist the INP in CT activities. Sub-cabinet
officials debated for several months on how to do so in a
politically acceptable way. The TNI,s primary CT function
has been in intelligence collection and surveillance. The
TNI's involvement has been widely interpreted as a
provisional measure to tap the intelligence capabilities
afforded by the TNI's territorial structure, a legacy of the
past which continues to give the TNI a presence at the
village level throughout Indonesia. With the INP's
separation from the TNI in 2001, the TNI was removed from
domestic law enforcement, but the INP's intelligence
capabilities remain underdeveloped. In mid-2006, TNI ground
troops and air assets joined INP units in response to the
possible sighting of terrorist leader Noordin Top in a remote
area of East Java. Special Forces units form the backbone of
the TNI's crisis response capacity, and train in various
skills, such as anti-hijacking, hostage rescue, and explosive
ordnance disposal. The skill levels vary within each
service. The TNI Army,s KOPASSUS Task Force 81 generally is
regarded to be the TNI's most capable CT unit. All TNI
units, however, face shortages of specialized equipment,
training, funding, and experience, and both inter-service and
interagency rivalries are common. As with the INP, foreign
assistance to fund essential training and equipment for the
TNI will improve its terrorism response capacity and its
ability to assist the INP in CT operations.

Attorney General's Office Making Progress
--------------


5. (C) The AGO continued to earn convictions at an impressive
rate during SBY's second year, and there seems to be a
growing awareness within the AGO that terrorism cases should
not be left to inexperienced prosecutors. In the spring, the
AGO transferred two senior prosecutors with significant
experience in terrorism cases to Bali and Semarang, areas in
which multiple terrorist suspects were coming to trial. In
Bali, all four suspects tried for their role in the 2005
bombings were convicted under the 2003 terrorism law, with
sentences ranging from 8-18 years (ref D). The ongoing
trials of eight terrorism suspects in Semarang also appear to
be going well, and prosecutors have asked for the death
penalty for JI recruiter Subur Sugiarto. Prosecutors in
Jakarta won conviction in 15 terrorism cases earlier in 2006,
although the longest sentence imposed was seven years, with
most of the convicted receiving less than five. A number of
factors have been cited as possible explanations for the
short sentences in those cases, including a lack of physical
evidence directly linking suspects to attacks, inexperienced
prosecutors failing to make the case for stiffer penalties,
and judges who are not supportive of the GOI's CT agenda.


JAKARTA 00013392 003 OF 005



6. (SBU) The question of sentencing is compounded by the
Indonesian custom of granting "remission" (sentence
reductions) to virtually all prisoners at least twice a year.
In addition to JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who
was released from prison in June, at least nine other
convicted terrorists were released in October, due in part to
multiple sentence remissions (ref G). One of the recently
released, Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, helped to finance the 2003
Marriot bombing and is the brother of well-known terrorist
Hambali, currently in U.S. custody. While a new Presidential
order scheduled to take effect in 2007 will it make it more
difficult for newly-convicted terrorists to receive
remissions, those convicted in the past who have served at
least a third of their sentences will continue to qualify.


7. (C) The inauguration of the AGO's Terrorism and
Transnational Crime Task Force in July 2006 (ref C)
represents a long-awaited step forward in the Indonesian CT
effort. The Task Force brings together a group of
prosecutors who will oversee high-profile terrorism cases
throughout Indonesia, with USG funds providing renovated
office space, computers, and training. Contacts there
recently forwarded us a list of 11 terrorism cases that they
are overseeing, including the three men allegedly involved in
the Tentena bombing and other crimes in Central Sulawesi (see
above and septel). They also state that, using the
Anti-corruption Task Force as a model, they have developed a
good working relationship with police officials who track
terrorism cases. The Task Force also provides a partner for
targeted CT training; Poloff and DOJ's Resident Legal Advisor
are working with them to put together a series of training
programs for late 2006 and early 2007. While some questions
remain regarding the ongoing evolution of the Task Force, we
are confident that it will continue to improve the AGO's
ability to prosecute suspected terrorists successfully.

Development of CT Strategy Moves at Glacial Pace
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The Yudhoyono Administration's development of a
broader CT strategy lags far behind the steadily improving
tactical skills of its CT investigative units. A case in
point is Indonesia's National CT Coordination Desk, a
testament to the GOI's short attention span and political
rifts within the Cabinet over CT policy. Formed in the wake
of the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks while SBY was serving as
the Coordinating Minister under then-President Megawati, the
Desk was intended as a temporary body which would later
evolve into the National CT Coordination Agency. However,
four years and three major terrorist attacks later, its
status remains unchanged. Having no autonomous budget, the
Desk lacks the institutional clout necessary to work with the
INP and the other main CT players as an equal partner,
despite widespread respect for its chief, retired Police
Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai. In late 2005, the Desk
drafted an impressive national CT strategy only to see the
document shelved by the administration, supposedly due to
fear of an Islamist backlash (ref F). Compounding the
funding problem, a CT Desk official told us that Deputy
Coordinating Minister Joko Sumaryono, who controlled the
Ministry's finances, had withheld money from the Desk because
of the significant amount of funding the Desk had received
from international donors to conduct CT programs.


9. (C) Despite the Desk's lack of financial and institutional
resources, it serves as a useful GOI face to implement
valuable CT programs funded by the U.S., the U.K., and other
donors. Among the Desk's key accomplishments, according to
Mbai, were: a) improved CT cooperation among Indonesia's
Police, Attorney General's Office, and Judiciary, b) a public
education campaign that used former radicals to network with
former mujahadin and c) the drafting of a guidebook for joint
CT operations focused on crisis management. Moreover, Mbai
is one of the few officials in the GOI looking seriously at
the "softer" side of CT; his newest projects are geared
towards using Muslim religious leaders who reject terrorism
to preach to pesantren students as well as convicted
terrorist currently in prison. Mbai has also consistently
advocated a tough posture on CT in his frequent media
appearances.


JAKARTA 00013392 004 OF 005



10. (C) Another CT institution whose status remains unclear
is the Anti-Terror Team, a group of senior Muslim leaders
formed after the 2005 Bali attacks by Vice President Jusuf
Kalla to educate the public about the dangers of violent
extremist ideology (ref I). In November 2005, team members
issued strong condemnations of the Bali attacks after viewing
the video "suicide notes" the three bombers had left behind.
The statements raised hopes that Islamic groups would for the
first time actively assist the GOI in a campaign to undermine
the legitimacy of violent Jihadist ideology in Indonesia,
thereby giving the SBY administration much-needed political
cover for more aggressive CT measures. As with other aspects
of CT policy, however, the initial momentum failed to
generate a sustained effort. In a March interview, Team
Leader Ma,ruf Amin told us that the group was conducting a
public relations campaign that would include media spots,
banners, and the publication of a booklet on the true meaning
of Jihad. Six months later, we have seen little evidence of
such a campaign, and staff at the Team,s office recently
confirmed to our Library of Congress representative that the
booklet for the effort had yet to be developed.

No Updates to CT Legislation
--------------


11. (C) Embassy contacts in the law enforcement community
have told us that revisions to the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law
could significantly enhance CT efforts. They cite, as
measures which would strengthen the hand of law enforcement
without eroding civil rights, modest extensions of the
initial detention period for terrorist suspects (currently
limited to seven days),more liberal standards for
introducing evidence in terror cases and the addition of
comprehensive conspiracy articles. However, despite prodding
from both the INP and the CT Desk, neither the government nor
the Parliamentary leadership have yet taken any steps towards
revising the law.

CT Finance: A Mixed Bag
--------------


12. (C) The GOI's approach to terrorist financing has been
cooperative but passive. While Indonesian police have
investigated and seized terrorists' assets (Ref H),the GOI's
support for the international CT financing regime based on
UNSCR 1267 is lukewarm at best. Department of Foreign
Affairs officials frequently state that the GOI respects the
rights of other countries and will not stand in the way of
their efforts to sponsor names of Indonesian citizens for UN
1267 designation. However, with the exception of
co-sponsoring with some ASEAN neighbors the October 25, 2002
UN 1267 designation of JI, the GOI has otherwise avoided
sponsoring or co-sponsoring designations. Indonesia's
implementation of UN 1267 designations suffers from
bureaucratic delays and poor financial supervision and
capacity, and has not resulted in the identification and
freezing of terrorists' assets to date. A number of donors
provide support for Indonesia's AML/CTF efforts, including
USAID's Financial Crimes Prevention Project, AUSAID, the
Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the EU and the
International Monetary Fund. In defending their reluctance to
lead or support specific designations, Foreign Ministry
officials typically note that most evidence suggests that
terrorists in Indonesia move and store assets in the form of
cash or, when they do use the formal financial sector, use
aliases or smaller rural banks with poor recordkeeping. GOI
political opponents and terrorist leaders have portrayed
attempts to seize assets as Western efforts to discredit
Islam, making such seizures sensitive politically.


13. (C) As noted above, the GOI does not object to the USG
initiating actions against Indonesian nationals. On April
13, 2006, the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign
Asset Control (OFAC) added four Indonesian JI members (Abu
Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdullah Anshori, Gun Gun Rusman Gunawan, and
Taufik Rifki) to its Special Designated National (SDN) list.
The United Nations Security Council 1267 Committee on April
25 subsequently added the same four to its consolidated list
of individuals associated with Al-Qaeda. On August 3, OFAC
added the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)
Indonesia Branch to its SDN List. After an initial block

JAKARTA 00013392 005 OF 005


from China, the UN 1267 Committee added the IIRO Indonesia
Branch to the UN 1267 Consolidated List on November 9.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) By creating a supportive atmosphere for the GOI's CT
operators, the SBY administration has enabled its law
enforcement agencies to take more aggressive action against
terrorists than was previously possible. . The frustration
and sense of bureaucratic isolation regularly cited by our
police contacts in the early months of the new administration
have largely been replaced by modest optimism. In general,
however, it has been local actors in the INP, AGO and CT Desk
(and the foreign funders who support them),rather than the
SBY administration as a whole, who have pushed the CT agenda
forward over the past two years. Other major national
priorities, including the economy, corruption, education and
disaster relief, compete with counterterrorism for the
President's attention and budgetary resources, and foreign
funding remains essential to the continued success of
Indonesia's fight against terrorism. The GOI would likely be
unprepared to draw from its own coffers to continue existing
programs if faced with a significant drop in foreign funding
of its CT units.


15. (C) We will continue to use Mission contacts and various
programs to support the GOI's successful tactical CT track
record and encourage the GOI to develop a broader and more
public strategy that explicitly denounces terrorism and
violent jihad and reinforces Indonesia's continued evolution
toward a more tolerant, democratic, and terror-free society.
We appreciate Washington's support in this ongoing, high
priority effort.

PASCOE