East Java: NU Political Clout Diminished As

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 013304

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E.O.12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL ID
SUBJECT: East Java: NU Political Clout Diminished As
PKB Splits

(U) Classified by Pol/Econ Officer David Williams,
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

REFS:
A: 05 JAKARTA 8492 (PKB MUDDLING ALONG IN EAST JAVA)
B: JAKARTA 12778( EAST JAVA'S MUSLIM LEADERS,
OBSERVERS COMMENT ON NU-MUHAMMADIYAH RELATIONS)


1. (C) SUMMARY. In the final battle for control of
the National Awakening Party (PKB),Nahdatul Ulama's
(NU) political wing and Indonesia's 4th largest
political party, the Indonesian Supreme Court ruled
on October 12 against East Java PKB Chairman Choiral
Anam's attempt to overthrow former Indonesian
President Abdurahmin Wahid as party leader.
Admitting defeat, Anam has vowed to form a new
political party and is recruiting conservative
leaning East and Central Java NU clerics to back his
new party, the National Clerics Awakening Party
(PKNU). Wahid has impotently threatened local PKB
politicians who support Anam with removal from their
posts. Local political analysts predict PKB will
lose up to one third of its support to the new party
in 2008 local elections in East and Central Java,
PKB's stronghold provinces. The PKB split damages
the political influence of NU and is further
evidence that growing conservative factions within
the 40 million member strong organization are
dissatisfied with NU's historically tolerant and
pluralistic attitudes. END SUMMARY.

PKB Split Background
--------------


2. (SBU) Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),Indonesia's largest
Muslim social organization with over 40 million
loyal followers, founded the National Awakening
Party (PKB) in 1999. NU is a rural based religious
organization with most of its clerics (kiai) running
pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) in more than
10,000 villages throughout East and Central Java and
incorporates local Javanese tradition and culture
into its religious practices. NU clerics command
great respect in local communities and their
instructions are normally obeyed without reserve
(Ref. B). PKB's affiliation with NU and its support
by the clerics allow easy mobilization of its
members for "get out the vote" efforts to support
PKB candidates. In the 2004 national elections, PKB
ran fourth nationally, throwing its support to
President Yudhoyono and won control of the East and
Central Java Provincial legislatures. Half of the 38
regents in East Java are PKB affiliated.


3. (SBU) Former President Abdurahman Wahid has been
the driving force behind the PKB. Revered as a
"living saint" (Note: Followers believe his
spiritual powers are evidenced by his surviving
three major strokes),Wahid dominates the party's
decision-making mechanisms. Wahid's absolute
authority allowed him to fire or freeze local PKB
chairmen for challenging his commands. The
arbitrary nature of many of Wahid's decisions led a
number of high ranking clerics and party officials
to do the unthinkable - publicly challenge him. The
opposition included his political protege Choirul
Anam, chairman of East Java PKB. Anger erupted in
April 2005 when Wahid held a PKB Conference and
sacked his former Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab from
his post as national chairman of PKB and replaced
him with Wahid's nephew Muhaimin Iskandar (Ref. A).
A group of clerics from East and Central Java held
an October 2005 "alternate" conference in Surabaya
which elected Choirul Anam as the chairman of PKB.
Both the Wahid and Anam camps exchanged lawsuits in
the Jakarta courts with Anam consistently losing and
appealing the verdicts to higher courts.

Wahid Retains Control
--------------


4. (C) The Indonesian Supreme Court issued its final
verdict October 12, rejecting Anam's appeal and
vesting control of the PKB in Wahid. Several

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prominent NU clerics are supporting Anam to file a
judicial review to the Supreme Court to overturn the
verdict, but the chances of succeeding are slim.
Taufikurahman, a PKB member of the national
parliament from Lamongan, East Java and a member of
Wahid's inner-circle , told us that Wahid was always
confident of retaining control of PKB because
President Yudhoyono prefers Wahid as an important
moderate figure in Indonesian politics representing
pluralism and secularism to the masses. In
addition, Wahid supported Yudhoyono during his 2004
presidential campaign by appointing Wahid's Harvard
educated and former Australian journalist daughter
Jenny as "ambassador" to the campaign, escorting and
introducing Yudhoyono to NU pesantrens throughout
East and Central Java. According to Taufikurahman,
this demonstration of support and tacit approval of
Yudhoyono by Wahid was critical to Yudhoyono's
acceptance by local villagers as a legitimate
presidential candidate and his eventual victory over
Megawati in the 2004 national elections.

Anam Forms New Party - PKNU
--------------


5. (C) After his Supreme Court defeat, Anam vowed to
start a new party he named the National Cleric
Awakening Party (PKNU). He is recruiting
conservative NU clerics in East and Central Java who
disagree with Wahid's liberal views on Islam and
oppose his choices for PKB candidates. Anam named
his "Team of 17" consisting of clerics publicly
supporting his move. Kiai Faqih, the highly
respected leader of Pesantren Langitan in Tuban,
East Java and well-known NU kiai, is the leading
figure among the group. Kiai Faqih is a noted
conservative figure in NU having issued fatwas
(religious decrees) prohibiting NU members from
voting for a woman for public office and denouncing
the existence of the NGO Islam Liberal Network and
its campaign for Islamic moderation in Indonesia.
Anam has garnered support from other NU conservative
kiais by promising them a public forum to express
their conservative views and to influence on-going
public policy debates such as the anti-pornography
bill. According to Fathorashid, speaker of the East
Java Provincial Legislature (DPRD) and close contact
of Anam's, the draw to the party will be its use of
clerics to nominate and choose its candidates.
There will be a "democratic" process within the
party; the kiais will elect party candidates, thus
cementing their interest and commitment to support
PKNU's candidates. PKNU supporters see this party
structure as the party's "hook", appealing to a wide
range of NU clerics disappointed with Wahid's
authoritarian and non-consultative leadership of
PKB. The name PKNU was specifically derived to
contain "NU" as a marketing tool to more closely
associate the party with NU, a strategy East Java NU
leaders deride.

Politicians Forced to Choose Sides
--------------


6. (C) East and Central Java PKB politicians are
being forced to choose sides. According to
statements by Wahid to the press, Anam supporters
may no longer use PKB symbols, colors or offices.
Fathorashid told us that Wahid sent him a letter
ordering him to step down as East Java DPRD speaker
and resign from the DPRD. Since there is no legal
mechanism for the PKB to remove him, he plans to
stick the letter in a drawer and run as an incumbent
in the 2008 local elections. Wahid threatened
arrest for PKB elected politicians supporting Anam
without giving up their positions, but none as yet
have surrendered their positions. As added
incentive, both groups are fighting for government
funds allocated to support political parties. The
Ministry of Home Affairs announced September 21,
ahead of the Supreme Court ruling, that PKB funds
would be disbursed to Wahid's PKB faction. The
Ministry also instructed all governors, regents and
mayors to do the same. Taufikurahman offered the

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Ministry's decision as further evidence that the
central government is siding with Wahid. Fathorahid
admitted that the PKNU has limited funding at this
point and said they expected to raise USD 550,000
for the 2008 East and Central Java local campaigns.

Both Sides Likely Losers
--------------


7. (C) Asfar, an astute political observer from
Airlangga University in Surabaya, predicts that PKB
would lose one-third of its support in East and
Central Java to the PKNU. He believes that the two
largest national political parties, Golkar and PDI-
P, will take advantage of the PKB split, taking
votes from both factions. A two-thirds/one-third
split will mean both PKB factions will be under the
20 percent minimum needed to field its own candidate
in coming East and Central Java local elections.
Both parties will likely need to join forces with
other smaller parties to field candidates. Asfar
predicts that loyal NU followers may become confused
as to which NU clerics to follow and feel "released"
to vote for any party in future elections.
According to Aribowo, a member of East Java DPRD's
expert political council, PKNU's success will depend
heavily on which NU clerics Anam is able to bring
into his party's fold. Aribowo estimates 20-30
percent of PKB's votes will slide to PKNU and that
due to their internal squabbling, the two parties
combined will lose 10-20 percent of their local
support to other parties. He sees the final split
of PKB votes as a referendum on the NU electorate's
attitudes on the importance of social issues
(education, healthcare and the economy),which favor
PKB, versus religious issues (anti-pornography
legislation and sharia law),which favor PKNU.
Fathorashid agrees that the local kiais are the key
to winning, "The people will do what ever they say.
The key for us is to get the kiais that are tired of
Wahid on our side."

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The pettiness of the internal PKB conflict,
seen as a personality conflict between the two
leaders, has damaged the reputations of all those
involved and distanced NU voters from both the PKB
and the PKNU. It is doubtful that PKB can match its
strong 2004 performance in coming local elections
whether the PKNU is formed or not. The structure of
the PKNU would bring NU and its kiais firmly into
the political arena, an area NU, as a social
organization, has staunchly avoided. (Note: In the
past, NU has been criticized for not taking a
political stance against repressive central
governments with poor human rights records.) PKNU's
leaders, not noted for their conservative views, are
convinced their gimmick will be very appealing to a
large number of their "target market" conservative
kiais. PKB insiders are concerned that if the PKNU
can strip away support from more conservative NU
clerics, both parties will seem unbalanced - either
too "liberal" or too "conservative" - with both
becoming less appealing to the average voter. The
kiais most attracted to the concept of the new party
are those more socially conservative and
disenfranchised with Wahid's liberal leanings and
unwillingness to listen to any other voice than his
own. The PKB split and potential emergence of an
alternative party is further evidence that growing
conservative factions within NU are looking for a
way to voice their social and religious views
without going so far as to join more radical, "anti-
Indonesia" Islamist parties.

PASCOE