Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA13303
2006-11-27 10:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

Central and East Java: Increasing

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KISL ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8913
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHJA #3303/01 3311009
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271009Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2217
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0124
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1149
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
ZEN/AMCONSUL SURABAYA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013303 

SIPDIS

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 2680

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS

E.O.12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL ID
SUBJECT: Central and East Java: Increasing
Conservatism Concerns Local Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Leadership

(U) Classified by Pol/Econ Officer David Williams,
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

REFS:
A: 05 JAKARTA 12864 (Seminars on Islam Highlight
Trends in East Java)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 013303

SIPDIS

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA 2680

SIPDIS

SECSTATE FOR EAP/MTS

E.O.12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KISL ID
SUBJECT: Central and East Java: Increasing
Conservatism Concerns Local Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
Leadership

(U) Classified by Pol/Econ Officer David Williams,
reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

REFS:
A: 05 JAKARTA 12864 (Seminars on Islam Highlight
Trends in East Java)


1. (C) Summary/Introduction: Over the past several
months, what began as a debate of the controversial
draft pornography law has revealed deeper fissures
with the leadership of Indonesia's largest Muslim
organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),showing a quiet
shift to the right of NU clerics and their
followers. Central and East Java NU leaders are
deeply concerned over increasing influence of
conservative blocs in the organization, some with
close ties to more radical groups like the Islamic
Defenders Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
(HTI). NU insiders cite four factors leading to the
organizational shift: 1) exposure via the mass media
to more Wahhabist, radical teachings is pulling
students away from traditional learning from senior
kiai; 2) NU complacency - ulema no longer actively
discuss the key intersection of the nation-state
with NU's own social role, as they did in the past;
3) increasing influence of hardliners over senior
kiai; and relatedly 4) increased, well-targeted
funding from the Middle East, particularly Saudi
Arabia, to influence NU cadre down to the village
level. End Summary/Introduction.

Background on NU
--------------


2. (SBU) East Java is the birthplace of Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU),Indonesia's largest Muslim social
organization with over 40 million members
nationwide, and remains home to the majority of the
organization's most powerful clerics (kiai or
ulema). NU kiai in Central and East Java, broadly
speaking, follow NU's moderate, relatively syncretic
teachings incorporating Javanese cultural beliefs
with Islam. However, within that framework there
have traditionally been significant geographic
variations on the definition of "moderate." The
numerous powerful kiai in the "Tapal Kuda"
(horseshoe) area of East Java, which runs from
Madura Island down through the northern coastal
areas to Jember, tend to be much more socially

conservative than their counterparts in other areas
of the province. Many of the most powerful kiai in
these coastal cities are themselves Madurese.
Unusually, the organization's formal East Java (Ali
Maschan Moesa) and Central Java (Adnan) chairmen are
known more as Islamic intellectuals than as
traditional scions of major NU families.

Leaving the Middle Path?
--------------


3. (SBU) One of NU's key basic values since its
inception has been its adherence to the "middle
path" (jalur tengah),as a deliberate center between
Islamic liberalism and radicalism in Indonesia. The
current internal debate ("whither NU") may have been
sparked by the anti-pornography bill but the real
focus is NU's stance on religion and the State and
whether NU national Chairman Hasyim Muzadi is
pushing the organization (and its public image) in a
more conservative direction. Historically, NU kiai
were among those leaders who helped draft
"Pancasila", Indonesia's founding five principles
that enshrine religious tolerance and suggest
(although do not state) the separation of religion
from the State.


4. (SBU) ConGen Surabaya contacts acknowledge, as
radical groups in Indonesia have become increasingly
vocal public presences in recent years (Ref. A),the
NU "middle" has shifted increasingly rightward.
Those critical of NU's shift cite four main reasons
for increasing conservatism/Wahabism: 1) exposure
via the mass media to more Wahabist, radical

JAKARTA 00013303 002 OF 004


teachings is pulling students away from traditional
learning from senior kiai; 2) NU complacency - ulema
no longer actively discuss the key intersection of
the nation-state with NU's own social role, as they
did in the past; 3) increasing influence of
hardliners over senior kiai; and relatedly 4)
increased, well-targeted funding from the Middle
East, particularly Saudi Arabia, to influence NU
cadre down to the village level.


5. (C) National NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi himself is
seen as a political opportunist by some and his
association with more radical groups such as the
Islamic Defender's Front (FPI) and Hizbut Tahrir
Indonesia (HTI) are anathema to mainstream NU
leaders. East Java NU Chairman Ali Maschan Moesa
noted to us, "Muzadi appears to want to be a neutral
leader, in the middle between hardliners and non-
hardliner groups. Unfortunately, this kind of
approach has changed his style." As Muzadi himself
told us back in 2004 soon after his controversial
election as NU National Chairman, he has serious
ambitions for both NU and himself and he intends to
work with whatever political parties or groups help
him attain his goals. His recent closer association
with radical groups appears to be part of that
strategy. Muzadi was vocal and public in his
denouncements of President Bush's recent visit to
Indonesia. He said that even if he were invited to
meet with the President, he would not attend and was
scheduled to headline an anti-Bush rally that
included FPI leader Habib Rizieq and Abu Bakar
Ba'ashir as speakers. Distaste for Muzadi's at
times unrepentant politicking has simmered below the
surface since his 2004 appointment and his
unsuccessful run for Vice President that same year.


6. (SBU) While in private, NU leaders argue heatedly
over the organization's views on key issues, in
public they have tried to present a united front.
That facade has slipped somewhat as former President
Abdurrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur) and his erstwhile
protege, Muzadi, have increasingly traded public
barbs. Additionally, NU provincial leaders
previously appeared to have been unwilling to
publicly criticize or contradict Muzadi. The anti-
pornography bill debated definitely changed that
dynamic. Muzadi has increasingly been the target of
criticism from NU provincial leaders; his full
public endorsement of the controversial anti-
pornography bill sparked an unprecedented level of
public disavowal from East Java and other NU
leaders. In April 2006, key East Java NU leaders
took this debate to the editorial pages of the Jawa
Pos, the largest daily newspaper in Eastern
Indonesia. Both Ali Maschan and Adnan view
Muzadi's statements supporting the anti-pornography
bill as an organizational tipping point, publicly
opposing NU leadership stances on social issues.


7. (C) East Java NU leaders are concerned with
Muzadi's increasingly close relationship with
Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) leader Habib Rizieq,
whom he has met frequently over the past year. Part
of the furor appears to be embarrassment: East Java
NU leaders take great pride in flaunting their
organization's moderate credentials; Muzadi's full-
bore backing of the anti-pornography bill and all
its controversial precepts--several of which our
contacts have described as an "Islamization" effort-
-put NU, however rhetorically, in the same camp as
Indonesia's most radical organizations, such as FPI
and Hizbut Tahrir.


8. (C) Many NU clerics, including in its senior
ranks, are also relatively active members of some
very conservative groups such as the Indonesian
Ulema Council (MUI),known for its fatwas on a
variety of subjects, including a recent death fatwa
against Liberal Islam Network leader Ulil Abschar
Abdalla. While NU has organizationally always
supported pluralism, MUI fatwas have held that
pluralism is against Islam. Ali Maschan has

JAKARTA 00013303 003 OF 004


suggested to us that Sahal Mahfudz, a senior NU kiai
and member of MUI, is "staying too quiet" and
letting more radical members of MUI determine the
organization's agenda of intolerance. Whether or not
that is the case, the fact remains that some leading
NU clerics are now becoming indelibly associated
with some very radical aims. One of the most
conservative members of MUI is its deputy, Ma'ruf
Amin, who is NU. He also voiced strong public
objections to the President Bush visit.

Whither the Clerics?/Eating NU Piece by Piece
--------------


9. (C) As noted political commentator and NU insider
Muhammad Asfar put it to ConGen, "the traditional
clerics are the backbone of NU". The so-called
traditional clerics are the senior kiai, many of
whom descend from the founding fathers of NU and are
considered "the keepers of the flame." However,
some of the most influential of these kiais are
increasingly themselves influenced by hardliners.
East Java NU leaders are distressed by the
increasing ties between NU and FPI. For example, a
Bangkalan, East Java area kiai recently became head
of the local chapter of FPI. (Note: Bangkalan is
the westernmost-city on Madura Island; while most
Madurese and Madurese kiai are NU, they are
considered more socially conservative than
counterparts in other areas of the province. End
Note.) Our contacts have raised other cases of
concern, such as several recent incidents of local
NU leaders joining forces with more radical groups
(e.g. an NU branch chairman in the East Java city of
Nganjuk recently joined HTI).


10. (C). NU East Java Chairman Ali Maschan summed it
up, "In the past, these groups [like FPI and Hizbut
Tahrir] attacked NU, but now they eat NU piece by
piece by intensively lobbying NU clerics." For
example, they were able to persuade Kiai Yusuf
Hasyim (respected leader of the famous Tebu Ireng
pesantren, uncle of former President Wahid, and
descendent of NU's founder) and Kiai Abdullah Faqih
(venerated leader of Langitan pesantren in Lamongan,
East Java) to become members of the newly formed
National Leaders Council (Dewan Imamah Nusantara -
DIN),a "forum to represent Muslim interests".
(Note: Other members of DIN include East Java FPI
Chairman Habib Abdurrahman Assegaf; the group has
held joint demonstrations with FPI and other hard-
line Islamic groups. End Note.) Maschan noted,
"Those hardliner groups are smart. They told those
old clerics that the establishment of a new such
institution is for the sake of Islam. In fact, if
we notice carefully, "Imamah" is actually "Khilafah"
which is the caliphate Hizbut Tahrir is fighting
for." What rankles NU pluralists the most it that
the radical groups, at their core, oppose the State
and the unity of Indonesia.

Middle East Connections
--------------


11. (SBU) Hard-line groups can easily afford public
outreach campaigns because they receive financial
assistance from Middle East Countries. Many of NU's
most prominent leaders, such as former President of
Indonesia and NU Chairman Wahid, studied at al-Azhar
University in Cairo. However, Saudi Arabia is
beginning to be the destination of choice for some
NU scions, our contacts say. Madurese clerics, many
of whom have longstanding ties to the Middle East,
are increasingly sending their students to Saudi
universities rather than the traditional NU higher
education bastions of Jombang and Kediri. According
to Ali Maschan, this is an important factor in the
increasing Wahhabism in NU. We ourselves have
observed and spoken with numbers of teachers from
Pakistan, Egypt, and other areas during visits to
several Tapal Kuda-area pesantrens.

Comment

JAKARTA 00013303 004 OF 004


--------------


12. (C) It is clear that hardline groups are
increasingly prominent and public in East Java, and
equally clear that moderate NU leaders are at
somewhat of a loss in confronting this growth. They
have no answers to the growing availability of
radical Islamic viewpoints from satellite television
and the internet which impact the views of their
members. The "anti-Muslim" perception that world
events in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine pit the West
against underdog Muslim Arabs is strong in rural
East and Central Java. Many East Javanese, who see
themselves as underdogs compared to wealthier
Javanese in Jakarta and the more cultured Javanese
of Central Java, sympathize with the plight of
Middle East Muslims, making them easy targets for
propaganda eschewing radical or militant aims. NU's
lack of an outreach budget and its loose network of
clerics tied together by a general set of principles
and long standing traditions make divergence from
their norm easier for clerics wishing to move their
flocks in a more conservative direction.

PASCOE