Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA13218
2006-11-15 10:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

INDONESIA BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD BILATERAL

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL TBIO AMED AMGT KFLU KTIA ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJA #3218/01 3191057
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151057Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2081
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSAAV/NAVMEDRSCHCEN SILVER SPRING MD PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/BUMED WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 013218 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL TBIO AMED AMGT KFLU KTIA ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD BILATERAL
NAMRU-2 AGREEMENT

REF: JAKARTA 13143

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.5 (b, d).


INDONESIA AGREES TO PURSUE BILATERAL NAMRU-2 AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 013218

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL TBIO AMED AMGT KFLU KTIA ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA BEGINS NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD BILATERAL
NAMRU-2 AGREEMENT

REF: JAKARTA 13143

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.5 (b, d).


INDONESIA AGREES TO PURSUE BILATERAL NAMRU-2 AGREEMENT


1. (C) Summary: Formal discussions between the Indonesian
and U.S. governments on the future status of the Naval
Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) in Jakarta began on
November 9. The Indonesians, fresh from high-level
interagency discussions, came in with a set of six concerns
which were mostly unacceptable to the U.S. side. These
included making the TNI Navy rather than the Ministry of
Health NAMRU-2's counterpart, a system of unworkable
supervisory committees, and diplomatic status for only two
American personnel. These positions were rejected out of
hand by the U.S. side, which then initiated extensive
discussions of just what NAMRU-2 is and how it and the
international scientific community functions. The
Indonesians spent very little effort defending their position
and began rather quickly to look for areas of agreement and
in the end asserted they believed we could reach closure on a
final text quite quickly. We agreed to a few rounds of
technical level discussions to resolve outstanding issues.
The Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU),which
led the negotiations, appears to be under strong pressure
from President Yudhoyono to complete the agreement and
appeared prepared to drop many of their demands as
negotiations move forward. Para 8 contains a request for
assistance. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Pascoe held initial discussions with the
Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU) on November
9 concerning the status of NAMRU-2 in Jakarta. The
discussion centered on points of disagreement between the
Indonesian and U.S. draft texts for a Memorandum of

Understanding, which had been exchanged months ago. The
Indonesian team, led by Director General for European and
American Affairs Eddi Hariyadhi, included representatives
from other DEPLU offices, the Department of Defense (DEPHAN),
the Department of Health (DEPKES) and the National
Intelligence Agency (BIN). At Hariyadhi's side was
Presidential Adviser Dino Patti Djalal, who has worked
consistently to resolve the issue quickly.


3. (C) The discussions identified several substantive
differences which will require further work on a technical
level before they can be resolved. Indirect support for U.S.
positions on some issues was forthcoming from Dr. Soendoro
Triono, Director General of the National Institute of Health
Research and Development (LITBANGKES) at the Indonesian
Department of Health. Djalal and Hariyadhi expressed
confidence that the differences could be overcome and an
agreement achieved in the near future. We pushed back hard,
however, on several substantive issues where the GOI sought
to impose unnecessary and cumbersome bureaucratic controls
which could interfere with NAMRU-2's scientific work and
ultimately undermine its quality and ability to continue
drawing funding.


4. (C) Hariyadhi identified six main Indonesian concerns.
Three of these represented questions of terminology or
perception and appear to be readily resolvable with
additional clarifications. First, the Indonesians wanted to
restrict the scope of NAMRU-2's work to infections diseases
and new and reemerging diseases, rather than what they saw as
a more open-ended formulation in the U.S. draft. Subsequent
discussions did not address this point so the reason for
their concern is not yet clear. Second, they wanted the
agreement to include explicit provisions for the transfer of
technology to Indonesian partners. Third, the Indonesians
found the term "funding sponsors" to be vague and open to
interpretation.


5. (C) We responded that technology transfer was a natural
consequence of cooperation and that the type of technology
NAMRU-2 could transfer was in the form of practical
scientific expertise on the research that it conducted.
NAMRU-2 was not a donor agency or a capacity-building
organization which could build laboratories and distribute
equipment. Rather, it was a scientific mission whose main
asset was its intellectual capital. Individual scientists'
ability to secure funding from sponsors for specific projects
was the primary determinant of the direction of NAMRU-2's

research. We pointed out that we had several
capacity-building efforts currently underway (including
assisting security and design of a BSL-3 lab for the Ministry
of Health),but that these were not funded by NAMRU-2.


6. (C) Three GOI concerns appeared to reflect more
substantive differences about the degree of institutional
control to which NAMRU-2 should be subjected; ensuring
transparency of its work to GOI agencies; and the status of
NAMRU-2 personnel. The first involved the language on the
joint coordinating committee to supervise NAMRU-2's work.
The GOI version portrayed the body as a steering rather than
an advisory committee, emphasized its coordination of
research as opposed to administrative and programmatic
aspects, attached NAMRU-2 to the Ministry of Defense as well
as to the Ministry of Health and appointed an Indonesian
official as the sole chairman of the body, rather than
allowing for a co-chairman from each side. Additionally, the
GOI proposed to have the joint committee establish a
subordinate "Joint Scientific Working Group," which had no
counterpart in the U.S. draft, consisting of appointed
members of the scientific committees of the Department of
Defense and the Department of Health and NAMRU-2, which would
"review and assess" research proposals. The U.S. side felt
this would allow the working group and, through it, the
coordinating committee, to set the research agenda.


7. (C) These provisions for a joint scientific review group
and for a central management structure which would
effectively subordinate NAMRU-2 to the TNI are particularly
problematic and were vigorously rejected. The GOI did not
demonstrate a need for these bureaucratic mechanisms, and we
suspect they reflected Indonesian intelligence community
concerns about the nature of NAMRU-2's work as well as a
general failure to understand professional procedures already
in place. We argued that these supervisory bodies
represented unnecessary encumbrances which would impair the
integrity and quality of the scientific work and could, in
effect, kill the goose that lays the golden egg. We stressed
again the role funding played in selection of projects and
the determination of NAMRU's research agenda. The
contractual obligations supporting such funding had to be
fulfilled to maintain institution's reputation and ensure
continued funding.


8. (C) Assistance Request: The Indonesian draft contains
language explicitly requiring compliance with the 1972
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction, ostensibly because of their
concern that Indonesian scientists could be drawn into
clandestine weapons research conducted at NAMRU-2 as an arm
of the U.S. military. This point was pressed at some length
by the BIN representative at the table. We argued that this
provision was irrelevant, if not offensive, and should not be
mentioned in such an agreement. We would appreciate the
Department's confirmation of our interpretation.


9. (C) A final issue concerned the status of NAMRU-2
personnel. The Indonesian side argued against granting
diplomatic status to NAMRU-2's staff and dependents. The
Ambassador responded that diplomatic status for the two
leaders would be acceptable provided A&T status was granted
to the rest of the staff, but he emphasized that all NAMRU-2
officials had to be considered part of the Mission and
receive appropriate protection. (The Indonesian oral
presentation referred to diplomatic status but their text
calls for A&T status for two personnel and no status for the
rest. We saw no reason to point that out.)


10. (C) The discussion ended with agreement to hold several
subsequent meetings at a technical level to iron out the six
issues identified above and any other significant
differences, before returning to a plenary session to review
and approve the results. Clearly, many points in the
Indonesian draft are the product of a basic misunderstanding
of NAMRU-2's role and mission and meant to mollify wild
accusations coming from the Indonesian intelligence services.
As the discussion proceeded, the Indonesian side appeared to
mellow considerably. Many of the comments from their side
were obviously in support of the U.S. positions and designed
to move away from what they knew to be an unacceptable
Indonesian draft agreement.


11. (C) The Indonesian side, obviously feeling pressure from
the President's office, said it was ready to begin more
detailed discussions immediately, but we noted it was more
realistic to wait until after President Bush's visit and the
Thanksgiving break. We plan to engage them on the technical
level to see how far they have moved in that time and do not
believe further guidance (aside from that requested in para 8
above) or textual changes are necessary at this time.
PASCOE