Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA12778
2006-10-20 10:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

EAST JAVA'S MUSLIM LEADERS, OBSERVERS COMMENT ON

Tags:  PGOV SOCI PHUM KISL ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5544
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #2778/01 2931028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201028Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1521
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHJA/ISLAMIC CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0040
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1094
ZEN/AMCONSUL SURABAYA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 012778 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA #2622

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2011
TAGS: PGOV SOCI PHUM KISL ID
SUBJECT: EAST JAVA'S MUSLIM LEADERS, OBSERVERS COMMENT ON
NU-MUHAMMADIYAH RELATIONS

REF: A. 04 JAKARTA 902 (NU -- BIG LOOSE AND BOTTOM-UP)

B. 05 JAKARTA 10917 (PKB VERDICT UPS THE ANTE IN
EAST JAVA)

C. 04 JAKARTA 911 (PIOUS TECHNOCRATS: A PROFILE OF
MUHAMMADIYAH)

D. 01 JAKARTA 1349 (NU BLOOD LUST)

Classified By: Political Officer Catherine E. Sweet, Reason 1.4(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 012778

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FROM AMCONSUL SURABAYA #2622

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2011
TAGS: PGOV SOCI PHUM KISL ID
SUBJECT: EAST JAVA'S MUSLIM LEADERS, OBSERVERS COMMENT ON
NU-MUHAMMADIYAH RELATIONS

REF: A. 04 JAKARTA 902 (NU -- BIG LOOSE AND BOTTOM-UP)

B. 05 JAKARTA 10917 (PKB VERDICT UPS THE ANTE IN
EAST JAVA)

C. 04 JAKARTA 911 (PIOUS TECHNOCRATS: A PROFILE OF
MUHAMMADIYAH)

D. 01 JAKARTA 1349 (NU BLOOD LUST)

Classified By: Political Officer Catherine E. Sweet, Reason 1.4(d)


1. (C) Summary. On October 10, we met with the East Java
provincial leadership of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and
Muhammadiyah to discuss their organizations' activities in
East Java. We also called on political scientist Aribowo
from Surabaya's Airlangga University, who shared his
observations (based in part on USAID-funded research) on the
state of East Javanese political Islam. From these
discussions, it was clear that NU is still the dominant
player in the province of its birth, and former Indonesian
president and NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur)
remains iconic. At the same time, although less popular in
East Java than NU, Muhammadiyah is playing an increasingly
active role in civil society. And while relations between
the two groups have improved significantly since NU
supporters attacked Muhammadiyah schools and buildings in
2001, some tensions persist. End summary.

East Java: Cradle of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
--------------


2. (SBU) On October 10, we met with the East Java provincial
leadership of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah to
discuss their organizations' activities in East Java. We
also called on political scientist Aribowo from Surabaya's
Airlangga University, who shared his observations (based in
part on USAID-funded research) on the state of East Javanese
political Islam. The most important civil society
organization in East Java is Nadhlatul Ulama, a mass Muslim
movement that claims a nationwide membership of 40-45
million. Founded 80 years ago in East Java, NU is primarily
populated by rural Javanese (although it has a strong
presence in Java's large cities as well). NU's East Java
Deputy Chairman Sholeh Hayat and other local officials

explained that throughout Indonesia, NU focuses on four main
areas: proselytizing (dakwah); education; delivery of social
services; and economic development. To this end, NU clerics
(kiai) run the vast majority of Java's pesantrens (Islamic
boarding schools),as well as a significant number of higher
education institutions and hospitals. In East Java alone, NU
administers 42 hospitals and some 5000 pesantrens.


3. (U) A variety of committees, social institutes and
semi-autonomous organizations fall under the NU tent. The
institutes work on NU's priority issues in conjunction with
the autonomous bodies, which are organized primarily by age
and sex (women's and student groups, a labor organization,
and a martial arts self-defense group). For instance, NU's
young women's organization, Fatayat, works mainly on
education, anti-trafficking, reproductive health and HIV-AIDS
issues through its approximately 9000 chapters.

The Centrality of the Kiais
--------------


4. (U) NU followers tend to practice a syncretic form of
Islam that blends Indonesians' traditional religious
practices (themselves heavily influenced by Hinduism, which
predates Islam on the archipelago) with Islamic mysticism
(Sufism) and the relatively moderate Shafa'i branch of Islam
jurisprudence (ref A). Perhaps the most significant factor
differentiating NU followers from their coreligionists in
organizations like Muhammadiyah is the role of the kiai (also
sometimes referred to as ulama),or local religious leader.
The kiai, a man educated in Islamic teachings and law (ilmu
fiqh),holds tremendous authority within his community, with
his followers looking to him for spiritual and other
guidance.


5. (SBU) Political scientist Aribowo described three primary
routes to becoming a kiai. First, and most traditionally, is
blood descent from a kiai family (former President
Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gus Dur, became a kiai via
this method of transmission). Second, a kiai may identify a
particularly clever student (santri) studying at his
pesantren as a kiai candidate. That student would then be
expected to become proficient in Islamic teachings and found
his own pesantren. Once established, the community would

JAKARTA 00012778 002 OF 003


deem him a kiai. A related method for non-genetic kiais to
attain the title is to marry into a kiai family. These
latter two methods are becoming increasingly common, Aribowo
said; indeed, current NU chairman and Gus Dur rival Hasyim
Muzadi became a kiai in this way. According to Aribowo, Gus
Dur's supporters use this to discredit Muzadi, claiming that
he is not a "real" kiai like Gus Dur, who is of "royal"
kiai/NU blood (Gus Dur's grandfather was NU founder Hasyim
Asy'ari, and his father a former minister of religion).


6. (SBU) While they all fall under the same NU rubric,
Aribowo noted that the kiai are factionalized both
politically and socially. He said that although the kiai
were united in supporting Gus Dur while he was president, the
internal conflicts that have developed within NU and its
affiliated political party, the National Awakening Party
(PKB),since Wahid's impeachment are mirrored within the kiai
community (ref B and previous). Aribowo lamented the
negative effect that this politicization has had on the
"dignity" of the kiai, who he contended previously preferred
to not involve themselves in politics. This conflict
notwithstanding, Aribowo's research has determined that NU
voters will continue to support PKB and will choose
candidates based in part on their kiai's instructions.

The Cult of Gus Dur
--------------


7. (SBU) Aribowo believes that until Gus Dur dies, there
will be no reconciliation among the various PKB and NU
factions. Indeed, a Gus Dur cult of personality persists,
fueled in part by his miraculous survival of a series of
strokes that Aribowo claimed should have killed him three
times over (although he did acknowledge that Gus Dur has been
"slipping" lately). And while NU is Muzadi's organization
structurally, it is Gus Dur's culturally. Aribowo repeatedly
referred to Gus Dur as an "extraordinary" politician, one who
can talk with ease about everything from classical music to
soccer. As a key reformer within NU, Gus Dur promoted
democracy and modernism, and remains a symbol of pluralism,
he said. Moreover, Wahid has opposed the "Arabization" of
Indonesian Islam and culture, even urging Indonesian Muslims
to use the Indonesian language when greeting one another,
rather than the Arabic expression "assalama alaykum."


8. (SBU) Aribowo also praised Gus Dur's audacity and
willingness to capitalize on his stature to take
controversial positions. Aribowo referred to an incident
this past April when Gus Dur fielded a question on a radio
program about Indonesia's draft anti-pornography/
pornographic action law, which he openly opposes (although NU
as an organization supports it). Trying to emphasize that
the definition of pornography is relative, Wahid remarked
that even the Qur'an could be considered pornographic since
it talks about breastfeeding (Al-Baqara 233) and illicit
sexual relations (Surat Yusuf). (Note. Despite his venerable
reputation, Wahid seems to have overreached with those
remarks. Following his comments, more than 500 outraged
Javanese ulama issued a statement condemning Gus Dur's
remarks, and in May, while Wahid was speaking at an
interfaith seminar in West Java, radicals from the extremist
Islamic Defenders Front, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Forum Umat
Islam, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Islamic Mujaheddin Council
forcibly chased Wahid from the stage. End Note.)

Muhammadiyah: Relations on the Mend, but Tensions Remain
-------------- --------------


9. (SBU) For their part, East Java's Muhammadiyah membership
is somewhat less enamored of Gus Dur and NU. Structurally
and doctrinally and, the organizations are quite different,
with Muhammadiyah's command structure much more rigid and
hierarchical than NU's (ref C). Where NU draws its support
primarily from rural and poorer Indonesians, Muhammadiyah has
traditionally been strongest among the urban elite and within
the business community (East Java Muhammadiyah Chairman
Shafiq Mughni called it a "university-based organization").


10. (U) Doctrinally, Muhammadiyah tends to be more
conservative, rejecting NU's syncretism in favor of Islamic
modernism, a school of thought pioneered by Arab
intellectuals like Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries. (Note. Modernism
advocates the application of "Western" science, technology,
and intellectual methods -- notably reason -- to bring Islam
to a purer and more advanced state. End Note.) As a

JAKARTA 00012778 003 OF 003


modernist movement, Muhammadiyah, which was founded in
Yogyakarta in 1912 and claims a national membership of
roughly 30 million, rejects strict adherence to any one
school of Islamic jurisprudence and, by extension, the
intercession of intermediaries like kiais. (Indonesians
often comment that Muhammadiyah is more of a "protestant"
organization and NU a "Catholic" one, given the latter's
reliance on religious intermediaries to interpret God's
will.) Muhammadiyah advocates returning to the original
Islamic texts (Qur'an and hadith) and reinterpreting them
afresh with a modern perspective.


11. (U) Consequently, Muhammadiyah stresses the importance of
education; this is reflected in the strength of
Muhammadiyah's school system, which brings together a
state-sanctioned secular curriculum with a religious one.
There are more than 10,000 Muhammadiyah primary and secondary
schools nationwide and 164 universities; students do not need
to be affiliated with Muhammadiyah to attend (in fact, Mughni
pointedly noted, about 30-40 percent of their East Java
students are affiliated with NU, adding that current NU head
Hasyim Muzadi's children are graduates of Muhammadiyah's
university in Malang).


12. (U) In East Java, according to Mughni, Muhammadiyah
membership runs in the 7-9 million range. This figure
includes members of its autonomous youth, student, women's
and martial arts organizations, but excludes students
enrolled at Muhammadiyah schools who are not formally
affiliated with Muhammadiyah. In NU's heartland,
Muhammadiyah operates far fewer schools (approximately 1400
schools and 14 institutions of higher learning) than its
rival, although Mughni asserted that Muhammadiyah is
expanding its facilities in the region. Its membership and
leadership are also diversifying, he said: of the 13-member
provincial board, five are professors, one is a kiai, and one
(Mughni) has a Ph.D. (Mughni received his Ph.D. in Islamic
Studies from UCLA; he will be leaving Indonesia shortly to
begin a Fulbright teaching fellowship in Buffalo, New York.)


13. (C) Mughni said that relations in East Java between
Muhammadiyah and NU, which were heavily damaged by NU
supporters' attacks on Muhammadiyah facilities in 2001 (NU
adherents blamed former Muhammadiyah chairman and then-head
of the People's Consultative Assembly, Amien Rais, for
orchestrating Gus Dur's impeachment; ref D and previous),are
getting better. Still, bitterness was not far from the
surface when Mughni spoke about NU. For example, he made a
disparaging remark about Gus Dur traveling abroad while he
was president, allegedly trying to drum up funding for NU
rather than for Indonesia. He also criticized NU's lack of
transparency and accountability, which he said stems from NU
members being "under the control of the kiais," men who "are
like kings and control all."
PASCOE