EAP DAS ERIC JOHN'S MEETING WITH BG DADI SUSANTO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 012732

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP, PM/RSAT, PM/SNA (LOFTIS),
PM/ISO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM MASS MOPS ID
SUBJECT: EAP DAS ERIC JOHN'S MEETING WITH BG DADI SUSANTO


Classified By: Political Officer Daniel Turnbull, for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with Indonesian Director
General for Defense Strategy Susanto on October 18, EAP DAS
Eric John raised U.S. human rights concerns, the need for
continued military vetting and accountability for past
abuses, the importance of a SOFA in underpinning bilateral
cooperation and U.S. interest in holding a regional
multilateral humanitarian relief exercise with Indonesia and
other ASEAN countries. John described the overall
relationship as being on track but stressed progress on
issues must continue. Susanto characterized bilateral
military cooperation with the U.S. as positive, acknowledged
U.S. human-rights concerns, explained Indonesian budgetary
limitations and competing national spending priorities and
expressed support for the proposed regional exercise provided
it was not perceived to be directed against China. He urged
greater U.S. use of soft rather than hard power in the Middle
East and greater U.S. military attention to Islamic custom
with respect to dead civilians and sold iers in conflict
areas such as Iraq. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) EAP DAS Eric John discussed the U.S. policy priorities
concerning the Indonesian military with Indonesian Ministry
of Defense (DEPHAN) Director for Defense Strategy BG Dadi
Susanto on October 18 in Jakarta. Both interlocutors
described U.S.-Indonesian relations as positive and moving in
the right direction. Noting that restrictions on Indonesia
had finally been removed in the most recent U.S. assistance
budget, John stressed that while the overall framework of the
relationship was satisfactory, both sides had to ensure that
progress continued to be made on U.S. policy concerns.
Describing U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation as developing
"very fast" in the past three years, Susanto said he would
work to keep the "good news" coming on those concerns.
Susanto cited the annual Bilateral Defense Dialogue (BDD) and
Security Dialogue (IUSSD) as registering the progress which
had occurred in that time. There were no political obstacles
to military cooperation with the United States, he averred,
on the Indonesian side.

LIMITED MILITARY BUDGET AND COMPETING PRIORITIES


3. (C) Susanto said Indonesia's military budget was still
very limited, totaling less than one percent of GDP and
equivalent to only 60 percent of Singapore's and 20 percent
of Australia's military spending. The Indonesian Armed Forces
(TNI) received $2.8 million, or only 49 percent, of the $5.8
million necessary to meet "minimum essential needs." The TNI
supported the priority the government placed on meeting the
nation's educational and health needs first, and would have
to await stronger growth in the Indonesian economy before
military spending was likely to catch up. In the meantime,
the TNI relied on regional budgets to supply the other 51
percent. Indonesia would have to postpone major purchases of
defense equipment until budgetary resources improved. On the
positive side, Indonesia did not feel threatened within the
region, owing to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
and other bilateral security arrangements, including one
recently concluded with Australia and one soon to be
completed with Singapore. Indonesia did not object to the
purchase of new planes by Singapore.


4. (C) More important in the immediate term, Susanto
stressed, was the acquisition of equipment to meet commercial
and humanitarian challenges. Indonesia suffered billions of
dollars in national economic losses annually from its
inability to patrol its territory and waters from illegal
fishing, illegal logging and similar activities. Ships and
planes to monitor and interdict these activities were thus a
priority. Transport for disaster relief and humanitarian
operations were also high on the list.

PROPOSED ARF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EXERCISE: CHINA SENSITIVE


5. (C) John said the USG understood and supported these
priorities, along with interoperability and multilateral
cooperation. On that note, John stressed, EAP Assistant
Secretary Hill wanted to move forward with a proposal he had

SIPDIS
made earlier to Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda to hold
a regional multilateral humanitarian relief exercise in the
context of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Susanto said

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Indonesia supported the idea and had no objections to either
multilateral or bilateral exercises of this nature.
Indonesia and Singapore were laying the basis for beginning
military cooperation on land, air and sea. Indonesia would
want to ensure that the exercise remained purely "military"
and did not become "political." China would be sensitive to
any regional multilateral military activities with the United
States from which China was excluded. It was therefore
essential that the exercise not be identifiable with any
specific country or feature in the region. He noted China
was pressing for an ASEAN-Plus-One dialogue and cooperation.
John observed that such objections usually originated
elsewhere than from defense departments, and suggested the
event could be discussed further at the upcoming meeting of
the ARF Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building
Measures and Preventive Diplomacy on Batam Island, which the
United States would chair. Susanto said he would attend the
meeting.

SOFA: AN APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY STEP


6. (C) Observing that the United States and Indonesia had
recently conducted a successful initial round of talks toward
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA),John said USG was well
aware how sensitive the issues could be for host nations,
including allies. When completed, however, SOFAs helped show
respective capitals and publics how close cooperation had
become. Moreover, SOFAs were necessary in order to make the
military relationship work properly. Susanto replied that
Indonesia had never had a SOFA before and that the topic was
"something very new for us." The U.S. embargo on military
cooperation with Indonesia had only recently been lifted, so
this was also a big step in a short time. Some Indonesian
legislators and public interest groups opposed a U.S.
presence on Indonesian soil. Criminal jurisdiction in
particular was extremely sensitive and would be "almost
impossible" for the national legislature to accept in
writing. Indonesia had no desire to prosecute U.S. soldiers,
but the provision would be seen as exempting U.S. soldiers
from liability. Indonesia was grappling with its own attempt
to delineate military from civilian justice under Indonesian
law, and Indonesia's security negotiations with Singapore had
encountered the same problem.


7. (C) John reiterated that the United States had encountered
these sensitivities even with allies, for very understandable
reasons. The United States and Indonesia should work
together closely, he proposed, on a public relations campaign
to overcome these concerns. DEPHAN was in the best position
to step out publicly and take the lead in this effort.
Noting that the Indonesian public's view of the United States
was still very poorly informed, Susanto suggested that public
attitudes would change over time as bilateral cooperation
produced visible results. U.S. disaster relief in Aceh,
Yogjakarta and elsewhere in the past two years had
demonstrated real, concrete military cooperation and had made
a very favorable impression on the Indonesian public. In
this respect, the tsunami had been a "blessing in disguise"
allowing the two militaries to work "side by side" for
several months. Pursuing a "perfect" SOFA now, he averred,
would fail. Rather, the two sides should begin with a more
basic arrangement which, as public attitudes matured, could
become more "solid." The SOFA should be a "work in progress"
which could be upgraded over time line, in line with the
relationship's growth. John stressed the two sides should
work toward the best possible SOFA now, rather than later.

UNIFIL CONTRIBUTION


8. (C) John thanked Susanto for Indonesia's contribution to
UN peacekeeping forces for Lebanon. This was an important
statement and involved a significant burden on national
resources. Susanto said the majority of Indonesia's UNIFIL
troops would be Muslim but would also include some Christian,
Hindu and Buddhist soldiers. In accordance with the national
policy of Pancasila, Indonesian forces would seek to remain
neutral in Lebanon. Susanto said no Brunei forces were would
accompany the Indonesian battalion.

VETTING


9. (C) John said USG appreciated DEPHAN's cooperation to
complete the necessary human-rights vetting for UNIFIL and

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other military activities. This was essential in order to
maintain U.S. public support for cooperation. Indonesia's
continued compliance would help to keep this issue from
obstructing military cooperation. Susanto suggested the
process could be improved. Vetting should be completed
further in advance; last-minute denials were embarrassing.
The process should also be more fair. "Almost everyone in
the TNI, including the President," could be considered
"guilty by association with Battalion number 744 in East
Timor," he stated. It was "not right" that some who
committed no abuses but happened to be there at the wrong
time were blackballed. Not everyone who went to East Timor
committed violations. Susanto cited a close colleague, a
colonel, who had been denied the position of military attache
because he had been transferred from Bali to East Timor five
days before the massacres began there
in 1991. Susanto said he was absolutely sure this officer,
who had even paid for the education of several East Timorese
children, was not guilty of human-rights abuses.

ACCOUNTABILITY


10. (C) John said that two recent TNI promotions in a list of
32 had raised U.S. concern. These were BG Muhamad Noer Muis,
to become Infantry Division 1 Commander of TNI Special Forces
(Kopassus),and MG Zamroni, to become Commander of Military
Area XVII (Trikora) in Papua. This was a sensitive issue
which, although Indonesia might wish to regard it as an
internal matter, deeply concerned USG and had generated much
justifiable public criticism. This detracted from the
progress being made in many other areas. Susanto replied
that these two officers were not guilty according to
Indonesian law and that it was therefore difficult to deny
them a promotion which they had earned. Still, he understood
USG concerns and noted that the two officers would remain in
their positions for at least one year before being moved to
new assignments.

INDONESIAN CONCERNS


11. (C) Susanto said that, in his view, Indonesia's leading
concern regarding U.S. policy was its tendency to use hard
rather than soft power, especially in the Middle East. This
made Indonesia's position more difficult. As the world's
only superpower, the United States received much attention,
which magnified the impact of negative consequences of its
actions. The high number of casualties in Iraq, particularly
among civilians, caused many to question the ideals behind
U.S. intervention. Saddam Hussein had been a dictator, but
post-Saddam casualties were now equally high. Susanto said
he had also been surprised to learn from U.S. officers that,
after three years in Iraq, U.S. forces reportedly had no
Islamic clerics to ensure the handling of dead Iraqi soldiers
and civilians according to Islamic law. The TNI had taken
care, even in Aceh, to wrap the body of the deceased soldier
or civilian, pray together and ensure timely burial. They
were still human beings, and the respect for custom was
important to the local population


12. (U) DAS John has cleared this message.
PASCOE