YUDHOYONO CONVOKES AMBASSADOR ON IRAN;

S E C R E T JAKARTA 001179

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PGOV ID IR
SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO CONVOKES AMBASSADOR ON IRAN;
ILL-PREPARED ON FEBRUARY 2 VOTE

REF: JAKARTA 1177

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe,
reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: President Yudhoyono (SBY) convoked the
Ambassador to an extraordinary meeting January 31, attended
by four ministers, to convey Indonesia's intention to decide
its position on Iran's nuclear program when the IAEA Board of
Governors meet on March 6. He conveyed concerns with respect
to stability in the Middle East and the world economy along
the same lines as Foreign Minister Wirajuda the previous day
(reftel). When the Ambassador encouraged Indonesia to vote
on February 2 to report Iran to the Security Council, SBY was
caught unaware. The Ambassador briefed SBY on the P5 plus
Germany position on reporting Iran on February 2 coupled with
UNSC action delayed until March 6. After obtaining
confirmation of the upcoming vote from Wirajuda, SBY replied
that he would need a more complete briefing on the February 2
agenda, and closed by thanking the Ambassador for providing
"more complete information" on the situation at hand.
Clearly caught off guard about having to decide soon, and
visibly not well briefed by his staff, SBY gave no concrete
indication on how Indonesia will vote February 2. End Summary


2. (S) In a highly unusual event, President Yudhoyono (SBY)
convoked the Ambassador the afternoon of January 31 (a local
holiday) to convey the Government of Indonesia's policy on
Iran's nuclear program. The President was accompanied by
Coordinating Minister for Security, Political and Legal
Affairs Widodo, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, State Secretary
Mahendra, Cabinet Secretary Silalahi and foreign affairs
adviser Djalal. The Ambassador was accompanied by PolCouns
(notetaker). SBY had already met with the Russian Ambassador
and with EU Ambassadors. He was scheduled to meet as well
with the Chinese Ambassador.

Hope for a Resolution Before March 6
--------------


3. (S) Apparently poorly briefed and not aware of the
importance of the upcoming February 2 meeting of the IAEA
Board of Governors, SBY said that he hoped the Iran nuclear
program issue could be resolved before the March 6 meeting
would have to decide whether Tehran should be referred to the
UN Security Council. He stressed the importance of Iran
continuing to work the issue with the EU-3 and the Russians.
He said Wirajuda conveyed the importance of positive action
to the Iranians when the FM was in Tehran the previous week.
SBY emphasized the need to avoid tensions in the Middle East,
noting that there were strong emotional ties between some
Indonesians and Iran. He also cited the possible effect of a
resulting increase in oil prices resulting from any such
tensions as deleterious to the economies of Third World
nations such as Indonesia. Referring to a visit of an
Iranian special envoy, SBY said that Indonesia made clear
that it opposes the development of any nuclear weapon by
Iran, and that Tehran must comply with all IAEA safeguard
provisions. The Iranians must only pursue nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. SBY closed by inviting the Ambassador to
present U.S. views.

Iranian Blackmail Should Not Be Tolerated
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador said the issue is neither religious
nor regional but global. Iran acquired its technology
illicitly from the A.Q. Khan network and never admitted to
anything until the outside world managed to expose its
activities. Only then was the IAEA allowed to inspect.
Iran's cutting the seals effectively ended the EU-3 effort,
and it has given lip service thus far to the Russian
proposal. They have already contracted for the fuel for
their nuclear power plant and do not need to enrich uranium
themselves in order to supply it. The Ambassador reviewed
Iranian behavior over the last few months, concluding that
Iranian threats with respect to the price of oil constituted
blackmail that the international community should reject.

The P5 and Germany will Refer Iran

--------------


5. (S) The Ambassador reported that the P-5 foreign
ministers and Germany worked late the previous night on the
issue and said that there was a sense of frustration among
them with Iranian behavior. At the end of the meeting, they
issued a statement calling for the reporting of the steps
required of Iran to the UNSC on February 2. The UNSC would
take no further steps until the IAEA report of March 6. SBY
reiterated that Indonesia would base its decision on the
March 6 report.

What Will Indonesia Do February 2?
--------------


6. (S) When the Ambassador then encouraged Indonesia to join
with the P-5 on February 2 to report Iran to the UNSC, SBY
was taken aback. The Ambassador continued by noting that
while there was a majority in favor of reporting Iran,
Indonesia's vote would be important and we did not want to
see Indonesia separate itself from the will of the
international community. SBY turned to Wirajuda and asked
whether there would in fact be a vote February 2 and the FM
so confirmed. A discussion then broke out on what that vote
would constitute. The Ambassador then read out the operative
paragraph from the P5 1 statement about reporting Iran on
February 2, and copies of the statement were passed out to
each minister.

SBY: I Need More Information
--------------


7. (S) SBY then told the Ambassador that he would obtain the
"concrete agenda" for the Feb. 2 meeting. The Ambassador
pointed out that Iran would not have Russia or China to hide
behind during that vote, and should not have Indonesia
either. SBY said that he would obtain a further brief from
his people. He closed by thanking the Ambassador for
providing "more complete information" on the situation that
would help the GOI prepare for the next IAEA meeting on
February 2.
PASCOE


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