CRUCIAL 2007 JAKARTA GOVERNOR,S RACE TAKING SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 011376

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL ID
SUBJECT: CRUCIAL 2007 JAKARTA GOVERNOR,S RACE TAKING SHAPE


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Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reason: 1.4 (b) and
(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Approximately one year before Jakarta holds its first
ever directly elected Governor's race, behind the scenes
political maneuvering is already in full swing, reflecting
the high stakes involved in what will be the most significant
Indonesian election prior to the 2009 Legislative and
Presidential campaigns. Although a strong field of
contenders has already emerged, the major political parties
have yet to formally align themselves with individual
candidates and are in the process of evaluating their
options. Though the election will undoubtedly turn on local,
Jakarta-centric issues, the results will have national
implications and set the stage for 2009. The Prosperous
Justice Party (PKS),seemingly poised to capitalize on its
strength in Jakarta and seize the country's most important
governor's mansion, has struggled to identify a suitable
candidate. Rather than play to win, reportedly PKS has
instead opted to sell the party's nomination to the highest
bidder: Adang Daradjutan, the Deputy Chief of the national
police force. With PKS' curious, pre-emptive capitulation,
the field is wide open and any one of a handful of candidates
could easily win the race. End Summary.

LOCAL ELECTION, NATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
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2. (C) As the seat of the nation's capital and its corridors
of power, Jakarta is Indonesia's wealthiest and most
politically influential province. One byproduct of this
power is that the Jakarta Governorship is the most highly
sought after in the country. Conventional wisdom suggests
the Jakarta governorship is one of the few non-national
elected offices that can be used as a launching pad for the
presidency, and the media attention and financial resources
already being directed at a race still one year away reflect
its importance in the national psyche. Every day in Jakarta
newspaper articles, local television programs and seminars
with political wonks all focus on a race that lacks a date or
official candidates.


3. (C) Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso is proof enough of the
potential of the Governor's office to function as a breeding
ground for future presidential candidates. Sutiyoso manages
the unwieldy metropolis of Jakarta with a firm hand,
cultivating a reputation as a strong and organized leader.
Not everyone appreciates the Governor's direct and unyielding
style, but he has gained respect in most corridors for his
ability to achieve goals - such as the development of very
controversial bus lanes - by any means necessary. In
contrast with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who has
been criticized for his deliberate, sometimes indecisive
nature, Sutiyoso's term as Governor is viewed by some more
favorably. It remains to be seen whether Sutisyoso will be
able to cash in on this reputation and ascend to the
Presidency or Vice Presidency, but he has certainly
catapulted himself into consideration through his current
performance.

FEATHERING THE NEST
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4. (C) In a country where using public office to line one's
pockets is a national sport, the Jakarta Governor's mansion
is the ultimate prize. The salary is almost paltry - only
about $330 US a year - but the opportunities for graft are
virtually unlimited and the job comes with a U.S. $1.4
million a year budget for office related expenses. In short,
the price of paying off a political party to enter the race
and then funding a campaign may be prohibitive, but the
opportunities for making a healthy return on this investment
are abundant. A winning candidate can expect to leave the
Governor's mansion a very wealthy man, and this is also
certainly a consideration for each candidate.

THE MECHANICS
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5. (C) The Jakarta Regional Electoral Commission (KPUD)
should officially announce the schedule for the election in
January. According to local election guidelines, the

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election would take place within six months of that date,
most likely in July or August. Voters will elect the
Governor directly in a one-day event provided the winning
candidate garners at least 25 percent of the vote. If no
candidate wins that percentage, there will be a runoff
between the top two finishers.


6. (C) The only candidates eligible to run are those
affiliated with parties, or coalitions of parties, which hold
at least 15 percent of the seats on the Jakarta Regional
Representative Council (DPRD),or a total of 11 seats. Only
three parties meet the 11 seat threshold on their own: PKS,
with 18 seats, the Democratic Party (PD),with 16, and the
Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P),which holds
11 seats. Political powerhouse Golkar is relatively weak in
Jakarta, with only seven seats, and opted to form a coalition
with the National Mandate Party, the United Development
Party, the National Awakening Party, and the Prosperous Peace
Party in order to field a candidate. A variety of other
plausible coalition scenarios could push the total number
candidates in the field to five.

SEVERAL MAJOR HATS ALREADY IN THE RING
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7. (C) Fauzi Bowo is probably the best known of the current
crop of candidates widely thought to be in contention. As
the current Vice Governor of Jakarta, he enjoys some of the
trappings of incumbency and stands to benefit from his
association with Governor Sutiyoso, a popular figure in
Jakarta. Bowo's smiling mug is also as nearly as ubiquitous
in Jakarta as the traffic, the result of some 250,000 posters
that have been strategically placed throughout the city as
part of an anti-drug campaign led by Bowo. In addition, he
is a native Betawi, the ethnic group indigenous to Jakarta.


8. (C) Agum Gumelar has strong name recognition after having
teamed up with Hamzah Haz as a vice presidential candidate
during the 2004 presidential elections. Before his failed VP
run, Gumelar was the transportation minister under former
President Megawati. Though Gumelar has not yet formally
announced his candidacy, he has been making the rounds on the
Jakarta speaking circuit and appears to be openly flirting
with the possibility of running as the Democratic Party's
candidate.


9. (C) Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, a member of the powerless
Regional Representative Council (DPD),is a former
environment minister and one-time Golkar Secretary General.
In a meeting with Poloff, the decidedly low-key Sarwono
demonstrated a surprising self-awareness in admitting younger
voters find him "old and sleepy." Sarwono outlined a
strategy to improve his name recognition with the under
twenty-five set, who will represent the largest chunk of the
vote, pointing to his frequent appearances on soccer shows,
on the radio, and at local concerts to harness multi-media
outlets in his favor. Sarwono also has an informative and
reasonably well trafficked website (Sarwono.net) and a
full-time campaign team working to increase his profile.
Several contacts have dismissed his prospects, telling us he
is too old and handicapped by having a Christian wife.
Nevertheless, he has generated considerable buzz in the
newspapers and we have not had a single conversation about
the race that has not involved him in some way. Sarwono's
biggest obstacle appears to be his limited finances and
commensurately limited ability to line up party support.


10. (C) Adang Daradjutan is the Deputy Chief of the national
police force and the presumed standard bearer for PKS.
Despite the fact that he is somewhat lacking in name
recognition, Adang creatively kicked off his campaign for the
Governor's race by organizing a citywide soccer tournament
with a name that hints at his candidacy: the 2006 Adang
Daradjatun Cup.


11. (C) Faisal Basrie, a U.S. educated economist, also
declared his candidacy. Basrie has received scant press
attention and does not appear to have the star power of the
other major candidates in the field, but nevertheless has
attracted the attention of PDI-P and our contacts believe he
has the inside track on their nomination.

THE PKS FACTOR
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12. (C) PKS' remarkably strong showing in 2004 raised
expectations to the point that a letdown was almost
inevitable, and perhaps this helps explain the party's
curious decision to abandon a serious run at the
governorship. With the most seats in the Jakarta DPRD, in
theory PKS was very well positioned to win the race and serve
notice to all the other parties that PKS is not a one hit
wonder. In practice though, members of the leadership told
us the party struggled to identify a candidate with the
combination of star power and governing experience necessary
to not only win the election, but govern effectively. With
no obvious candidate to run, and enormous pressure and
expectations building, our contacts tell us the party decided
to effectively sit the election out by nominating a
lightweight with only a small chance of winning.


13. (C) The decision to not run a serious candidate was not
made because the party lacks electable figures. One PKS
member with the name recognition required is Hidayat Nur
Wahid. As Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly
(MPR) and a former President of PKS, Hidayat is by far the
biggest party star and would have been considered an
overwhelming favorite had he entered. A winning Hidayat
would have generated a tremendous amount of press coverage,
increased his national profile, and immediately found himself
on the short list of viable Presidential or Vice Presidential
candidates for 2009. The problem, apparently, was that the
potential risks involved with his candidacy - losing the
election and damaging the party's momentum, or winning the
election and showcasing on the biggest stage the party's
inability to govern effectively - outweighed the potential
rewards. We have also heard that Hidayat believed moving
from MPR Chair to the governorship would have represented a
step backwards in some respects.


14. (C) With Hidayat's candidacy off the table, PKS
reportedly decided to use the election to make money.
According to several party contacts, the leadership opted to
sell PKS support to the highest bidder, with little to no
regard for electability. The auction winner was Adang
Daradjutan, who cobbled together the party tribute required
to win the PKS endorsement (Note: The sum is rumored to be
several million US dollars, but we do not have an exact read.
End Note).


15. (C) In the end the PKS leadership decided to sell off the
nomination and build up party coffers not only because of the
risk of losing the election, but perhaps even more
compellingly, because of the chance they might have won. PKS
recognized its lack of leadership depth and determined that
trying to run one of the world's largest and most
dysfunctional cities could well have been a strategic long
term mistake. Better to make some money and watch the other
parties fight it out. Given the underwhelming performance of
the party's three representatives in the President's cabinet,
as well as the obvious dearth of managerial talent in the
party ranks, this decision may well have been a very shrewd
one.
PASCOE