Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA11344
2006-09-13 02:28:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

MINISTRY OF HEALTH CHANGES AI SAMPLE SHARING

Tags:  TBIO AMED CASC EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KFLU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1203
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1344/01 2560228
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130228Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9939
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA PRIORITY
INFO RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/BUMED WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9913
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0951
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1933
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1861
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2197
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3635
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0131
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0280
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 011344 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/IET, A/MED AND S/ES-O
DEPT FOR G/AIAG/JLANGE AND RFENDRICK
DEPT FOR OES/FO, OES/EID, OES/PCI, OES/STC AND OES/IHA
DEPT PASS TO USDA/FAS/DLP/HWETZEL AND FAS/ICD/LAIDIG
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USDA/FAS/FAA/DYOUNG AND USDA/APHIS
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USAID/ANE/CLEMENTS AND GH/CARROLL
DEPT ALSO PASS TO HHS/WSTEIGER/ABHAT/MSTLOUIS AND HHS/NIH
PARIS FOR FAS/AG MINISTER COUNSELOR
CANBERRA FOR APHIS/DHANNAPEL
ROME FOR FAO
NSC FOR JMELINE
BANGKOK FOR RMO, CDC, USAID/RDM/A
USPACOM ALSO PASS TO J07

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO AMED CASC EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KFLU
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF HEALTH CHANGES AI SAMPLE SHARING
PROCEDURES

REF: A) Jakarta 09914

JAKARTA 00011344 001.2 OF 003

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 011344

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/IET, A/MED AND S/ES-O
DEPT FOR G/AIAG/JLANGE AND RFENDRICK
DEPT FOR OES/FO, OES/EID, OES/PCI, OES/STC AND OES/IHA
DEPT PASS TO USDA/FAS/DLP/HWETZEL AND FAS/ICD/LAIDIG
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USDA/FAS/FAA/DYOUNG AND USDA/APHIS
DEPT ALSO PASS TO USAID/ANE/CLEMENTS AND GH/CARROLL
DEPT ALSO PASS TO HHS/WSTEIGER/ABHAT/MSTLOUIS AND HHS/NIH
PARIS FOR FAS/AG MINISTER COUNSELOR
CANBERRA FOR APHIS/DHANNAPEL
ROME FOR FAO
NSC FOR JMELINE
BANGKOK FOR RMO, CDC, USAID/RDM/A
USPACOM ALSO PASS TO J07

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO AMED CASC EAGR AMGT PGOV ID KFLU
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF HEALTH CHANGES AI SAMPLE SHARING
PROCEDURES

REF: A) Jakarta 09914

JAKARTA 00011344 001.2 OF 003


1.(SBU) Summary. The Mission's Naval Medical Research Unit
(NAMRU-2) has continued to be able to send samples to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) since
Minister of Health Dr. Siti Fadilah Supari's August 3
announcement that only three in-country laboratories would
conduct tests on suspected H5N1 samples and confirm H5N1
cases for Indonesia. In the August 3 announcement, Supari
also stated that the Ministry of Health (MOH) will no longer
send samples to the World Health Organization (WHO)
Reference Laboratory at the University of Hong Kong and
would only send samples outside of Indonesia if
collaborating institutes agree to a Materials Transfer
Agreement (MTA). While the reasons behind the announcement
are not completely clear, the Government of Indonesia's
(GOI) relationships with both the University of Hong Kong
and WHO Indonesia have grown increasingly strained in recent
months. While samples continue to flow to CDC via NAMRU-2,
the MTA issue remains unresolved and could impede future
shipments. End Summary.

Announcements on Sample Sharing
--------------


2. (U) At a press conference on August 3, Minister of Health
Supari made three important announcements concerning testing
samples for avian influenza and sharing data
internationally. At the conference, the Minister also
expressed her satisfaction in the ability of local

laboratories to accurately confirm newly emerging AI cases
in humans. The three announcements are:

--Effective immediately, three in-country laboratories
exclusively will conduct tests and confirm H5N1 cases for
Indonesia. These laboratories are NAMRU-2, the Eijkman
Institute and National Institute of Health Research and
Development (NIHRD).

--The GOI will not send samples to the WHO-Reference
Laboratory at the University of Hong Kong and will only send
samples outside of Indonesia if collaborating institutes
agree to a Materials Transfer Agreement (MTA).

--The GOI wishes to be more open and transparent and will
seek to release information soon related to the sequencing
of H5N1 viruses.


3. (SBU) Upon hearing the announcement, NAMRU-2 immediately
contacted MOH and received permission to continue to send
samples to CDC. Since August 3, NAMRU-2 has sent samples
from five patients, including three recent cases from Garut.

Motivations behind MOH Announcement
--------------


4. (SBU) While the reasons behind Supari's decisions are not
completely clear, the MOH has been unhappy with delays in

JAKARTA 00011344 002.2 OF 003


receiving information from Hong Kong. At the same time, the
MOH has been generally satisfied with reports from NAMRU-2
and US CDC. Various contacts have told us that the MOH has
become increasingly uncomfortable with Dr. Malik Peiris,
senior investigator at the University of Hong Kong WHO
reference laboratory. According to our contacts, Malik has
made public comments about H5N1 in Indonesia while in Hong
Kong without clearing them with the MOH, and failed to
inform MOH officials in advance that the Hong Kong
laboratory was conducting research with H5N1 virus from
Indonesia. In addition, MOH officials have complained that
the Hong Kong laboratory has not forwarded data on sequences
in a timely and complete fashion.


5. (SBU) At the same time, relations between the MOH and the
WHO Indonesia office have deteriorated since the Karo
District family cluster in May 2006 and the Expert
Consultation sponsored by the WHO in June 2006. Some MOH
officials told us that they felt publicly criticized during
the Expert Consultation, and several senior MOH officials
made announcements denying firm evidence of human to human
transmission in North Sumatra. Jakarta-based WHO officials
have also advocated that the MOH send specimens from human
cases to the WHO-Reference Laboratory at Hong Kong
University, while generally discounting results from the
CDC.


6. (U) Another MOH motivation for the revised sample sharing
procedures may be that, under the leadership of Director
General Dr. Triono Soendoro, the NIHRD is moving to develop
the full capacity to diagnose and characterize influenza
samples in-country in collaboration with the Eijkman
Institute.

Implications for NAMRU-2
--------------


7. (SBU) Dr. Triono has told us that he views the
announcement as an endorsement of NAMRU-2, and in general,
the MOH has been pleased with the responsiveness and
completeness of reports from CDC and NAMRU-2. The MOH has
granted NAMRU-2 permission to continue to send samples to
the CDC, and since Supari's announcement, NAMRU-2 has sent
samples from eight patients including three recent cases
from Garut.


8. (SBU) However, the efficiency of sample transfers in the
future will depend on any final MTA with the MOH. The draft
MTA the Ministry of Health has given NAMRU-2 is very
restrictive, with provisions that would assert full control
on sample flow, sample information and their usage for the
production of vaccines. It also raises complicated
intellectual property rights issues, as well as topics that
are to be covered in the upcoming GOI-NAMRU-2 Memorandum of
Understanding. NAMRU-2 is in the process of reviewing the
draft MTA and meeting with various MOH officials to better
understand the implications of the August 3 announcements.


JAKARTA 00011344 003.2 OF 003



9. (SBU) Comment: We believe that much of the driving force
behind the Minister's announcement is a nationalistic appeal
for Indonesia to develop full capacity to diagnose and
characterize influenza samples in country. However, no in-
country laboratory currently has the capacity to perform
necessary testing at the level performed by CDC. Until the
MOH and collaborating laboratories sort through the MTA and
associated issues, the prospects of a more restrictive
sample sharing regime could dampen NAMRU-2 and other
researchers' abilities to conduct studies related to H5N1.
End comment.

PASCOE