Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA11214
2006-09-11 10:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

KEITH LUSE'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN MOD DEFENSE

Tags:  PREL MARR MASS PGOV PHUM ID 
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R 111001Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9808
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3633
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9909
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3744
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0010
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1026
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 011214 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV PHUM ID
SUBJECT: KEITH LUSE'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN MOD DEFENSE
STRATEGY DIRECTOR SUSANTO

Classified By: Poloff Daniel Turnbull for Reasons 1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 011214

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR MASS PGOV PHUM ID
SUBJECT: KEITH LUSE'S MEETING WITH INDONESIAN MOD DEFENSE
STRATEGY DIRECTOR SUSANTO

Classified By: Poloff Daniel Turnbull for Reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Senate SFRC Senior Professional Staff Member
Keith Luse met with Indonesian Defense Ministry Director
General for Defense Strategy Major General Dadi Susanto on
August 28 in Jakarta. Susanto characterized U.S.-Indonesian
relations and military cooperation as positive. Susanto
welcomed Indonesia's partnership with the Hawaii National
Guard on disaster relief training and said the Indonesian
military was working hard to change its human rights image,
including conducting a dialogue with human-rights
organizations. Indonesia wanted a continued U.S. presence in
the region to counterbalance China's growing influence, but
needed to improve the Indonesian public's perception of the
U.S. Indonesians were beginning to distinguish between
terrorism and Islam, and the Indonesian military was playing
an important role in helping to track down terrorists in
Indonesia. Indonesia and the Philippines were considering
maritime security cooperation to impede the flow of illicit
arms through the Sulawesi S
ea. North Korea was seeking to escape from its international
isolation, but should not be pushed into a corner. End
summary.


2. (C) Susanto expressed satisfaction at the normalization of
U.S.-Indonesian military relations. One such example was the
TNI's cooperation with U.S. National Guard units in Honolulu.
Such cooperation was helping to develop the TNI's ability to
respond to disasters and other emergencies, which was
important given Indonesia's vulnerability to natural
disasters. He had just returned from one such TNI operation
in a remote area where the TNI was helping the local
population rebuilding houses and community infrastructure.


3. (C) Indonesia regarded the United States as an anchor of
stability in Southeast Asia. East Asia was moving forward
rapidly. In the future, the United States and China would be

"two superpowers" in the region, and Indonesia would find
itself in the middle. Competition was expected, but
cooperation would also be essential for regional stability.
Indonesia was cooperating with China in rocketry research,
and was cooperating with other countries militarily as a
result of the U.S. "embargo" in the 1990s. Indonesia had no
plans for a nuclear military program, but had several
commercial power-generating reactors in central Java.
Indonesia risked being left behind in the region, and had to
reform. Malaysia and even Vietnam were now moving ahead very
fast. Indonesia must do the same or become like Burma.


4. (C) To further strengthen the bilateral relationship, a
top priority should be to improve the Indonesian public's
perception of the United States. The Indonesian media often
presented a misleading picture. It was important to bridge
this gap between perception and reality. Most Indonesian
Muslims were moderate, and most of the Indonesian pesantren,
or madrasas (parochial schools) were moderate. (Note:
Susanto is a Christian.) The United States was already
supporting educational and informational programs in these
schools, but this must be done with regard for Indonesian
cultural sensitivities. Both the Indonesian government and
Indonesian NGOs could help in this regard. The second Bali
bombings had made clear to the Muslim community the need to
distinguish between Islam and terrorism, and Islamic leaders
had sent this message out within the Islamic community,
including the schools. The Muslim leadership, he noted,
could be very effective, as it had been in earlier campaigns
on family planning where its endorsement and assistance was
critical to reaching the grassroots level.


5. (C) Terrorism was a real threat to Indonesia, and the
Indonesian government took this threat seriously. Terrorist
methods and equipment were increasingly sophisticated. The
TNI, which President Yudhoyono had directed to help fight
terrorism domestically, was making a major contribution owing
to its intelligence capabilities through its traditional
territorial structure. The TNI had an NCO in nearly every
village across the country to report unusual activities in
their respective communities. As a result, terrorists were
being flushed out of rural areas, where the local population
could easily identify them. Now they were moving to the
suburbs of larger cities. More broadly, the national
military intelligence body, BAIS, was coordinating in a
subordinate role with the national intelligence agency, BIN,
through regular joint meetings.


JAKARTA 00011214 002 OF 002



6. (C) The TNI was working very hard to change its
human-rights image and to change its practices in line with
democratic norms. That effort involved establishing a
dialogue with human rights groups which were critical of the
TNI's past record, in an effort to present the human side of
the TNI soldier and overcome misperceptions. The dialogue
with Human Rights Watch, which had opposed military
cooperation with the TNI as paying too high a price, was
bearing fruit. The new guidance manuals for soldiers devoted
much space to the rules of engagement.


7. (C) Indonesia and the Philippines were considering
collective maritime security arrangements in the South
Sulawesi Sea. In addition to traffic across the Sulawesi Sea
from the Philippines, old weapons from the Vietnam War were
still finding their way from private sellers in Laos and
Cambodia to Thailand and from there through Malaysia and
Indonesia to the Sulawesi area.


8. (C) North Korea was isolated, and was seeking to escape
from that isolation, going so far as to seek military
cooperation with Burma. Indonesia's relations with North
Korea allowed Indonesia to talk directly to the North
Koreans. North Korea boasted about its technological
achievements, including development of a new wonder strain of
wheat and radars which could lock onto U.S. stealth planes.
(Note: Susanto offered no comment on the veracity of such
claims.) The international community should avoid pushing
North Korea into a corner, but rather draw it out.


9. (C) The U.S. military could improve its reception among
the local population in Iraq by adopting the Indonesian
practice of praying together with the families of fallen
comrades. U.S. soldiers could pray with survivors of Iraqis
who had fallen victim to the violence. Indonesia would also
be interested in exchanging U.S. and Indonesian military
chaplains to learn from and share with one another.
PASCOE