S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MEETINGS WITH INDONESIAN FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 010399

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/P, EAP/FO, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON EAID CVIS ID
SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MEETINGS WITH INDONESIAN FM
WIRAJUDA AND MOD SUDARSONO

Classified By: Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with S/P Director Stephen
Krasner on August 11, Indonesian Foreign Minister Wirajuda
emphasized Indonesia's desire to expand and deepen bilateral
cooperation with the United States on political, security,
economic and other fronts. Wirajuda appealed for U.S.
assistance and exchanges, particularly in education, and for
a streamlined visa clearance process, particularly students.
He reiterated Indonesia's interest in cooperation toward the
objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
urged the continued active presence of the United States in
Southeast Asia as an essential counterweight to China and
India and sketched Indonesia's plans for developing the East
Asian Summit (EAS). He stressed Indonesia's desire to play a
constructive role in supporting the Six-Party Talks on North
Korea, to provide moderate leadership within the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and to contribute to the
projected UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon.


2. (C) In Director Krasner's meeting with Indonesian Defense
Minister Sudarsono, Sudarsono said Indonesian military
priorities were to improve integration among forces,
establish civilian control over military procurement, develop
airlift, draw more non-Javanese into the officer corps and
develop civilian expertise in security matters. Indonesia
needed 10-15 years to achieve its proper role in Southeast
Asian security, he said, and the biggest threats to
Indonesian security were non-military. This message has been
cleared by S/P. End Summary.

MEETING WITH FM WIRAJUDA


3. (C) Noting that the U.S.-Indonesia relationship was
developing rapidly, Wirajuda detailed a long list of areas of
current and potential cooperation. Indonesia and the United
States shared many basic values of democracy, freedom, human
rights, pluralism and tolerance. These shared values
provided a basis for a continued improvement in relations.
The United States was a world power, while Indonesia's
influence was far more limited. While this disparity was a
source of different approaches on some issues, both countries
should keep in mind their shared values and work together to
find solutions.


4. (C) Krasner responded that the United States wanted
Indonesia to succeed in its reforms and development. Both
countries were large, multi-ethnic democracies, which created
shared interests and common challenges. Indonesia was the
linchpin of Southeast Asia: if Indonesia failed, Southeast
Asia as a whole would fail.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION


5. (C) Indonesia would benefit from U.S.-ASEAN economic
cooperation, Wirajuda suggested. Trade and investment were
important drivers of economic growth in the region.
Cooperation with the United States in education was also
critical for Indonesia's success in particular. Indonesia
welcomed U.S. assistance in improving the quality of
Indonesian education. Development of the Sesame Street
project for Indonesia was proceeding well, and the
programming would appear next summer.


6. (C) On the energy front, Wirajuda said an Indonesian team
had visited Brazil the previous week with an eye to
developing the Indonesian market in biofuels based on palm
oil and casava, for domestic consumption as well as export.
Indonesia was also working with South Korea on nuclear
energy, and wanted to cooperate with the United States in
this area as well.


7. (C) Krasner replied that it was important to deepen the
bilateral economic dialogue and make it work in a concrete
way, in sharing technology, attracting foreign investment and
trade. Much progress had already been made.

POLITICAL COOPERATION


8. (C) Wirajuda stated Indonesia's readiness for additional
consultations on political-military issues, including the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and other mechanisms
to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Indonesia

JAKARTA 00010399 002 OF 003


was eager to begin discussions on a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) and looked forward to planned discussions on
this in the near future.


9. (C) Wirajuda said the East Asian Summit (EAS) was
attractive to Indonesia as a regional forum for political
coordination. With its current membership of 16 countries it
had achieved an internal balance, which should be given time
to stabilize while further modalities were discussed. Once
institutional structures became stronger, countries such as
the United States, China and Russia could also be added as
observers, providing an external balance as well. The
overall process should be inclusive, with membership limited
to East Asian states, Australia and New Zealand. Wirajuda
noted that this strategy had been agreed at the ASEAN meeting
in Bali in April.


10. (C) On North Korea, Indonesia had continued to encourage
a return to the Six-Party Talks. Indonesia had appreciated
being included in the Korea-related consultations on the
margins of the ARF meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Wirajuda also
noted that he had met Iran's foreign minister on the
sidelines of the ARF. Iraq, where the wave of bombs and
killings continued, appeared to be on the verge of a civil
war. Likeminded countries should discuss solutions for Iraq
and mobilize a "concentration of forces" to bring about an
end to the conflict. Wirajuda remarked that the U.S.
military presence in Iraq might be part of the problem.

MIDDLE EAST


11. (C) On the Middle East, Wirajuda said that the longer the
"stalemate" persisted in Lebanon, the more intense the public
reactions around the world and in Indonesia. The protraction
of the conflict was "radicalizing" the Indonesian public, and
this worked against bilateral cooperation with the United
States. President Yudhoyono had proposed a "troika" of
non-Arab countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and possibly
one other within the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC) to provide leadership within the organization on the
Middle East. Indonesia was preparing to participate in that
force, Wirajuda noted, but only on the basis of Chapter 6 of
the UN Charter. Solving the problem in Lebanon, he stressed,
could help prevent Islamic radicalism in the region and
elsewhere.


12. (C) Krasner replied that the United States was sensitive
to the civilian deaths in Lebanon. A fundamental cause of
the conflict was that the Siniora government had been unable
to exercise sovereignty over its entire territory. It was
essential to achieve a sustainable solution, so the recent
situation would not reoccur. Israel must be able to trust in
the elements of that solution for it to work. Hizbollah must
be contained in the near term and disarmed in the longer term.

NORTH KOREA


13. (C) On North Korea, Krasner noted the 5 plus 5 exchange
on North Korea at the ARF had been interesting and might be
worth repeating. Wirajuda noted that the symbolism of the
exchange was positive, letting the public know that countries
were working on the issue. For Indonesia, a resumption of
the Six-Party Talks was important. Indonesia had regretted
having to cancel president Yudhoyono's visit to North Korea,
and had been disappointed that China had been able to
exercise so little leverage on North Korea. But the United
States was the key to a solution because of its economic
sanctions against the country. Krasner responded that the
sanctions argument was only an excuse, and pointed out that
sanctions had been imposed to curb North Korea's illegal
trade in arms, its money laundering and other criminal
activities. Negotiating on sanctions was out of the
question, and would not induce North Korea to cooperate.
North Korea had obtained much of what it wanted for the
negotiations to proceed, but had then allowed the process to
unravel. Direct negotiations with North Korea had been tried
and had failed. Even China was now upset with North Korea,
and South Korea was extremely concerned about the missile
threat. Still, it was up to China to press North Korea to
return to the Six-Party Talks.

MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SUDARSONO


JAKARTA 00010399 003 OF 003



14. (C) Defense Minister Prof. Juwono Sudarsono said the MOD
was making progress on integrating military doctrine,
reducing rivalry between the defense forces, pulling more
civilians into defense planning and establishing civilian
control over military procurement. Indonesia was focusing on
developing airlift rather than a strike force, while its
military budget remained limited. The Navy, which had been
neglected in the past, was now receiving one third of defense
funding. Indonesia would need ten to 15 years to recover its
proper role in Southeast Asian security. Indonesia was
preparing a combined peacekeeping force of 850 for Lebanon,
should the UN stand up such a force. (Note: Indonesian
projections of the force size have since increased to 1000
persons.)


15. (C) One of the biggest challenges facing Indonesia for
the future, Sudarsono said, was the rise of non-military
threats to security. Another was economic justice, meaning
an equitable balance between the center and periphery of the
country's provinces and the creation of a sense of belonging
among outlying regions. The officer corps, he explained,
consisted overwhelmingly of Javanese. The military was
trying to redress this balance through more aggressive
recruitment, but cultural factors impeded the ability of
outsiders to cope with the rigors of training.


16. (C) Indonesia was in the process of producing civilian
expertise in the military area, including positions in the
Ministry of Defense. A whole generation had been lost during
the Suharto years, and civil society was still trying to
overcome the gap. Political parties had moved slowly to
develop popular bases and organizational structures, and had
yet to realize their proper role in the political process
under democracy.
PASCOE