Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06JAKARTA10298
2006-08-15 11:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

INDONESIA WANTS TO ELEVATE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON EAID PARM KDEM ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8811
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 3595
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 9849
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1206
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RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0993
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 010298 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID PARM KDEM ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA WANTS TO ELEVATE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
TO "STRATEGIC LEVEL"

Classified By: Amb. B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 010298

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID PARM KDEM ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA WANTS TO ELEVATE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
TO "STRATEGIC LEVEL"

Classified By: Amb. B. Lynn Pascoe, for reasons 1.4 (b and d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: S/P Director of Policy Planning Dr. Stephen
Krasner met on August 11 with Indonesian Foreign Ministry
officials for a strategic dialogue on U.S.-Indonesian
relations. Led by Secretary General Imron Cotan, the
Indonesians stressed their desire to expand and deepen
bilateral cooperation and announced Indonesia,s decision to
&elevate the relationship to a strategic level.8 Cotan
listed maritime security, drug smuggling, piracy, trafficking
in persons, proliferation of WMD, illegal logging, natural
disaster and pandemic response, and development of a tsunami
Early Warning System as potential areas of cooperation.
Cotan emphasized the constructive role the United States
could play in ensuring the success of Indonesia,s nascent
democracy, and appealed for more student and cultural
exchanges and a streamlining of the visa clearance process.


2. (C) Cotan stressed Indonesia,s desire for a strong U.S.
presence in Southeast Asia to counterbalance the rising
influence of China and India, but stressed Indonesia would
maintain its tradition of nonalignment. Cotan said Indonesia
was ready to work together to interdict vessels in its
territorial waters and exclusive economic zone but restated
GOI reservations about joining the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). He pushed for greater USG engagement to
bring an end to the violence in the Middle East, reiterated
Indonesia,s intention to send peacekeeping forces to Lebanon
following an eventual settlement, and made a pitch for
considering Indonesia as a candidate for the UN Security
Council.


3. (U) Per the request of Dr. Krasner, this message
summarises the Indonesian views presented during the talks,
and was not cleared by him. End Summary

SHARED VALUES AND EXPERIENCES
--------------


4. (C) Foreign Ministry Secretary General Imron Cotan

initiated the policy planning talks by underlining the
similarities and shared values between the two countries.
Cotan pointed out the United States and Indonesia were the
world,s second and third largest democracies, respectively,
and shared similar experiences as former colonies, secular
nations, free market economies, and victims of terrorism with
a common interest in combating extremism.


5. (C) Cotan said Indonesia hoped to accelerate the pace with
which bilateral relations were improving, and pressed for
continuing to &expand and deepen ties,8 a phrase he
attributed to the Foreign Minister and repeated throughout
the discussion.

AREAS FOR ASSISTANCE
--------------


6. (U) Though optimistic about the state of U.S-Indonesian
relations, Cotan cautioned that Indonesia was still in the
midst of a democratic consolidation process. The average
Indonesian remained skeptical of the GOI,s ability to
translate hard earned political freedoms into better lives
for its people. In this respect, the United States could
help lay the foundation for a stable, long-term partnership
by intensifying joint efforts to improve good governance,
eradicate corruption, increase and encourage foreign
investment and trade, encourage global peace and security,
and build the capacity of local governments. Indonesia would
also be receptive to suggestions about how it could better
position itself for assistance through the Millennium
Challenge Account.


7. (U) Noting the presence of over a dozen U.S.-educated
Ministers in the current GOI cabinet, Cotan emphasized one of
the most important contributions the United States could make
to the future of Indonesia and U.S.-Indonesian relations was
through educational and cultural exchanges. Cotan argued for
a more robust program, including U.S.-funded exchanges and
scholarships for Indonesian nationals. In addition, Cotan
asked the United States to re-evaluate current visa policies
for Indonesia and study ways to simplify and expedite the
clearance process. He asked that the United States devise a
more sophisticated and balanced approach to visitors arriving
to the United States with Muslim names. He said Indonesians

JAKARTA 00010298 002 OF 003


routinely were subjected to unnecessarily harsh treatment
upon arrival to the United States, and noted he personally
had endured such treatment from U.S. border and security
officials.


8. (C) Turning to bilateral cooperation on terrorism, Cotan
cited the strong partnership between the two countries in
support of the Indonesian request for access to Hambali.
Cotan asked that the United States reconsider the Indonesian
request, which had been steadfastly denied, and grant
Indonesian officials at least brief access to him, to allow
them to portray the relationship as one of mutual cooperation.

AREAS FOR COOPERATION
--------------


9. (U) Stressing the significance of resuming bilateral
military ties, Cotan eagerly outlined additional areas for
cooperation and partnership. He said Indonesia would welcome
the opportunity to negotiate an MLAT with the United States,
enhance cooperation on extradition issues, conclude a
consular notification agreement and create the legal basis
for exchanges of prisoners.


10. (U) Cotan expressed confidence the United States and
Indonesia could continue as partners on terrorism issues. He
urged that bilateral cooperation increase in such areas as
maritime security; combating drug smuggling, piracy,
trafficking in persons, proliferation of WMD and illegal
logging; improving natural-disaster and pandemic response and
developing an Early Warning System for tsunamis. Addressing
specifically the question of trafficking, MFA Director of
International Security and Disarmament Hasan Kleib thanked
the USG for its continued assistance on trafficking issues
and argued Indonesia,s efforts to combat trafficking had not
been accurately reflected in the most recent Trafficking in
Persons Report for Indonesia (Note: Indonesia was designated
as a Tier 2 Watch List country).


11. (U) On the subject of economic cooperation, Cotan
articulated a desire to conduct an economic dialogue with the
United States. He acknowledged it was important that
Indonesia continue to tackle &pervasive corruption8 in
order to enhance the Indonesian business climate and attract
investment; Indonesia hoped the United States would continue
to work together with Indonesia to this end. Addressing the
issue of international trade, Cotan said the failure of the
Doha Round had greatly disappointed Indonesia and would cost
the country an estimated $1.8 billion.


12. (C) Cataloguing this extensive list of potential issues
for cooperation, Cotan stressed Indonesia,s firm commitment
to its traditional nonalignment meant Indonesia could not
allow itself to align itself one-sidedly with the United
States.

UNILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL AND THE UN
--------------


13. (C) On Indonesia,s role in Southeast Asia and the world,
Cotan said Indonesia preferred to exercise its influence
through multilateral and regional fora, using a policy of
concentric layers that included institutions and fora such as
ASEAN, APEC, the East Asia Summit, NAM, and the United
Nations. Noting America,s &unquestioned status as a
hegemonic power,8 Cotan expressed understanding for
America,s tendency to pursue unilateral solutions on some
issues but emphasized the hope that the United States would
also use its power to build consensus in multilateral fora as
well.


14. (C) In a discussion about UN reform, Cotan made a pitch
for considering Indonesia as a candidate for the UN Security
Council. As the world,s largest Muslim country and third
largest democracy, Indonesia would be a natural ally for the
United States on the UNSC and would seem to merit closer
consideration, he suggested.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI)
--------------


15. (C) Responding to U.S. urging that Indonesia join the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),Kleib emphasized
Indonesia,s reservations about joining initiatives and

JAKARTA 00010298 003 OF 003


groupings that lay outside multilateral fora, meaning the
United Nations and other international organizations that
were open to all countries. Joining PSI, with a selective
membership, was inconsistent with Indonesia,s longstanding
policy of nonalignment. Kleib also alleged weakened U.S.
support for international WMD conventions (NPT, BWC and CTBT)
in recent years had undercut their effectiveness.


16. (C) Taking a different tack, Cotan explained that
Indonesia was solely responsible for guarding its own
territorial waters and its exclusive economic zone.
Australia had interdicted Indonesian ships (mostly fishing
vessels) in Indonesian waters (near the island of Roti, west
of Timur) some 300 times, thereby sensitizing Indonesia to
the negative consequences of international enforcement
regimes for the transport of people and goods in its own
waters. Indonesia was ready to cooperate with the United
States on exchanging intelligence and developing capacity
toward interdiction, but independently of PSI and consistent
with Indonesia,s archipelagic character. Indonesia,s
strong stance on nonproliferation was evidence of its
commitment to PSI objectives.

THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------


17. (U) On the Middle East, Cotan said the GOI supported a
two-state solution with Israel and Palestine living
side-by-side in peace within internationally recognized
borders, and urged a more assertive role by the United States
in bringing hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah to a
close. Noting the outpouring of support in Indonesia for the
plight of Muslims in Lebanon and Palestine, Cotan said the
situation had radicalized the public discourse in Indonesia
and had momentarily given militant groups an upper hand.
Cotan appealed for a more balanced approach by the United
States to the Palestinian and Lebanese problems, rather than
what was perceived to be one-sided support for Israel, to
help Indonesia contain Islamic extremism.


18. (U) Cotan reiterated Indonesia,s publicly announced
plans to mobilize an Indonesian peacekeeping battalion that
could be dispatched to the Middle East as soon as needed.
Cotan stressed Indonesia could contribute such a force only
under Chapter Six of the UN Chapter.



19. (U) U.S. Participants:

S/P Director Dr. Stephen Krasner
Ambassador B. Lynn Pascoe
Acting Political Counselor Daniel Turnbull
Embassy Notetakers: Eric Kneedler and Michael Turner

Indonesian Participants:

MFA Secretary General Imron Cotan
MFA Deputy Director General of Policy Planning and
Development Suprapto Martosetomo
MFA Director of North American Affairs Harry Parwanto
MFA Director of International Security and Disarmament Hasan
Kleib
MFA Director of International Treaties Arif Hava Oegroseno
MFA Director of the Center for Policy and Planning
Development - American and European Region Sjahril Sabaruddin
Political Counselor to the Indonesian Embassy to the U.S.
Arko Hananto Budiadi
Notetakers

PASCOE