URBANCIC AND BASER DISCUSS EFFORTS TO COMBAT PKK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 002105

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/11/2016
TAGS: PTER EFIN PREL TU IZ
SUBJECT: URBANCIC AND BASER DISCUSS EFFORTS TO COMBAT PKK

REF: ANKARA 6496

Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and
(d)


1. (C) Summary. S/CT Deputy Coordinator Urbancic met Gen.
(ret) Baser, the GOT's counter-PKK envoy, in Istanbul on
November 11. After expressing appreciation for Urbancic's
efforts to curb PKK criminal support in Europe, which was the
subject of Urbancic's Ankara meetings, Baser took the
opportunity to describe the often hostile media environment
in which he and his U.S. counterpart, Gen. (ret) Ralston,
must operate. The group also discussed discrete areas -
extradition, smuggling - where more cooperation might be
useful. Baser agreed to meet with his Iraqi counterpart,
State Minister al-Waili, but categorically refused to meet
with anyone "chosen by Barzani." Baser also complained about
recent statements made in Washington by a senior U.S.
military official, which he claimed incorrectly characterized
the GOT position. End Summary.


2. (C) S/CT Deputy Coordinator Frank Urbancic and EUR/SE
Director Doug Silliman met General (ret) Edip Baser, the
Turkish counter-PKK Coordinator, on November 11 in Istanbul
to discuss ways in which the USG can work with the Government
of Turkey (GOT) to reduce and eliminate PKK fundraising and
other activities in Europe. Baser was accompanied by MFA
Chief of Section for Security Affairs Ceren Etiz. Zack
Rothschild, S/CT, Suzanne Hayden, Resident Legal Advisor
Ankara, and Sandra Oudkirk, notetaker, rounded out the group.


3. (C) The meeting began with a presentation by the U.S. side
of the same points covered in their Ankara meetings (septel.)
Baser stressed the importance of working against the PKK's
propaganda establishment and financing and told the group he
was glad the USG was thinking along the same lines. Fighting
terrorism is not just an issue for the security forces. The
problems are legal, political, and financial as well as
propaganda. Without cutting off those lines of support, we
can never finish terrorism, he argued.

Turkish Public Opinion
--------------


4. (C) Baser noted the extremely high level of sensitivity in
Turkish public opinion following the Iraq invasion and March
1 vote. He explained the general intellectual view, which he
shares, is that the decision to go into Iraq was wrong. He
believes that a majority of Turks are pessimistic and suspect
ulterior motives in any U.S. offers of assistance. He has
discussed this with Gen Ralston and believes that their role
is two-fold: first to do something about the PKK and in
doing so to improve US-Turkish relations. Public opinion
demands results, he argued. Some sort of concrete action
such as arrests or handover of leaders is necessary to answer
the question "Why can't the most powerful nation on earth do
something about the PKK leaders in Northern Iraq?" Media
interviews of senior PKK leaders in Iraq were particularly
aggravating to public opinion, he stressed. He explained
that he would feel more comfortable working this issue if
Turkish public opinion were more confident. He argued that
success in combating the PKK would give the world proof that
international cooperation on counter-terrorism really works.
Success would go far beyond the PKK.


5. (C) Baser complained that European countries do not treat
PKK terrorism with the same level of seriousness that the
U.S. does. He explained that the Turks expect the Europeans
to help Turkey fight the PKK in the same way Turkey helped
Europe by being a bulwark against the Soviets during the cold
war. When the Europeans fail to live up to these
expectations it creates problems. Silliman explained that
the USG hoped that the intent and willingness of some
European governments to act, as described in the U.S.
presentation, would result in action in the mid-term
including arrests and prosecutions. Silliman explained our
effort to link the PKK with criminality in Europe as well as
with terrorism in Turkey. This may help to change European

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public opinion.

Baser Complaints Regarding Washington Institute Comments
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Baser raised comments made by a senior U.S. military
officials at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Baser claimed the official made points that contradicted
Baser's agreement with Ralston, in particular the official
ascribed to the TGS the belief that the PKK "cannot be
totally eliminated." Baser argued that the GOT aims to
totally end terrorism and the PKK -- underscoring this "would
not mean we kill every PKK cadre." He noted that this does
not mean that the only solution will be military, but the GOT
will not take any steps forward until the PKK disarms and
hands itself over to Turkish security forces. From then on
the Turkish legal system will handle individuals on a case by
case basis, with most expected to be returned to their
villages. This already happens with some frequency, he
explained. PKK members surrender, their case files are
reviewed and the courts decide to release or convict. The
GOT even offers some support to PKK defectors. The GOT must
handle all terrorists in this way, we cannot go around our
legal system, he argued. Baser also criticized the official
for referring to "limits to a general amnesty" - an amnesty
is not on the table, it has never been mentioned on behalf of
the GOT. This is in fact Talabani's idea, argued MFA
representative Etiz.


7. (C) Baser also criticized the official for referring to
"incentives." EUR/SE Director Silliman jumped in at this
point to clarify a point on incentives. He explained the USG
has encouraged the GOT to provide incentives for Turkish
Kurds living in Northern Iraq (i.e. at Makhmour) to come back
to Turkey. The USG is not suggesting the GOT should provide
incentives to the PKK. However, in the long run, Silliman
suggested that in order to meet its goals the Turkish
government may not want to take the concept of incentives off
the table. Urbancic made it very clear that the US has very
good, direct relations with the GOT and we will not make
policy at the Washington Institute, this is simply not how we
work with the GOT. Urbancic reiterated our policy of no
compromise with terrorists and no negotiations. We believe
in eradicating terrorism. However, he noted that we have a
deficit in Turkish public opinion dating back to the invasion
of Iraq and cannot minimize this. Our efforts in Europe are
a supplement not a substitute
.

Military Service, Citizenship and the Failure to Extradite
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Urbancic asked whether the Turkish Kurds who have
evaded military service and lost their citizenship could be
given some sort of travel document so that they could be
brought to trial in Turkey. Turkish law deprives those who
reside abroad and evade their military service of their
citizenship. As a result, some PKK cadres of Turkish origin
cannot be extradited to Turkey because they are no longer
Turkish citizens and do not possess the requisite travel
documents. There is one such case in the U.S. and about 65
in Germany. Etiz clarified that citizenship was not stripped
on the basis of Kurdish ethnicity but because of a failure to
complete military service. Silliman pressed the point noting
that if what public opinion needs is an arrest or
extradition, Turkey could issue passports to these detainees
and prosecute them in Turkey. Etiz acknowledged the point,
and mentioned that MFA was in discussions with the Turkish
Chief of Staff on the matter, and that legislation is under
consideration to permit such extraditions.

Counterfeit Cigarettes
--------------


9. (C) Baser raised the issue of counterfeit cigarettes,
Marlboro as well as other brands, being produced in Northern
Iraq. He asserted the sales of these cigarettes helps fund
PKK activities. He also said that Gen Ralston had told him

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that Roj TV was pirating a couple of U.S. programs. Ankara
Resident Legal Advisor Hayden indicated that she would very
much like to work the smuggled cigarettes issue with the GOT
from a terrorism financing/money laundering aspect. She has
personal experience working with Philip Morris investigators
in very difficult circumstances (North Korea) and they are
very professional.

Al-Waili Meeting
--------------


10. (C) Silliman asked whether Baser would be willing to meet
Iraqi State Minister al-Waili when he is in Ankara during the
Al-Maliki visit. Baser indicated that he would be going to
Ankara for the 11/15-16 visit and was prepared to meet
al-Waili. Baser noted however, that the Iraqi central
government lacks authority in Northern Iraq. As a result
there is a need to manage expectations with regard to what
the Iraqis can and cannot do vis-a-vis the PKK. Silliman
noted that the Iraqi central government has authority but not
ability. Baser reiterated his willingness to meet al-Waili
but said he would not meet anyone chosen by Barzani. The PKK
is too deeply embedded in Northern Iraq --- a TV station
owned by Barzani recently broadcast an hour-long interview
with Karayilan, he noted. Silliman responded that the USG
has tried to convince Barzani and Talabani that the PKK is
also a problem for them.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) This meeting was significant in that it brought the
U.S. team's message directly to an influential member of the
secularist "old guard" who has a personal interest in working
with the Europeans as well as the USG in combating the PKK as
a result of his role as the GOT-designated counter-PKK
coordinator. He seemed mollified by Urbancic's general
response to his complaint regarding the Washington Institute
comments. We are working with Washington to respond to the
substance of his complaints. End Comment.

S/CT Urbancic and EUR/SE Silliman cleared this message.
JONES