Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISTANBUL2013
2006-11-02 13:59:00
SECRET
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

ISTANBUL'S KURDISH INTELLECTUALS: THE TIME IS NOW

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PTER TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7608
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHIT #2013/01 3061359
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021359Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6270
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002013 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL'S KURDISH INTELLECTUALS: THE TIME IS NOW

REF: A. A. ANKARA 1899


B. B. ANKARA 5735

C. C. ANKARA 5922

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL DEBORAH K. JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 002013

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER TU
SUBJECT: ISTANBUL'S KURDISH INTELLECTUALS: THE TIME IS NOW

REF: A. A. ANKARA 1899


B. B. ANKARA 5735

C. C. ANKARA 5922

Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL DEBORAH K. JONES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).


1. (S) Summary. Istanbul's Kurdish intellectuals opine the
evolving political situation in Turkey and the region sets a
favorable stage for agreement to end the Kurdish conflict in
Turkey. According to these intellectuals, Turkey's Kurds --
accepted as equals during Turkey's war of independence, but
thereafter relegated to second class status, with poor job
opportunities and impoverished living conditions especially
in Turkey's southeast -- are pressing the PKK for a
settlement of the long-running conflict with the Turkish
state. The "disorderly situation" in neighboring countries,
the high levels of international attention paid to the
broader Middle East and Kurdish longing for genuine progress
on dreams for recognition and equality will enable a
compromise settlement, they believe, although the absence of
direct commmunication with the PKK and mechanisms to remove
institutionalized bias against Kurds will remain critical
barriers. Dr. Mensur Akgun, TESEV Foreign Policy Director,
reflected much of this sentiment, saying Turkey knows
something must be done to solve the Kurdish problem,
particularly in light of the unsettled situation in Iraq and
the growing influence of Iran. End summary.

HOPE IN THE U.S., SOMEWHAT LESS IN THE EU
--------------


2. (S) We met recently with a handful of DEMOS members, an
Istanbul-based group of 40-50 Kurdish professionals from
medicine, law and the media who chartered themselves in 1996
as a forum for discussing Kurdish issues and conflict
resolution. DEMOS, which stands for the Democratic
Reconciliation and Solution to the Kurdish Question, wants a
political solution to the longstanding conflict. Though
their remarks often reflect commonly held beliefs, members
are well informed by their close ties to family and friends
in Turkey's southeast. They cling to hope in the U.S.'s
greater Middle East project to "wipe out dictators." They
see benefit from an EU process that blunts "radical" elements

in Turkey while promoting greater democracy and moderating
its military stance. These Kurds, steeped in the "deep
state" mindset, posit that though Chief of the General Staff
Buyukanit is outspoken compared to his predecessor on
perceived dangers to the Turkish state, the military is
effectively blocked from coup-making because top commanders
are all close to the United States, which according to this
outlook, has some controlling interest. Now, they believe,
more than at any time in the past 40 years, finding agreement
is critical to allow Kurds more freedom of expression and
opportunity. (According to Mustafa Ayzit, Istanbul attorney
and 2005 International Visitor grantee, the necessity of
winning Turkey's patriotic war for independence led
temporarily to greater rights and recognition for Kurds in
Turkey that were reversed in 1923, followed by Kurdish
revolts culminating in 1937 with heavy loss of life.) Now,
even though the military has decreed no direct Turkish
Government dialogue with the PKK, whether front or back
channel, DEMOS members believe some in the government realize
contact of some kind is necessary.

THEIR BEST CASE SCENARIO
--------------


3. (C) Noting that the Kurdish issue is now
internationalized with U.S., Iraqi, Iranian and EU
participation, these interlocutors read significance into
apparently superficial statements, such as those by former
Turkish Interior Minister Mehmet Agar turned Dogru Yol
Partesi (DYP) politician when he said -- to the military's
consternation -- that it was better to have Kurdish
politicians in the cities than Kurdish fighters in the
mountains, and when Iraqi President Talabani speaks of
amnesty. DEMOS members hope for agreement on a one-year
trial period during which the U.S. will insure Turkey does
not make an incursion into northern Iraq to fight the PKK
while Turkey sends numbers of PKK fighters abroad, leaving
their weapons behind. With this, they suggest, the Turkish
press could declare a "PKK surrender." While raising
Turkey's image in northern Iraq, the agreement would increase
support from the EU and United States for Turkey and lead to
an eventual permanent peace and better political, social, and
economic conditions for Kurds; everyone would win.


4. (C) While declaring lack of "sympathy" or ties to the PKK,
DEMOS members suggest they know the PKK is discussing this
scenario as a viable "surrender plan." If the U.S. were to

ISTANBUL 00002013 002 OF 002


come up with a similar plan, Turkish Kurds would love it,
along with quite a few Turks. The PKK currently does not
challenge Turkey's territorial integrity, DEMOS claims, but
they will require certain political advances for Kurds. They
suggest that though the Turkish government may be
undemocratic in some respects, such as in finding a solution
to the Kurdish problem, it nevertheless does a fine job
rallying support for any plan it devises, especially through
"control" of the media. According to their hopeful scenario,
Kurds are now a significant regional player and international
powers (read the U.S. and possibly EU) will make helpful
input along the way to see that Kurds receive some portion of
what they seek regarding improved social and economic
conditions within Turkey.

FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRESS
--------------


5. (C) Many pressure points will lead to progress, they
assert, among them the anticipated referendum on the future
of Kirkuk and the formation of a federal Kurdish state in
northern Iraq. Thoughtful Kurds tend to see a wider U.S.
plan in the naming of retired General Ralston to work for
elimination of the PKK. Citing the Semdinli incident (ref
A),Kurds doubt the Turkish military's genuine commitment to
a just solution to the Kurdish issue. Yet, DEMOS members
brook no doubt the Turkish General Staff is closely following
developments in northern Iraq and Iran. They believe neither
the military nor the PKK can afford to ignore developments
that pressure both sides to seek a long-term solution while
one is still attainable; in their view, Turkish government
benefits from grass roots opinion that pressures the PKK
through its hunger for peace.


6. (C) Supporting some key DEMOS assertions, Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation's (TESEV) Foreign
Policy Program Director Dr. Mensur Akgun, close to the
Turkish MFA according to TESEV founder Can Paker, made the
following points to the Ambassador on October 30. Akgun said
that Turkey is "haunted" by Northern Iraq and that the
government realizes it has to do something to solve the
Kurdish issue. The U.S., he said, is a very big actor and if
the U.S. could deliver on "some of your promises" regarding
the PKK, then Turkey could take bold actions. With respect
to the region, Akgun said Northern Iraq, with U.S. troop
concentration, could become a buffer zone of stability,
without which it would be impossible to solve the Kurdish
problem. But, Turkey also needed to take account of Iran in
its security calculations, depending on developments in
Northern Iraq. Not only Iran's nuclear ambitions, but its
growing influence could overwhelm security cooperation
agreements. All of this had links to the PKK, according to
Akgun.

AND IF THIS FAILS
--------------


7. (C) On the other hand, DEMOS members fear, should Turkey
choose (with or without the U.S.) to take a military
approach, it will lead to both political and violent chaos in
Turkey. They draw hope from Prime Minister Erdogan's
moderate approach to the military's recent tough speeches
(see reftels B, C),a response they say favors dialogue that
could result in moderation on both sides. While not certain
even the AKP-led government has genuine interest or the
political muscle necessary to fight for progress on the
Kurdish issue, DEMOS members wonder if this government may
have done all it can to advance progress for the Kurds,
especially since "Islamists are not very democratic."


8. (C) Comment. DEMOS members think the time is right for
a lasting solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey. They
believe Kurdish longing for peace and better living
conditions, combined with regional pressures on Turkey, might
result in real progress toward an agreement. Biases and
history precluding settlement to this point will not be
forgotten and the traditional state apparatus and military
would have to be convinced that a mutually beneficial
accommodation is in their best interest. The Kurds of DEMOS
may be overly optimistic, but forces are in play that may
contribute to progress toward a solution. End comment.
JONES