Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISTANBUL1358
2006-08-01 12:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

THE AKP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY'S FUTURE:

Tags:  PGOV TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 011215Z AUG 06
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5557
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5401
RUEHAL/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 2239
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001358 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: THE AKP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY'S FUTURE:
ISTANBUL VIEWPOINTS

REF: A. ANKARA 7215


B. ANKARA 6543

Classified by Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISTANBUL 001358

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: THE AKP AND THE STRUGGLE FOR TURKEY'S FUTURE:
ISTANBUL VIEWPOINTS

REF: A. ANKARA 7215


B. ANKARA 6543

Classified by Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Recent discussions with Istanbul
intellectuals interested in the political and social aspects
of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) reflect a
vigorous ongoing debate regarding the ideology of the AKP and
how it could shape Turkey in coming decades. These observers
were eager to share their views of the AKP's agenda, and the
potential implications for Turkish society. Predictions
ranged from the alarmist -- fears of an Iran-style religious
state or a domineering executive a la Russia's Putin -- to
the fulfillment of middle class desires for democracy, as
well as aspirations for an American-style state with freedom
for all kinds of expression. These diverse opinions suggest
that the Istanbul elite remain suspicious of a party with
central Anatolian and Islamist roots and what appears to them
to be an ambiguous agenda. This ambiguity can also be seen
as a result of the 'big-tent' politics the AKP espouses to
juggle competing internal factions. End Summary.

-------------- ---
The Context of the AKP Agenda: Big-Tent Politics
-------------- ---


2. (C) Unlike most Turkish political parties which tend to be
ideologically homogeneous, the AKP is an umbrella party that
encompasses different ideological views and personalities
(refs A and B). Within this coalition are a pious group, a
nationalist group, and a pragmatic group, all of whose
interests AKP leadership has to keep in balance. In
addition, its roots are Anatolian and generally more pious
than those parties with which the Istanbul elites
traditionally have been more comfortable. To a certain
extent, the AKP agenda is deliberately ambiguous to maintain
a balance among the AKP's internal factions and to prevent
ideological and personality fault-lines from creating a major
split in the party. In this context, the ambiguity of the AKP
agenda as described by the following discussions with
Istanbul-based outsiders may reflect both this balancing act
and a continuing level of discomfort with an AKP party
structure and ideology that remains largely foreign to them -
and which AKP has failed adequately to explain.

-------------- --------------
Islam Lite: Religious Modernization and the American System

-------------- --------------


4. (C) Mustafa Akyol, a journalist at the widely-read,
mainstream secularist Hurriyet newspaper, told us recently
that many within the newspaper would not agree with his
views, but that he felt there had been a change within the
Islamic camp which now viewed democratic governance as
compatible with Islam as long as it allowed the latter to be
practiced freely. The change had not occurred due to pressure
from the secular establishment, he noted.


5. (C) Akyol agreed with the characterization of this
phenomenon by a professor at Ankara University as "Islam
Lite." He noted that when he drives home next to a
fashionably-dressed headscarved girl talking on her Nokia
cellphone in her car, he sees that Turks do not want a
Sharia-based legal system. As he put it, he feels that people
want the government to "defend the headscarf as much as it
defends the mini-skirt" and to protect the right to freedom
of expression for all. "As long as it is not forced, how can
one deny the right to wear a headscarf?" Akyol rhetorically
asked. Akyol went on to criticize "secular fundamentalists"
who are pre-emptively intolerant of expressions of Islam and
who see the subject of Islam in Turkey as a zero-sum game.
"If there is an Islamic, pro-Sharia party, please bring in
the army," Akyol said, "but the army and secularists
intervene before Turkey even has a chance to explore these
issues." Akyol declared that the AKP is part of this Islamic
modernization process and that despite difficulties, it won't
move backwards to the Islam of "narrow-minded people."

--------------
It's All About The Middle Class and Democracy
--------------


6. (C) We accompanied a Washington-based analyst to a
wide-ranging discussion with Can Paker, chairman of the
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation think-tank
(TESEV) and chairman of the Open Society Institute-Turkey.
Presenting a different perspective, Paker explained that
Turkish politics were based on a civil/military bureaucracy
that instituted top-down change upon a homogeneous society.
However, with the rise of a middle class, demand for greater
democracy, individualism, and better conditions for private
enterprise emerged. This, coupled with EU and US demands for
greater political openness, meant that Turkey was on a fast
track to democratization, according to Paker. Paker argued
that democratization has not yet been fully realized in
Turkey and the current political struggle is an attempt to
diminish the power of the civil/military bureaucracy and its
ability to "dictate to" political parties. The rise of the
AKP in 2002, according to Paker, was fueled by a desire for
greater democracy and an end to civil/military domination of
the political scene.


7. (C) With this political framework in mind, Paker declared
that the AKP's political future rests on continued
democratization and that the party knows it must be
progressive. He claimed that only a minority of the party
desires traditional Islamic ways and that the party therefore
cannot be an Islamic party. The party "must be secular," he
declared. "There is no second agenda," religious or
otherwise. Paker believes that the AKP desires democracy and
is a reflection of the aspirations of the middle class, which
in Paker's analysis, doesn't vote for religion or
nationalism, but rather for the party that helps advance its
interests.


8. (C) Paker went on to assert a position he's made
previously to the Ambassador -- that the headscarf is not a
religious expression, but rather a middle-class expression of
the desire of women to enter the public sphere and carve out
an active role in society. For him, women being active is a
sociological sign of the middle-class in society (versus at
home). When asked how to explain comments by an AKP MP who
told us that the AKP,s self-identification as a
"conservative democratic party" was merely code for "Islamist
party," Paker's response was that the AKP member was
"mistaken" and that "he will never be able to have an Islamic
government because of the civil/military bureaucracy." Paker
did say that Erdogan "probably started out as an Islamist,
but saw the realities and changed."

--------------
Iran in Turkey or the Russian Model?
--------------


9. (C) Of all our interlocutors, Kemal Koprulu and his
colleagues at the Ari Movement (a center-right NGOQocusing
on developing civil society with its roots in the
center-right Motherland party - ANAP) were most critical of
the AKP and the most suspicious of its agenda. Aside from
criticizing Prime Minister Erdogan for being "self-centered,
angry, and lacking accountability," the Ari Movement clearly
views the AKP as having a threatening ideological agenda.
Koprulu asserted that Erdogan's plan to establish 15 new
universities with rectors selected by the ruling party,
rather than the (arch-secularist, military controlled) Higher
Education Board (known by its Turkish acronym "YOK"),would
have led to ideological fights between pro-AKP rectors and
the rest of the university system. The plan ultimately
failed. (Note: It was vetoed and then declared
unconstitutional. End Note.) In Koprulu's view, this was part
of a broader AKP initiative to erode specific "subsystems"
and rebuild them with their "own people," ultimately leading
toward radical change overall. Another Ari Movement member
suggested that a successful AKP agenda could mean the
creation of an Iran-style Islamic government in Turkey.
Koprulu told us that he did not necessarily share that
opinion, but believes the AKP may indeed have a religious
agenda.


10. (C) Koprulu's greatest concern was that the AKP may be
seeking to mimic "the Russian Model" with a strong,
dominating executive leader along the lines of Vladimir
Putin. Noting that Erdogan "admires Putin", Koprulu said that
perhaps the AKP wants to change Turkey into a presidential
system so that it can hold power "from 2002 to 2032." Koprulu
concluded his comments by proclaiming that no matter the
AKP's true agenda, in 20-30 years "a secular republic like
the one established by Ataturk will not exist." (Comment: We
have heard similar arguments from other elites, who cite
instead the French presidential model while ascribing similar
motives. End Comment.)

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Ari Movement concerns notwithstanding, a recent
survey suggests that fewer than 10% of Turks want a
Sharia-based government, making the likelihood of a
successful imposition of a religious state highly unlikely.
Kemal Koprulu's "Russian Model," in which the AKP and PM
Erdogan seek to create a dominating executive power a la
Putin or as in France, remains widely discussed but clearly
speculative. Moreover, Koprulu's views and the opinions of
other members of the wealthy, secular elites must be tempered
with the understanding that AKP politicians and voters are
quite different from the Istanbul elite. The Anatolian and
pro-Islam nature of the AKP must be unsettling for thesQ
elites, and coupled with a deliberately ambiguous agenda, can
easily be seen as threatening. Ambiguity in the AKP's agenda
may very well not point to a sinister hidden ideology, but
rather the difficulties inherent in holding together a
big-tent political party with competing internal
constituencies.


12. (C) The AKP's balancing act may take a turn for the
worse, as Koprulu expects, or may succeed in the way Paker
and Akyol view the party. In order to hold together and
retain power, it must continue to perform its tricky juggling
act to keep its internal factions from splitting the party up.
SSOUDKIRK