PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 009964

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM PK
SUBJECT: PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

REF: 05 ISLAMABAD 1067

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Classified By: DSCG 05-01, b and d


1. (C/NF) Summary: The upcoming national and provincial
elections will be an important bellwether on progress towards
democratization in Pakistan. However, free and fair
elections must be supported by long-term systemic changes
that are necessary to institute good governance and firm
civilian control over the military. As we continue to track
progress towards elections, it will be important to assess
progress on institution building and transitional
arrangements -- both of which remain at relatively early
levels of development. This cable establishes a baseline
assessment of progress on transitional arrangements and
institutional development in four key sectors --
legislatures, local governments, political parties, courts,
and the bureaucracy. USG programs operating in these areas
provide opportunities to support the long-term institutional
change needed to allow a free and fair election in 2007 to
contribute substantively to long-term democratization. End
Summary

Ensuring a Smooth Transition


2. (C/NF) Given Pakistan's poor record on successful
transitions from military rule to sustainable civilian
democracy, successful management of transitional arrangements
will be a critical component of ensuring success in the
current cycle. A return to the corrupt, inept, and
anti-democratic civilian regimes of the 1990s will do little
to advance the cause of democracy in Pakistan. Similarly,
strained relations between the military and the political
classes -- the friction behind many of the country's military
takeovers -- must be systematically addressed and managed.
Post continues to believe that President Musharraf has the
vision, leadership skills, and establishment support to
address both issues in a meaningful fashion. As no party is
likely to obtain an outright majority in the upcoming
national elections, a coalition will be necessary to govern.
In a best-case scenario, Musharraf would be able to expand
his political support base to include mainstream political
forces, mainly the PPP, in the aftermath of genuinely free
and fair elections in 2007. Such a scenario would provide
Musharraf a popular mandate to enable a phased transition of
power over the ensuing five years from what will be viewed as
a military presidency (even if Musharraf removes his uniform)
to a civilian prime ministership. Such a phased transition
should allow for the development of civilian democratic
institutions and creation of an institutionalized
civil-military dispute resolution mechanism through either
the existing National Security Council or the opposition's
proposed Defense Consultative Committee.


3. (S/NF) This managed transitional approach, however, will
require pre-election understandings between the GOP and the
PPP. A dialogue has been ongoing between leaders on both
sides since at least 2004, but with little in the way of
concrete progress. Government overtures to PPP
leader-in-exile Benazir Bhutto in early 2006 have foundered
over intractable demands on both sides. Post is concerned
that positions have hardened in the last few weeks, due to an
erroneous perception that the USG (and possibly the British)
has decided to back Benazir Bhutto over President Musharraf
as head of a post-election government. While we have
repeatedly denied any truth to such rumors, the PPP seems
prepared to gamble on this possibility rather than negotiate
further. Absent PPP backing, Musharraf will face an
increasingly complex, and perhaps impossible task, in trying
to manage the transition.

Legislative Strengthening


4. (C/NF) Recent international literature has highlighted the

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linkage between strong parliaments and successful emergence
of democratic rule. By this measure, Pakistan falls far
behind the democratic curve. The national and the four
provincial assemblies do not yet play a meaningful role in
scrutiny of executive action, independent legislation, or
national conflict resolution. While there have been notable
improvements in the functioning of a handful of committees
and of independent oversight work by some legislators, these
have been almost exclusively concentrated at the national
level and appear to be the result of increased confidence on
the part of a limited number of legislators as opposed to
systemic changes. Post is concerned that as these gains lack
institutional support, they will quickly evaporate following
the next election. Institutionalizing changes through
building effective committee processes, establishing an
ongoing training center for parliamentarians, and
establishing a viable research center to assist both
committees and individual members with their oversight
responsibilities remain the focus of our assistance in this
area. Reforms allowing members to deliver constituent
services in a transparent, corruption-free method that does
not impede national development planning will also be
required.

Local Governance


5. (C/NF) For most Pakistanis, national and provincial
governments remain largely irrelevant. This is in sharp
contrast to local governments, which have responsibility for
most governmental services ranging from infrastructure to
social services. Musharraf's decision in 2000 to replace
bureaucratic administrators with elected local governments
represented a critical break with undemocratic local
government traditions. It also, however, meant a steep
learning curve for newly elected members of the highly
complex three-tier system that was implemented. Performance
during the first term that ended in 2005 varied radically. A
handful of elected governments were able to improve on the
performance of their bureaucratic predecessors, due to the
personal initiative and leadership of senior officials. The
remainder struggled, unable to navigate a complex governance
system, hostile provincial governments and local elites, and
parallel institutions that inserted the federal government in
local matters. As a result over half of incumbents were not
reelected in 2005. The National Reconstruction Bureau has
belatedly realized that its training and assistance
methodologies were badly outdated. It has, therefore,
approved USAID's "Districts that Work" program that will
assist a select number of districts to better manage existing
resources and deliver services to constituents. Lessons
learned and methods developed under this program can be
replicated in other districts across Pakistan.

Political Parties


6. (C/NF) The mainstream political parties focus almost
exclusively on personalities rather than programs or
ideology. None have strong internal democratic traditions
nor regular, competitive elections for leadership at any
level. Training of new leaders is practically non-existent,
and decision-making is generally highly centralized. Most
parties have not developed strong grass-roots support bases,
focusing instead on concluding agreements with feudal
landlords and tribal chiefs, who are then supposed to deliver
their supporters on election day. While certain of these
trends, particularly the centralization of decision-making
authority, have been exacerbated in recent years, there are
some positive indicators. NDI programs have increased the
parties' emphasis on leadership training and opened the
debate on democratic structures. The three largest parties
(PPP, PML, and PML-N) have all begun competitive elections
for local offices within the party. Indeed, the PML claims
that its senior office-bearers will face similar scrutiny --
although with President Musharraf having already endorsed the

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reelection of the current slate of senior leaders, these
contests will likely be meaningless. In the run-up to the
2007 elections, post will continue to work through NDI to
provide parties with support necessary to improve
candidate-selection methodology, develop issue-based
platforms, and improve connectivity with grass-roots voters.

Courts


7. (S/NF) The Pakistani court system is broken. Its ability
to deliver justice to the average citizen is badly impeded.
Corruption and elite influence on the lower courts are
rampant. Appellate tribunals are more independent from
financial pressure, but their decisions in high-profile
political cases are frequently influenced by the executive.
While President Musharraf and Prime Minister Aziz have both
expressed a desire to improve the court system, there seems
to be no systematic plan for doing so. Indeed, the Asian
Development Bank project has been unable to obtain
implementation of many of the recommended policy changes from
its "Access to Justice" program. In its most recent periodic
briefing to program stakeholders, the Bank was able to show
marked improvement in only one of its numerous progress
indicators -- the speed with which a case is decided by the
court system. Absent a significant improvement in the
quality and independence of judicial decisionmaking, post
does not consider rapidity an indicator of progress. Reform
of the judiciary will require a serious high-level commitment
by the GOP. Post recommends continued engagement with the
GOP on this issue but minimal funding until such time as a
genuine commitment is demonstrated. Meaningful reforms to be
enacted by a future coalition government should include
parliamentary confirmation of judicial nominees for appellate
courts and establishment of an independent entity to police
corruption within the judiciary.

Bureaucracy


8. (C/NF) The senior-levels of the Pakistani bureaucracy are
an extension of the feudal and tribal elites that dominate
the political classes, often coming from the same families.
These senior-level elites see themselves as an independent
center of power in the Pakistani political structure,
refusing to subordinate themselves to the government of the
day, be it civilian or military, and leading to continuous
behind-the-scenes battles for control. There are numerous
instances of Federal Secretaries blocking initiatives
approved at the political level through bureaucratic means.
While most of the senior levels of the bureaucracy hold the
minimum qualifications for their appointments, the same
cannot be said for their lower level counterparts, many of
whom obtained their job through political patronage.
Corruption at this level of the bureaucracy is rampant, and
work performance is poor. Even the most committed
senior-level bureaucrats often find that they lack the
support structures necessary to carry out their jobs
effectively. Radical reform of the bureaucracy based on a
merit system is essential.

Comment


9. (C/NF) Despite the serious impediments that still remain
in the path of democratization, post is optimistic.
President Musharraf has demonstrated a willingness to move
forward with reforms in many of the sectors that we have
identified, and there is a broadbased and growing coalition
of support for change in the legislatures and within
political parties among mid-level politicians. With
continued engagement and support, these groups can be aided
in bringing about meaningful and long-term change. End
Comment.
CROCKER