Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ISLAMABAD8829
2006-05-16 02:07:00
SECRET
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

S/CT AMB CRUMPTON ENCOURAGES ROBUST GOP

Tags:  MASS MCAP MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER 
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RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008829 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: MASS MCAP MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: S/CT AMB CRUMPTON ENCOURAGES ROBUST GOP
COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 008829

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KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016
TAGS: MASS MCAP MOPS PGOV PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: S/CT AMB CRUMPTON ENCOURAGES ROBUST GOP
COUNTERTERRORISM ACTION


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker,
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Introduction and summary: Visiting Islamabad on May
3-4, S/CT Ambassador Henry Crumpton and S/CT Senior Advisor
Michael Hurley engaged political, diplomatic and military
interlocutors on Pakistan's counterterrorim (CT) strategies
and policies. Calling on National Security Advisor Tariq
Aziz, Foreign Secretary Mohammad Riaz Khan and Director -
Military Operations BG Nasser Janjua, Crumpton commended his
interlocutors on Pakistan's political commitment to the
Global War on Terror (GWOT) and queried them on the
government's CT priorities. Tariq Aziz and BG Nasser
described in detail the GOP's three-tiered strategy for
denying Islamic extremists safe haven in the tribal areas
along the Pak-Afghan border. Tariq Aziz indicated his
willingness to work with he Afghan counterpart to identify
tribal leaders that could restore stability to the region,
and reaffirmed the GOP's support for Afghanistan's political
development. He shared his assessment that a military
confrontation between the U.S. and Iran would seriously
destabilize Pakistan and the region, and said that President
Musharraf was grateful for President Bush's comments on
Kashmir during his March 2005 visit to Islamabad. ForSec
Riaz Khan also discussed GOP policies toward the FATA, but
was stumped when AMB Crumpton asked about the Foreign
Office's top priorities for advancing CT policy. BG Nasser
presented a detailed briefing on the army's military
operations in the tribal areas, agreeing with AMB Crumpton
that the success of the GOP's counter-insurgency strategy
rests as much on progress on political integration and
economic and social development as on military victory. End
summary and introduction. (Note: AMB Crumpton's meeting
with Pakistan Interior Minister Sherpao will be reported

septel. End note.)

NSA Tariq Aziz
--------------


2. (C) AMB Crumpton underscored for Tariq Aziz the
importance the U.S. attaches to the bilateral relationship,
including cooperation on CT. Aziz stressed the importance of
understanding the root causes of terrorism throughout the
Moslem world and the need to combat it with both political
and military actions. Aziz has advised the British, as they
prepare to move into Afghanistan,s Helmand province, to
revive tactics from their imperial past and work as much as
possible through locally dominant proxies. The important
thing, he explained, is to avoid taking unnecessary British
casualties, which might create domestic pressure in the UK to
pull troops out. Pakistan opposed to a premature withdrawal
of UK or U.S. forces from Afghanistan; it is essential that
the coalition succeed, but succeed sooner rather than later.


3. (C) Turning to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA),Aziz said a multifaceted FATA Development Plan was
under development, but the government had not yet made a
final determination on who should lead the effort. The
leader should be a Pashtun familiar with the local
environment, he added. Former Chief Secretary of the NWFP
Sahibzada Imtiaz was a good bureaucrat, with a lot of
experience and a reputation for honesty, but had not been
definitively selected for the position


4. (C) When Aziz asked whether the U.S. was satisfied with
Pakistan,s performance in the war on terror, Ambassador
Crumpton assured him that there was no question as to
Pakistan,s political commitment, adding that no country had
captured or killed more Al Qaida operatives. Aziz noted that
Pakistan is under tremendous pressure from terrorists, but
that President Musharraf was convinced that fighting
terrorists vigorously was in Pakistan,s own interest.

ISLAMABAD 00008829 002 OF 003


Responding to AMB Crumpton, Aziz confirmed that Pakistan was
getting necessary support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
others, as the Gulf countries shared Pakistan,s concerns
regarding the spread of Al Qaida.


5. (C) The challenge in Waziristan was exacerbated, Aziz
said, by the assimilation of foreign elements into local
tribal societies: it is not uncommon now for Waziri tribal
elders to have grandchildren born to foreign militants, who
remained in the area after the anti-Soviet jihad and married
local women. These family ties created deep loyalties. Aziz
hoped that Asfandyar Wali Khan, leader of the Awami National
Party (ANP) and scion of a renowned Pushtoon nationalist
family, could play a helpful role, explaining that the ANP
had ties on both sides of the border. The ANP was "totally
moderate" and "anti-Mullah"; because of its deeper ties in
the region, it was better equipped than the ruling Pakistan
Muslim League (PML) to serve as a moderating influence.


6. (S) Aziz reported that Afghan National Security Advisor
Zalmay Rassoul had called recently to say the two should "be
in touch with each other." It was in Pakistan,s national
interest that Afghanistan succeed, Aziz added. Pakistan
could not accept the reinvigoration of the Taliban. Although
the message "may not have filtered down," Aziz said that
President Musharraf had opposed the Taliban even before 9/11.
Unfortunately Northern Alliance elements in Afghanistan
doubted Pakistan,s anti-Taliban credentials. Aziz agreed
that he and Rassoul should meet to discuss these issues; he
endorsed AMB Crumpton,s suggestion that the two could
"compare notes" on tribal leaders on both sides of the border
that could serve as common allies. Aziz said that he and
Rassoul could perhaps identify influential leaders, give them
responsibility to police their areas, supply them with
weapons and hold them accountable. Cash was often a very
effective inducement to cooperation, he observed, and if
30-40 percent of it was "pocketed" by these influential
leaders, then it was a small price to pay and should be
overlooked. Currently, neither the Afghans nor the
Pakistanis had the full support of the local populations, and
those that did support them were not properly armed and
trained.


7. (C) Aziz expressed concern about the fallout in Pakistan
from the "Iran situation," especially in view of Pakistani
elections scheduled for 2007. Military action against Iran
would pose and enormous political challenge for Musharraf, he
said. It would be exploited by Mullahs, who would argue that
Pakistan was next in line after Iran. However, sanctions
against Iran would be "livable" he judged. Aziz promised to
think about what role Pakistan could play in Iran, but he
explained that the current leader of Iran had "gone mad" and
it was unclear that he would listen to Musharraf, who was
perceived as pro-western.


8. (C) Aziz said that President Bush,s visit had gone well
-- contrary to popular perceptions -- and that Pakistan
welcomed the President,s comments on Kashmir. He asserted
that Pakistan wanted an "honorable exit" from Kashmir. "We
don,t want territory; we want a resolution of the conflict."
Aziz concluded by stressing, the importance of continuity
and stability in the U.S. Pakistan relationship going beyond
the war on terror. "We have a perception that when you are
done, you,ll leave us high and dry," he said. It was in the
U.S. interest to counter this perception because for decades
to come Pakistan would remain strategically significant --
"either as a problem or as an asset."

Foreign Secretary Muhammad Riaz Khan
--------------


9. (C) Introducing himself to ForSec Riaz Khan, AMB

ISLAMABAD 00008829 003 OF 003


Crumpton expressed appreciation for excellent bilateral CT
cooperation, which the USG would like to expand. Responding
to AMB Crumpton's comment that his key concern is eliminating
the safe haven along the Pak-Afghan border that is exploited
by al Qaidaa and Taliban forces, the ForSec noted that this
is also a key GOP concern. Reviewing the legacy of the
anti-Soviet jihad and subsequent years of turmoil in
Afghanistan, Riaz Khan called for greater cooperation between
Islamabad and Kabul to stabilize the border area. Noting the
three-tier strategy for the FATA advanced by President
Musharraf, the ForSec urged the U.S, to move quickly on
Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) to accelerate
economic development along the border. Riaz Khan was at a
loss for a quick response, however, when AMB Crumpton asked
him to describe the MFA's priorities for advancing Pakistan's
CT objectives; he said only that the Foreign Office plays a
traditional role in facilitating bilateral dialogue and
arrangements (e.g., extradition treaties) in support of
broader GOP CT goals.

Director - Military Operations BG Nasser Janjua
-------------- --


10. (C) BG Nasser Janjua presented a detailed briefing on
the Pakistan Army's strategy and tactics for combating al
Qaida, Taliban and other violent extremists in the FATA.
(Note: Embassy will forward an electronic copy of BG
Nasser's full presentation to S/CT. End note.) AMB
Crumpton was particularly interested in Pak mil tactics for
managing the broader counter-insurgency campaign; BG Nasser
responded by describing the deep tribal loyalties and
traditions that present a serious challenge to stabilizing
the region, as the mere presence of 80,000 Pakostani troops
on tribal lands is considered an affront to tribal
sovereignty. This prolonged military presence, along with
collateral civilian casualties search-and-destroy operations,
are being exploited by al Qaida and Taliban forces, who
engage in assassination campaigns against tribal leaders who
cooperate with GOP authorities. Human intelligence
collection is particularly difficult, BG Nasser noted, as
potential sources are well aware of the potential for quick,
lethal reprisal. BG Nasser said CENTCOM, with whom Pak mil
works hand-in-glove, knows that the GOP has made a serious
commitment to dislodge Islamic militants from the FATA. He
was concerned that, during a recent visit to Washington, he
sensed that this commitment was not recognized by civilian
USG officials. AMB Crumpton noted that the State
Department's 2005 Country Report on Terrorism highlights
Pakistan's strong performance in the GWOT, and pledged that
he would always be clear when speaking of the U.S.-Pakistani
CT partnership. The meeting concluded with AMB Crumpton and
BG Nasser agreeing that the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan
should work to identify tribal leaders who could advance
common counter-insurgency objectives.
CROCKER