A STRATEGY FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ISLAMABAD 008148

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM EAID OIIP KPAO PK
SUBJECT: A STRATEGY FOR FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN

REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 5364


B. (B) ISLAMABAD 4595

C. ISLAMABAD 4347

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Classified By: Derived from DSCG 05-01, b and d.


1. (C) Summary: With the appointment of a credible,
permanent Chief Election Commissioner (CEC),Pakistan is
moving in the necessary direction for free and fair elections
in 2007. Post believes that the credibility of the 2007
contest has significant implications for long-term stability
and democratization. A free and fair contest will set the
stage to begin significant long-term investment in the
strengthening of democratic institutions and the exit of the
military from elected politics. Rigged elections will only
serve to increase public ire at the current government,
weaken its ability to pursue necessary policies, and
undermine the credibility of the USG commitment to democracy
in the region. For these reasons, post has elaborated a
comprehensive assistance strategy matching technical
assistance, diplomatic engagement, and public diplomacy
programming directly to what we view as key election
obstacles. Post appreciates Washington agencies' careful
review of this strategy, provision of the identified
programmatic resources, and engagement with key
non-governmental agencies and other international donors.
End Summary.


2. (C) The upcoming national elections are a critical
benchmark in Pakistan's democratic development. They will
mark the final transition back to full civilian rule
following the 1999 coup and will lay the groundwork for the
country's future political evolution. Opposition parties,
civil society, and the central government are all placing
significant emphasis on the need for these elections to be
free and fair -- a marked departure from Pakistan's history
of controlled democracy. Achieving elections that major
parties accept as a genuine representation of the will of the
Pakistani people will provide the new, likely progressive,
government with a heretofore absent public mandate. This
will enable it to tackle forthrightly the domestic and
international challenges facing Pakistan, consolidate
democratic institutions, and make progress towards civilian
control over the military. Rigged elections will increase
opposition to the Musharraf government, fuel public unrest
and provincial insurgencies, and weaken the GOP's ability to
undertake controversial policies. In a worst case scenario,
united opposition protests over elections could topple the
GOP, leading to a coalition arrangement in which Islamist
parties would have greatly increased influence. While post
believes that the GOP is committed to organizing a reasonably
free and fair contest, international technical assistance,
election monitoring, and continuous diplomatic engagement
will be essential to overcome long-standing obstacles and
ensure public confidence in the process.

Electoral Set-Up


3. (C) The Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP)
credibility may be at an all-time low. Its last three

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attempts to organize national elections (2002 referendum,
2002 national elections, 2005 local elections) were failures.
The recent appointment of a permanent CEC is a necessary but
not a sufficient step to restore credibility. Pakistani law
does not provide sufficient independence or authority to the
ECP to carry out its mandate, and there is no tradition of
regular consultation between the ECP and political parties.
A number of outstanding issues need to be addressed relating
to the overall electoral set-up such as whether or not a
caretaker government will be appointed, the return of
opposition party leaders, and delimitation of electoral
districts. Regularized engagement between the CEC and the
heads of all major political parties would create the
necessary framework. To that end, post is proposing
assistance for the formation of a consultative forum to which
we would provide international expertise. The initial focus
would be on revision of electoral laws and regulations to
empower the ECP and address outstanding structural issues.
The forum would then focus on development of a universally
acceptable Electoral Code of Conduct and resolution of
disputes during the nomination, campaign, and election
process.


4. (C) Technical considerations also hamper the ECP's
effectiveness. The ECP requires fully-staffed provincial and
district offices that are empowered to pursue aggressively
suspected election violations and adjudicate such violations
in a timely and impartial manner. The previous reliance on
judicial personnel is insufficient and creates a conflict of
interest as the judiciary is expected to rule on its own
personnel's decisions during election appeals. Adequate
training of polling staff has also been a critical problem.
Early identification and in-depth training on simplified
electoral procedures needs to occur. Coupled with this,
enhanced voter training, appropriate for a largely illiterate
population, is required. Donor support will be necessary to
address these concerns and leverage GOP resources.

Public Confidence


5. (C) Rebuilding shattered public credibility will be key to
ensuring significant voter participation. Consistent
allegations of rigging have led to a perception that
government personnel occasionally stuff ballot boxes or
otherwise change electoral results. This is in addition to
the more frequent allegations of pre-poll rigging, voter
intimidation, and other forms of coercive support.
Monitoring by local NGOs coupled with selective observation
by international donors and NGOs has not ended these
practices. Transparent ballot boxes and appropriate voting
screens, as used in Afghanistan, would increase the
difficulty in carrying out fraud and would help increase
voter confidence. We also believe that a significant
investment in nationwide international observation from
nomination through appeal of results coupled with a parallel
vote count in each district is essential to address these
questions. To avoid competing programs and assessments, post
strongly recommends a single joint observation mission in
coordination with other donors.


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Voter Lists


6. (C) Pakistan's voter lists are in a state of complete
disarray. Initial lists prepared in 2000 for the local
bodies elections remain highly controversial with opposition
parties charging that their supporters were deliberately
omitted. The 2002 amendments to those lists are even more
controversial such that they were not even utilized in the
2005 local bodies contests. The CEC in his initial meeting
with the Ambassador made clear that entirely new lists were
required. For this to be an effective exercise, the ECP will
require extensive assistance in how to carry out a credible
non-partisan process. Considerable training of registration
personnel coupled with assistance in computerization of the
new lists so that they can easily be updated is needed.

Intelligence/Security Agencies


7. (S) The involvement of security agencies in elections has
been pervasive. Intelligence agencies have supported
candidates and parties for elections and have engaged in
candidate and voter intimidation. Organized voting fraud
supported by these agencies has changed results in certain
districts. Significant donor pressure during the 2005 local
elections was generally effective in keeping intelligence
agencies out of the electoral process. A similar, unified
intervention will be necessary for 2007. With the withdrawal
of intelligence agencies in 2005, provincial governments
utilized police to carry out many of the same fraudulent
activities. Coordinated engagement with the national and
provincial government on the police role in the electoral
process will be important. We also believe that direct
training in election security for police at the district
level can help to avert future misbehavior and, at the same
time, decrease violence at the polls.

Political Parties


8. (C) Pakistan's political parties have no concept of
issues-based campaigning. Their electoral campaigns tend to
revolve around personalities and mud-slinging. Grass-roots
involvement in the development of party platforms is
non-existent and the selection of candidates is a
highly-controversial, non-democratic exercise. Post believes
that continued work is crucial if we are to build a better
electoral system. The National Democratic Institute is
currently working with the parties to develop younger
leadership talent and to build democratic mechanisms. Its
program will conclude in early 2007, and we do not/not
believe that an extension is warranted given that parties
will be exclusively focused on electioneering by that time.
The International Republican Institute (IRI) is currently
concluding a small pilot program on electoral polling and
issues development funded by the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED). We believe that additional programming
through 2007 is warranted.

FATA


9. (C) Conduct of national elections in the Federally

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Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will continue to mark a
significant challenge for the GOP. Aside from obvious
security issues, the FATA has a very brief history of
electoral politics, low voter turn-out rates particularly
among women, and a bar on political party work (a bar
routinely flouted by the Islamist parties that use the
mullahs as their agents). Engagement at the senior levels of
the GOP will be critical to lift the bar on political party
activity to allow elections to be contested in a manner equal
to other areas of the country. This will allow secular
parties to compete, for the first time, on an equal footing
with their Islamist rivals. In addition, voter education
work, particularly among women, will be vital to ensure a
higher turn-out and a better informed electorate.

Existing Resources


10. (SBU) USAID has identified $16 million in FY 06 DG funds
for election-related activities. A request for proposals has
already gone out to IQC holders to utilize this existing
funding for the following activities:

-- Revision of voter roles
-- Creation of a forum between political parties and the
ECP to review election laws, regulations, and procedures,
draft a joint Electoral Code of Conduct; and serve as
a dispute resolution forum during the election process.
-- Purchase transparent ballot boxes and voting screens
for the ECP

On the political party front, USAID's $1.7 million program on
strengthening political parties through the National
Democratic Institute will continue through February 2007. A
portion of this program focuses on election-related issues.
NED's $500,000 program through the International Republican
Institute on polling and issues-based platform development
will conclude in September 2006. IIP has agreed to finance
two additional Speaker's programs in FY 2006. The first of
these would organize public discussion on reforms to
electoral laws and procedures. The second would work with
political parties on organization of campaigns and selection
of candidates. At this stage, no other donors have made
definitive commitments on elections. Local British,
Canadian, and EU missions have indicated a willingness to
fund some training of ECP staff, while Nordic countries,
Switzerland, and Canada are interested in funding voter
education.

Needed Funding


11. (SBU) Post believes that additional funding needs to be
rapidly identified and made available for full implementation
of our election support strategy. Post requires an
additional $13 million in FY 07 funding to support training
of ECP staff, establishment of district offices, and
post-election analysis and follow-up. Only $3 million of
that has been firmly identified by USAID. In addition, as
indicated reftels, post requires approximately $20 million
for nationwide international monitoring and a parallel vote
tabulation; $1 million for voter education in the FATA; and

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$250,000 for training of district police officers in election
security. We had originally requested that such funds be
made available through DRL. We understand, however, that
HRDF funds may not/not be sufficient. For this reason, post
requests that new resources from a combination of sources
(USAID, HRDF, and ESF) be identified for these activities.
Additional IIP support for election-related speakers will
also be required in FY 2007 on such topics as media coverage
of election campaigns. We understand that IRI will be
submitting an unsolicited proposal to USAID to continue work
on polling and issues-based platform development with
political parties. Post strongly supports this initiative
and recommends funding. In addition to USG support,
immediate engagement with like-minded donors to support voter
education (Nordics, Benelux, Germany, and EU),a single,
comprehensive international election monitoring mission
(Canada, Britain, EU, Switzerland, Nordics, Australia, Japan,
Germany, France, Benelux),training of ECP and polling staff
(Britain, EU, Canada),and FATA voter education (Japan).

Comment


12. (C) While there are significant obstacles, post remains
convinced that a generally free and fair election can be
achieved in Pakistan in 2007. To do so, however, we and
other international donors must be prepared to commit
significant resources early-on in the process in order to
shift a non-permissive electoral environment. To date, every
other major donor in Pakistan is well behind us on electoral
planning, a state of affairs that should not be allowed to
continue if we are to achieve the progress that we desire.
Post will continue to press like-minded donors through the
existing working group on elections, but we believe that
absent engagement with capitals and Washington progress will
be slow. Post welcomes Washington assistance in overcoming
this obstacle and building the needed international coalition
to support elections in Pakistan.
BODDE